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Google agreed with competitors, such as Apple, not to initiate contact to recruit each others' employees. In 2010, the Department of Justice filed a civil antitrust action, alleging that the agreements illegally diminished competition for tech employees, denying them job opportunities and suppressing wages. On the same day, the companies entered into a stipulated judgment, admitting no liability but agreeing to an injunction prohibiting the "no cold call" arrangements. Google posted a statement online announcing the settlement and denying any wrongdoing, with a link to a Department of Justice press release, describing the settlement terms. There was widespread media coverage. In 2011, class action lawsuits were filed against the companies by employees who alleged that the cold calling restrictions had caused them wage losses. A consolidated action sought over $3 billion in damages on behalf of more than 100,000 employees. A derivative suit, filed by shareholders in 2014, claimed that the company suffered financial losses resulting from the antitrust and class action suits and that the agreements harmed the company’s reputation and stifled innovation. Based on a three-year statute of limitations, the trial court dismissed. The court of appeal affirmed, finding the suit untimely because plaintiffs should have been aware of the facts giving rise to their claims by at least the time of the Department of Justice antitrust action in 2010. View "Police Retirement System of St. Louis v. Page" on Justia Law

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A corporate shareholder sought a shareholder list to mail proxy solicitations for an annual director election. The corporation required a signed confidentiality agreement in exchange for releasing the list. After obtaining and using the list, the shareholder later declared the agreement unenforceable, and refused to return or destroy the list. The corporation sued, seeking to that the shareholder had breached the confidentiality agreement and that the corporation was not obligated to provide the shareholder access to its confidential information for two years. After the superior court refused to continue trial or issue written rulings on the shareholder’s two pending summary judgment motions, the shareholder declined to participate in the trial. The court proceeded, ruled in favor of the corporation, and denied the shareholder’s subsequent disqualification motion. The shareholder appealed. The Alaska Supreme Court determined the superior court did not err in determining the shareholder had materially breached a valid, enforceable contract and did not err or abuse its discretion in its pretrial decisions or in denying the post-trial disqualification motion. But because the declaratory relief granted by the superior court regarding the shareholder’s statutory right to seek corporate information no longer pertained to a live controversy, the Court vacated it as moot without considering the merits. View "Pederson v. Arctic Slope Regional Corporation" on Justia Law

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The circuit court found merit in Petitioners’ assignments of error regarding attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest in this litigation in which a jury awarded Respondent damages on his breach of contract and fiduciary duty claims and attorneys’ fees in the amount of $1.5 million and prejudgment interest in the amount of $959,000. Respondent and his brothers and sisters owned three corporations and one limited partnership. After Respondent’s employment with one corporation was terminated and his shares and interest in the remaining entities were redeemed, Respondent sued his four siblings and the four entities (collectively, Petitioners). Respondent prevailed after an eleven-day trial. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Petitioners were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Respondent’s breach of contract and fiduciary duty claims; (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees without making sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding Respondent’s entitlement to the sum awarded or its reasonableness; and (3) the circuit court erred by finding that the entire jury verdict in this case, net of offsets, constituted “special damages” subject to W. Va. Code 56-3-31 and awarding Respondent prejudgment interest. View "Tri-State Petroleum Corp. v. Coyne" on Justia Law

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The circuit court found merit in Petitioners’ assignments of error regarding attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest in this litigation in which a jury awarded Respondent damages on his breach of contract and fiduciary duty claims and attorneys’ fees in the amount of $1.5 million and prejudgment interest in the amount of $959,000. Respondent and his brothers and sisters owned three corporations and one limited partnership. After Respondent’s employment with one corporation was terminated and his shares and interest in the remaining entities were redeemed, Respondent sued his four siblings and the four entities (collectively, Petitioners). Respondent prevailed after an eleven-day trial. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Petitioners were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Respondent’s breach of contract and fiduciary duty claims; (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees without making sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding Respondent’s entitlement to the sum awarded or its reasonableness; and (3) the circuit court erred by finding that the entire jury verdict in this case, net of offsets, constituted “special damages” subject to W. Va. Code 56-3-31 and awarding Respondent prejudgment interest. View "Tri-State Petroleum Corp. v. Coyne" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs John Davis and Shad Denson filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City of Jackson, Mississippi (“City”). The plaintiffs, both taxicab drivers, sought: (1) a declaratory judgment that the City’s taxicab ordinances violate the Mississippi Constitution; and (2) an injunction to prevent the City from denying the plaintiffs a Certificate of Public Necessity for their failure to comply with the City’s ordinances. The City filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75 (Rev. 2012), which required a bill of exceptions to be filed and transferred to circuit court when the complaining party was aggrieved by a discretionary action of a municipal governing authority. The chancery court granted the City’s motion to dismiss, finding it lacked jurisdiction to consider the case. The plaintiffs appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court found the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was proper, but for a different reason: plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the City’s taxi ordinances because they failed to file or complete the required application to start a taxicab company in Jackson. View "Davis v. City of Jackson" on Justia Law

