Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

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Donald Norman, Patrick Strateman, and Amir Taaki established Intersango, a cryptocurrency exchange. After Intersango ceased operations, Norman filed a derivative complaint on behalf of Intersango against Patrick and Jamie Strateman and Taaki, alleging various claims including breach of fiduciary duty and conversion. The parties later entered into a settlement agreement, but over a year later, Norman sought to set aside the settlement, while the Stratemans moved to enforce it. The trial court granted the motion to enforce the settlement and denied Norman's motion to set it aside, leading to the dismissal of the claims.The trial court, presided over by Judge Rochelle East, found that the settlement agreement was enforceable and dismissed the claims and cross-claims with prejudice. Norman appealed, arguing that the settlement required judicial approval because it involved derivative claims, and that the trial court erred in enforcing the settlement without such approval.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Norman, holding that the settlement of derivative claims requires judicial approval to ensure it is fair and reasonable and not the product of fraud or collusion. The court found that neither Judge Kahn, who mediated the settlement, nor Judge East, who ruled on the motions, conducted the necessary judicial review and approval of the settlement. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the trial court's order enforcing the settlement and remanded the case for the trial court to conduct the required judicial review of the settlement. View "Norman v. Strateman" on Justia Law

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Junius Joyner, III, an African-American male, was hired by a legal staffing agency, Mestel & Company (Hire Counsel), and assigned to work at Morrison & Foerster LLP in Washington, D.C. He worked on the merger of Sprint Corporation with T-Mobile U.S., Inc. from July to December 2019. Joyner alleged several incidents of racial discrimination and a hostile work environment, including delayed work assignments, derogatory comments, and harassment by coworkers. He also claimed wrongful discharge under D.C. law, asserting he was terminated after reporting potential antitrust violations.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Joyner’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that Joyner did not provide sufficient facts to support his claims of racial discrimination and a hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII. The court also dismissed his wrongful discharge claim under D.C. law, concluding that it lacked supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Joyner’s federal claims, agreeing that Joyner failed to plausibly allege that his treatment was racially motivated or that the work environment was sufficiently hostile. The court found that Joyner’s allegations did not meet the necessary standard to infer racial discrimination or a hostile work environment. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment on the wrongful discharge claim, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over this claim and remanded it with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Joyner v. Morrison and Foerster LLP" on Justia Law

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The case involves The Boeing Company and the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association (SWAPA). Boeing introduced the 737 MAX in 2011, which was marketed as more fuel-efficient and similar to previous models, requiring no additional pilot training. However, two crashes in 2018 and 2019 led to the grounding of the MAX. SWAPA, representing Southwest pilots, had agreed to fly the MAX but later sued Boeing, claiming Boeing interfered with their business relationship with Southwest and fraudulently induced them to fly the MAX without proper training.The trial court dismissed SWAPA's claims with prejudice, agreeing with Boeing that the Railway Labor Act preempted the claims and that SWAPA lacked standing. SWAPA appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas held that the Act did not preempt the claims, SWAPA lacked associational standing, but had standing to assert claims on its own behalf. The court also ruled that the assignments of claims from individual pilots to SWAPA were valid but did not retroactively grant standing in the original suit, leading to a partial dismissal without prejudice.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the Railway Labor Act does not preempt SWAPA’s claims because their resolution does not require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs). The court also held that the assignments of claims from pilots to SWAPA are not void against public policy, allowing SWAPA to pursue these claims as an assignee. The court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment, remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings on the claims SWAPA asserts on its own behalf. View "The Boeing Company v. Southwest Airlines Pilots Association" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute where Pranay Bajjuri and others (appellees) sued Anand Karney, Sudha Karney (appellants), and others for unjust enrichment, fraud, and civil conspiracy. The appellees alleged that the appellants fraudulently induced them to invest in various limited liability companies (LLCs) for purchasing and operating rental properties, but the appellants diverted the investments for personal gain. The appellants failed to produce financial and organizational documents related to the LLCs during discovery, leading to the current appeal.The District Court for Douglas County issued a scheduling order for discovery and trial. Despite repeated requests and a court order to compel, the appellants did not produce the required documents. The appellees filed a motion for sanctions, seeking default judgment and attorney fees. The district court found that the appellants had repeatedly violated discovery rules and had been previously warned of sanctions. The court granted the motion for sanctions, entering a default judgment of $2,201,385.82 and awarding attorney fees of $180,645.68 against the appellants.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the district court's decision. The court found that the appellants had frustrated the discovery process and failed to comply with the court's order to compel. The court determined that the appellants, as members and managers of the LLCs, had the ability to obtain and produce the required documents but did not do so. The court concluded that the sanctions of default judgment and attorney fees were appropriate given the appellants' inexcusable recalcitrance and history of discovery abuse. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's orders, finding no abuse of discretion. View "Bajjuri v. Karney" on Justia Law

