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Intel acquired McAfee, in a cash sale at $48 per share. Plaintiff, a pension fund, on behalf of itself and a class, alleged that McAfee, Intel, and former members of McAfee’s board of directors, consisting of nine outside directors and the former president and CEO, DeWalt (defendants), engaged in an unfair merger process contaminated by conflicts; that DeWalt withheld material information about negotiations from McAfee’s directors, who failed to safeguard the process and approved an undervalued price; and that defendants omitted material information from the merger proxy statement on which McAfee’s shareholders relied in voting for the merger. The trial court, applying Delaware law, granted the defendants summary judgment, finding no triable issue of material fact regarding the individual defendants’ alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, and concomitantly no liability on behalf of the corporation for aiding and abetting. The court of appeal affirmed as to the nine directors and reversed as to DeWalt and the corporations. Plaintiff raised triable issues of material fact related to DeWalt’s apparent nondisclosure of arguably material information about a $50-per-share overture. DeWalt bears the burden under the enhanced scrutiny standard to show that he exercised his fiduciary duties in furtherance of the obligation “to secure the transaction offering the best value reasonably available.” View "Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. McAfee, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law to defendants, concluding that federal law preempted ThermoTek's unfair competition claim and that ThermoTek failed to prove its damages for fraud. ThermoTek designs, manufacturers, and sells the VascuTherm system, which consists of a medical device and specially designed wraps that provide thermal and compression therapy. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in reaching the preemption defense on the merits. On the merits, the court held that federal copyright and patent laws preempted the unfair-competition-by-misappropriation claim. View "Motion Medical Technologies, LLC v. Thermotek, Inc." on Justia Law

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OpenRisk filed suit against MicroStrategy after MicroStrategy continued to provide services to OpenRisk's ex-employees after they had left and formed a new company. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to MicroStrategy and held that the federal Copyright Act preempted OpenRisk's computer fraud claims under the Virginia Computer Crimes Act (VCCA). The court explained that the core of OpenRisk's VCCA claims was the unauthorized copying and transfer of its data, and that claim was "equivalent to" a copyright infringement action and was thus preempted. The court also held that MicroStrategy was entitled to summary judgment on OpenRisk's remaining claims of computer trespass, tortious interference, and conspiracy. View "OpenRisk, LLC v. MicroStrategy Services Corp." on Justia Law

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Yelp Inc., operator of a website for consumer reviews, petitioned for a writ of mandate to overturn an order compelling its production of documents that may reveal the identity of an anonymous reviewer on its site. Yelp also appealed from a separate order imposing $4,962.59 in monetary sanctions against it for failing to comply with the subpoena requiring production of the documents. Gregory Montagna filed a lawsuit against Sandra Jo Nunis and several Doe defendants alleging a single cause of action for trade libel. Montagna, an accountant, prepared a tax return for Nunis in 2015, initially quoting Nunis a “minimum” fee of $200 for the preparation of her return, based on her representation that her income was comprised exclusively of wages reported on a W-2 form, and she would require only a simple return. However, both Nunis’ income and the resulting tax return were allegedly more complicated than she had represented. As a consequence, Montagna charged Nunis $400 for preparation of the return, rather than the $200 fee he initially quoted. Nunis allegedly paid Montagna only $200, and refused to pay him more even after receiving “a collection letter” for the balance. And in November 2015, Nunis allegedly went online to the Yelp website under an alias and posted a negative review of Montagna. Yelp argued the trial court's orders had to be reversed because: (1) the trial court erroneously concluded Yelp lacked standing to assert the First Amendment rights of its anonymous reviewer as grounds for resisting the subpoena; and (2) the court further erred by concluding Montagna made a prima facie showing the posted review contained defamatory statements. The Court of Appeal agreed the trial court erred in ruling Yelp lacked standing to assert the First Amendment rights of its anonymous reviewer, but found no error in its determination Montagna made a prima facie showing the challenged review was defamatory. The Court concluded the latter finding was sufficient to support the trial court’s order compelling Yelp to produce the subpoenaed documents in the circumstances of this case. Consequently, the Court denied the petition for writ of mandate. "However, given the dynamic nature of this area of law - the primary cases we rely upon were decided after the trial court issued its ruling - we also conclude Yelp’s opposition to Montagna’s motion to compel was substantially justified." Thus the Court reversed the order imposing sanctions against Yelp. View "Yelp Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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In 2012, Respondent Allister Boustred, a Colorado resident, purchased a replacement main rotor holder for his radio-controlled helicopter from a retailer in Fort Collins, Colorado. The main rotor holder was allegedly manufactured by Petitioner Align Corporation Limited (“Align”), a Taiwanese corporation, and distributed by Respondent Horizon Hobby, Inc. (“Horizon”), a Delaware-based corporation. Align had no physical presence in the United States, but it contracted with U.S.-based distributors to sell its products to retailers who, in turn, sell them to consumers. Boustred installed the main rotor holder to his helicopter and was injured in Colorado when the blades held by the main rotor holder released and struck him in the eye. He filed claims of strict liability and negligence against both Align and Horizon in Colorado. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on the stream of commerce doctrine and the prerequisites for a state to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), set out the controlling stream of commerce doctrine, which established that a forum state could assert jurisdiction where a plaintiff showed a defendant placed goods into the stream of commerce with the expectation that the goods will be purchased in the forum state. Applying this doctrine, the Court concluded Boustred made a sufficient showing to withstand a motion to dismiss. View "Align Corporation, Ltd. v. Boustred" on Justia Law