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Leonetti's filed suit against Crew for negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and trade libel. Leonetti's alleged that an email sent by the president of Crew caused Sam's Club to decline to purchase Leonetti's stromboli products. The district court granted summary judgment for Crew on each count except the breach of contract count, which was later dismissed with prejudice. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the causation of the project termination. In this case, the district court failed to consider Leonetti's evidence offered to rebut an email explaining that Sam's Club was terminating the project for product quality concerns. View "Leonetti's Frozen Foods,Inc. v. Crew, Inc." on Justia Law

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Leonetti's filed suit against Crew for negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and trade libel. Leonetti's alleged that an email sent by the president of Crew caused Sam's Club to decline to purchase Leonetti's stromboli products. The district court granted summary judgment for Crew on each count except the breach of contract count, which was later dismissed with prejudice. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the causation of the project termination. In this case, the district court failed to consider Leonetti's evidence offered to rebut an email explaining that Sam's Club was terminating the project for product quality concerns. View "Leonetti's Frozen Foods,Inc. v. Crew, Inc." on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether defendant Jack Grynberg impliedly waived the physician–patient privilege by either: (1) requesting specific performance of a contract; or (2) denying plaintiffs’ allegations that he made irrational decisions. Grynberg asserted counterclaims for breach of contract against the plaintiffs, his children and former wife (“the Family”). According to Grynberg, he transferred his ownership interests in the businesses to the Family on the condition that he would remain in control of the businesses until his death. Grynberg alleged Family members expressed agreement to these terms either orally, in writing, or implicitly through their conduct. Then in 2016, the Family voted to remove Grynberg as president of each business, citing his declining mental health. Grynberg refused to comply. The Family filed suit, seeking a declaration that Grynberg no longer controlled the businesses and an injunction preventing him from representing the businesses. In its complaint, the Family asserted that Grynberg was exhibiting erratic behavior, making irrational decisions, and committing significant company funds to obviously fraudulent scam operations. In his amended answer, Grynberg denied the Family’s allegations and asserted counterclaims, including claims for breach of the lifetime-control agreement. Grynberg alleged that the Family’s breach of the oral or implied contract caused substantial monetary harm, and he sought “damages and/or specific performance” as relief. The trial court found that Grynberg impliedly waived the physician–patient privilege by asserting those counterclaims, and it ordered him to produce three years’ worth of mental health records for in-camera inspection. Grynberg petitioned the Supreme Court to review that ruling. Only privilege holders (patients) can impliedly waive the physician–patient privilege, and that they do so by injecting their physical or mental condition into the case as the basis of a claim or an affirmative defense. An adverse party cannot inject the patient’s physical or mental condition into a case through its defenses. Patients do not inject their mental condition into the case by denying the opposing party’s allegations. The Supreme Court found Grynberg did not inject his mental condition into the case as the basis of a claim by alleging that the Family breached a contract that does not reference his mental health. Likewise, he did not inject his mental condition into the case as the basis of a claim or an affirmative defense by denying the Family’s allegations that he made irrational decisions. Accordingly, the Court concluded Grynberg did not impliedly waive the physician–patient privilege and that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Grynberg to produce his mental health records for in-camera inspection. View "Gadeco, LLC v. Grynberg" on Justia Law

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Alfa Insurance Corporation, ALFA Mutual General Insurance Corporation, ALFA Life Insurance Corporation, and ALFA Specialty Insurance Corporation (collectively, "Alfa") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus seeking review of an order entered by the Montgomery Circuit Court on December 18, 2015. Although Alfa set forth three issues for review, the Supreme Court reviewed only one: whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to enter the December 18, 2015, order and whether it exceeded its discretion by not setting that order aside. R.G. "Bubba" Howell, Jr., and M. Stuart "Chip" Jones were insurance agents for an Alfa insurance agency in Mississippi. Their agency agreements with Alfa included an arbitration provision, as well as a provision requiring Howell and Jones to purchase "errors and omissions" insurance coverage. In 2012, Alfa accused Howell and Jones of selling competing products in contravention of their agency agreements; Howell and Jones, however, alleged that their actions had been approved by Alfa. Regardless, Alfa forced Howell to resign his position as an Alfa agent on December 31, 2012, and discharged Jones on January 1, 2013. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court exceeded its discretion in entering the December 18, 2015, order compelling discovery pretermitted discussion of the other, two discovery issues. View "Ex parte Alfa Insurance Corporation et al." on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City and ImOn in an action brought by Mediacom, seeking declarations that certain resolutions were void and that the City could not permit a potential cable provider to construct a "cable system" without acquiring a cable franchise. Mediacom also alleged contract violations, tortious interference, civil conspiracy, and Equal Protection violations, all depending on whether ImOn could lawfully build a fiber-optic network without a franchise. The court held that ImOn's fiber-optic network was not a "cable system," because ImOn has not provided or proposed to provide cable services. Therefore, the agreements at issue authorizing ImOn's construction of a fiber-optic network were not a de facto cable franchise. In regard to Mediacom's equal protection claim, the court also held that the district court properly concluded that ImOn and Mediacom were not similarly situated because only Mediacom was a cable provider in the City, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mediacom's motion for discovery. View "MCC Iowa v. Iowa City" on Justia Law