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A Canadian energy company acquired a Delaware corporation in a merger, resulting in significant change-in-control payments to three of the acquired corporation’s executives. Two of these executives negotiated the transaction. Stockholders of the acquired corporation sued, alleging breaches of fiduciary duties by the executives and the board of directors, claiming the merger was timed to benefit the executives at the expense of stockholders. They also alleged that the acquiror aided and abetted these breaches and that the executives issued a misleading proxy statement.The Court of Chancery found that the plaintiffs proved their aiding-and-abetting claims, determining that the acquiror had constructive knowledge of and participated in the breaches. The court assessed damages, entering a judgment of approximately $200 million against the acquiror.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case. It reversed the Court of Chancery’s judgment, holding that for an acquiror to be liable for aiding and abetting a sell-side breach of fiduciary duty, the acquiror must have actual knowledge of both the target’s breach and the wrongfulness of its own conduct. The court found that the standard of actual knowledge was not met in this case. The court also concluded that the acquiror’s actions did not constitute substantial assistance in the fiduciary breaches, as required for aiding-and-abetting liability. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery’s judgment. View "In re Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc. Merger Litigation" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Shayne Lynn, was the founder and majority owner of High Fidelity, Inc., a Vermont cannabis business. In late 2020, defendants Peter Miller and Christopher Driessen, who controlled Slang Worldwide, Inc., proposed a merger between High Fidelity and Slang. They assured Lynn that Slang was financially sound and promised an $18 million investment into High Fidelity. Based on these representations, Lynn agreed to the merger in June 2021. However, Lynn later discovered that Slang was financially unstable and needed to borrow $18 million to survive. Lynn was subsequently terminated from his position.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed Lynn's complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that Lynn did not allege any actionable misrepresentations to support a fraud claim and failed to allege justifiable reliance or the existence of a duty to support a negligent misrepresentation claim. Lynn appealed the decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the statements made by Miller and Driessen about Slang's financial health were opinions and not actionable misrepresentations of fact. The promise of an $18 million investment was a future promise, not a misrepresentation of existing fact, and Lynn did not allege that Miller and Driessen intended to renege on the promise when it was made. The court also found that Lynn's claim of misleading financial data was not pled with particularity as required by Rule 9(b).Regarding the negligent misrepresentation claim, the court held that Lynn did not adequately allege justifiable reliance, as he did not claim that the truth about Slang's financial status was unavailable to him. The court affirmed the dismissal of Lynn's complaint. View "Lynn v. Slang Worldwide, Inc." on Justia Law

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Petitioner Dudley King and eight other individuals consigned their recreational vehicles (RVs) to Music City RV, LLC (MCRV), an RV dealer, for sale. On August 28, 2008, an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition was filed against MCRV in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The issue before the bankruptcy court was whether the consigned RVs were part of the bankruptcy estate. The parties stipulated that MCRV was not primarily engaged in selling consigned vehicles, was a merchant under UCC § 9-102(20), and performed the services of a consignee. None of the consignors filed a UCC-1 financing statement.The Bankruptcy Trustee argued that the consigned RVs were governed by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and were subordinate to the rights of perfected lien creditors, including the Trustee. Mr. King contended that the consignment was a true consignment of "consumer goods" and not a sale, thus not covered by the UCC, and the RVs should not be part of the estate. The bankruptcy court certified a question to the Supreme Court of Tennessee regarding whether such a consignment is covered under Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-2-326.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the statutory language and the Official Comments to the UCC. The court concluded that the 2001 amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-2-326 removed consignment transactions from the scope of Article 2. The court held that the consignment of an RV by a consumer to a Tennessee RV dealer for the purpose of selling the RV to a third person is not covered under section 47-2-326 of the UCC as adopted in Tennessee. The court assessed the costs of the appeal to the respondent, Robert H. Waldschmidt, Trustee. View "State of Tennessee v. Brown" on Justia Law