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Candy Parkhurst ("Parkhurst"), personal representative of the estate of her husband, Andrew P. Parkhurst ("Andrew"), deceased, file suit to compel Carter C. Norvell and Parkhurst & Norvell, an accounting firm Norvell had operated as a partnership with Andrew ("the partnership"), to arbitrate a dispute regarding the dissolution of the partnership. Pursuant to an arbitration provision in a dissolution agreement Norvell and Andrew had executed before Andrew's death, the trial court ultimately ordered arbitration and stayed further proceedings until arbitration was complete. Subsequently, however, Parkhurst moved the trial court to lift the stay and to enter a partial summary judgment resolving certain aspects of the dispute in her favor. After the trial court lifted the stay and scheduled a hearing on Parkhurst's motion, Norvell and the partnership appealed, arguing that the trial court was effectively failing to enforce the terms of a valid arbitration agreement in violation of the Federal Arbitration Act. The Alabama Supreme Court determined there was no evidence in the record indicating that Norvell made such an agreement and he, in fact, denied doing so. In the absence of any evidence that would establish such an agreement, as well as any other evidence that would conclusively establish that Norvell clearly and unequivocally expressed an intent to waive his right to have the arbitrator resolve this dispute. As such, Parkhurst failed to meet her burden of showing that the arbitration provision in the dissolution agreement should not have been enforced. Accordingly, the trial court erred by lifting the arbitral stay in order to consider Parkhurst's motion for a partial summary judgment, and its judgment doing so was reversed and remanded. View "Norvell v. Parkhurst" on Justia Law

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Grace Walker appealed a superior court judgment denying her petition for a writ of administrative mandamus. The petition asked the court to set aside a decision of the Physical Therapy Board of California (the "Board") that subjected Walker to discipline based on a misdemeanor hit-and-run conviction and the Board's finding she had used alcohol in a manner dangerous to herself or others. The superior court concluded the misdemeanor conviction was not an appropriate ground for discipline because it was not sufficiently related to Walker's fitness to practice physical therapy, but that discipline was appropriate pursuant to Business and Professions Code sections 2239 and 2660 based on Walker's use of alcohol in a dangerous manner. On appeal, Walker argued the court erred because the statutes did not permit discipline of a physical therapist based on a single isolated instance of alcohol use in a dangerous manner without a specific finding of a nexus between the conduct at issue and the fitness of the individual to practice physical therapy. The Court of Appeal concluded sections 2239 and 2260 did permit the Board to impose discipline in this context and affirm the judgment. View "Walker v. Physical Therapy Bd. of California" on Justia Law