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The case involves a putative class action filed by Christine Pino on behalf of herself and others against Grant Cardone and his associated entities, alleging violations of the Securities Act of 1933. Pino claims that Cardone made misleading statements and omissions on social media about the internal rate of return (IRR) and distribution projections for real estate investment funds, and misstated material facts regarding the funds' debt obligations.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially dismissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that Cardone and his entities were not "sellers" under § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act and that the statements in question were not actionable. Pino appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that Cardone and his entities could be considered statutory sellers and that some of the statements were actionable. The case was remanded for further proceedings.Upon remand, Pino filed a second amended complaint, and the district court again dismissed the claims without leave to amend, holding that Pino had waived subjective falsity by disclaiming fraud and failed to plausibly allege subjective and objective falsity. The court also found that the omission of the SEC letter did not support a claim and that the debt obligation statement was not material.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Pino did not waive subjective falsity by disclaiming fraud and sufficiently alleged that Cardone subjectively disbelieved his IRR and distribution projections, which were also objectively untrue. The court also held that Pino stated a material omission claim under § 12(a)(2) by alleging that Cardone failed to disclose the SEC letter. Additionally, the court found that Pino sufficiently alleged that Cardone misstated material facts regarding the funds' debt obligations, which could be considered material to a reasonable investor. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and allowed the claims to proceed. View "PINO V. CARDONE CAPITAL, LLC" on Justia Law

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In early 2020, Erste Asset Management GmbH filed a derivative action against Kraft Heinz Company’s fiduciaries, arising from an August 2018 stock sale by 3G Capital, Inc., a significant minority stockholder. The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint under Rule 23.1, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to plead particularized facts creating a reasonable doubt that six of Kraft Heinz’s eleven directors were disinterested or lacked independence. One of those directors, John Cahill, was alleged to have ended his consulting relationship with Kraft Heinz before the derivative action was filed. However, it was later revealed that Cahill continued to serve as a consultant after July 2019, contrary to Kraft Heinz’s public disclosures.The Court of Chancery dismissed the derivative action, relying on the false representation that Cahill’s consulting agreement had terminated. Erste later discovered the ongoing consultancy and filed a new action seeking relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b) for fraud and newly discovered evidence. The Court of Chancery dismissed this new action, holding that the fraud must be extrinsic and that the new information was not newly discovered evidence because Erste could have learned it with reasonable diligence.The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery’s decision, holding that Rule 60(b)(3) applies to both intrinsic and extrinsic fraud and that Erste had pleaded a claim that Kraft Heinz’s misrepresentations prevented it from fairly presenting its case. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, including Rule 23.1 motion practice to reassess demand futility in light of the new evidence. The court also remanded Erste’s breach of fiduciary duty claim for further consideration. View "Erste Asset Management GmbH v. Hees" on Justia Law

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Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der angewandten Forschung e.V. (Fraunhofer) is a non-profit research organization that developed and patented multicarrier modulation (MCM) technology used in satellite radio. In 1998, Fraunhofer granted WorldSpace International Network, Inc. (WorldSpace) an exclusive license to its MCM technology patents. Fraunhofer also collaborated with XM Satellite Radio (XM) to develop a satellite radio system, requiring XM to obtain a sublicense from WorldSpace. XM later merged with Sirius Satellite Radio to form Sirius XM Radio Inc. (SXM), which continued using the XM system. In 2010, WorldSpace filed for bankruptcy, and Fraunhofer claimed the Master Agreement was terminated, reverting patent rights to Fraunhofer. In 2015, Fraunhofer notified SXM of alleged patent infringement and filed a lawsuit in 2017.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware initially dismissed the case, ruling SXM had a valid license. The Federal Circuit vacated this decision and remanded the case. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for SXM, concluding Fraunhofer's claims were barred by equitable estoppel due to Fraunhofer's delay in asserting its rights and SXM's reliance on this delay to its detriment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's summary judgment. The Federal Circuit agreed that Fraunhofer's delay constituted misleading conduct but found that SXM did not indisputably rely on this conduct in deciding to migrate to the high-band system. The court noted that SXM's decision was based on business pragmatics rather than reliance on Fraunhofer's silence. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine if SXM relied on Fraunhofer's conduct and if it was prejudiced by this reliance. View "Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft v. Sirius XM Radio Inc." on Justia Law