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In this case brought against the Ute Indian Tribe, tribal officials, various companies owned by the tribal officials, oil and gas companies, and other companies, Plaintiff alleged that, through its ability to restrict the oil and gas industry’s access to the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, the tribe has held hostage the economy of the non-Indian population in the Uintah Basin. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the Ute Indian Tribe under sovereign immunity and the dismissal of Newfield, LaRose Construction, and D. Ray C. Enterprises for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted but vacated the dismissal of the remaining defendants and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the tribal exhaustion doctrine, holding (1) the Ute Tribe is immune from suit, but the tribal officials were not protected by sovereign immunity in their individual capacities; (2) the district court erred in dismissing the case for failure to join and indispensable party; (3) the tribal exhaustion doctrine prevents Utah courts from reviewing the case at this time; and (4) certain defendants were entitled to dismissal for failure to state a claim, but the remaining defendants were not. View "Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation" on Justia Law

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Jami Johnston appealed a judgment entered in favor of Castles and Crowns, Inc. ("Castles"). Castles was a children's clothing company formed by Julie Vickers and Amy Bowers. Brandi Stuart, Johnston's sister, worked for Castles from 2006 until 2011. From 2009 to 2010, while she was working with Castles, Stuart had 7,149 pounds of Castles' clothing shipped either to Johnston or to consignment companies used by Johnston. In January 2011, Vickers terminated Stuart's employment based on issues with her performance. In April 2011, Castles sued Stuart and Johnston, alleging conversion; civil conspiracy; "willfulness, negligence, and wantonness"; trespass to chattel; and unjust-enrichment against Johnston and Stuart. It also asserted fraudulent-misrepresentation and suppression claims against Stuart. Johnston answered, also asserting a counterclaim against Castles and a third-party complaint against Vickers. In her counterclaim and third-party complaint, Johnston alleged claims of defamation; "negligence, wantonness, and willfulness"; conspiracy; and tortious interference with business and contractual relations. She also sought recovery against Castles under the theory of respondeat superior. In this case, the trial court instructed the jury to consider Castles' unjust-enrichment claim against Johnston if it did not find against Johnston on the conversion and conspiracy claims. The jury found against Johnston on both the conversion and conspiracy claims. However, it then considered the unjust-enrichment claim and found against Johnston on that claim as well. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the jury's verdict was inconsistent with the trial court's instructions and "was obviously the result of confusion on the part of the jury." After it had discharged the jury, the trial court acknowledged the inconsistency in the jury's verdict. The trial court attempted to cure that inconsistency by setting aside the award in favor of Castles on the unjust-enrichment claim. However, the Supreme Court found the trial court's attempt to reconcile the inconsistency in the jury's verdict was based on mere speculation about the jury's intent. Additionally, the jury failed to follow the trial court's instructions, and Johnston moved for a new trial on that ground. The Supreme Court concluded Johnston was entitled to a new trial because the jury failed to follow the trial court's instructions. For these reasons, the trial court erred when it denied Johnston's motion for a new trial. View "Johnston v. Castles & Crowns, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed in part the circuit court’s judgment in favor of Sun Aviation, Inc. on the complaint filed by L-3 Communications Avionics Systems, Inc. for violations of various provisions of the Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 407.010 et seq. When L-3’s parent company underwent a consolidation process, the parent decided to terminate L-3’s distributorship with Sun, and directed L-3 to do so. Sun then filed an action against L-3. The court held (1) L-3’s gyros and power supplies did not fit the definition of “industrial, maintenance and construction power equipment” as applicable in the Industrial Maintenance and Construction Power Equipment Act and the Inventory Repurchase Act; (2) the circuit court erred in entering judgment in favor of Sun on L-3’s fraudulent concealment claim because the circuit court erred in determining that L-3 had a duty to disclose its parent company’s consolidation plans; and (3) the circuit court erred in awarding eighteen years of lost profits as damages on the count alleging violations of the Franchise Act. The court remanded the case for a new trial on damages and affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "Sun Aviation, Inc. v. L-3 Communications Avionics Systems, Inc." on Justia Law