At 3:35 a.m. on the San Mateo Bridge, Ong’s vehicle collided with the Gonzalez vehicle. Gonzalez's passenger, Morales, was killed. At the accident scene, Ong said that he worked the night shift at Genentech was driving his personal vehicle to Genentech on his night off to collect resumes for “upcoming interviews.” Before the accident, Ong told a friend that he was going to Genentech to do something important for work. During his deposition, Ong gave various reasons for his trip, including picking up personal items from work, visiting his grandmother, and picking up the resume of his unemployed friend, Alvarez. Ong’s testimony with respect to Alvarez’s resume was impeached. Genentech presented evidence that all of Ong’s technician duties were performed at Genentech during work hours. Genentech did not require Ong to drive or own a vehicle and did not compensate Ong for travel time or expenses. The Morales family sued, asserting negligence. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of "respondeat superior" claims against Genentech. The“going and coming” rule precludes Genentech’s liability because Ong was driving for his own convenience and not at Genentech’s request or as part of his regular duties. Plaintiffs failed to establish a triable issue that Genentech was liable under the “special errand” exception to that rule. View "Morales-Simental v. Genentech" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court approving a sale of Frank Gangi’s assets and the assets of entities owned by him. The sale was recommended by the receiver, Carl Jenkins, who was appointed by the court to sell those assets for the benefit of Gangi’s creditors. On appeal, Gangi argued that the assets were sold to a fiduciary of the receivership estate and, consequently, that the sale was prohibited, and, alternatively, that the sale was improper and unfair. The First Circuit held (1) despite Jenkins’s arguments, this appeal was not equitably moot; and (2) there was no abuse of discretion in approving the sale, and Gangi’s arguments to the contrary were without merit. View "Jenkins v. Gangi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondents in this action in which Respondents added Petitioner as a defendant. Respondents settled a lawsuit against certain companies (the Brozik companies) for failing to pay the purchase price under an agreement to buy the assets of Respondents’ business. The circuit court later awarded Respondents $47,184 to be paid by the Brozik companies based upon the cessation of payments pursuant to the settlement. This judgment became a lien. The assets of one of the Brozik companies was then sold to Petitioner, and Respondents amended their complaint to add Petitioner as a defendant. In reversing the circuit court's judgment, the Supreme Court held that Respondents did not satisfy their burden of showing the absence of any genuine issues of material fact, and therefore, summary judgment should not have been granted. View "Kourt Security Partners, LLC v. Judy's Locksmiths, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) without prejudice. In his complaint, Plaintiff, a shareholder of USANA Health Sciences, Inc., alleged that USANA’s board of directors and several of its officers authorized and received spring-loaded, stock-settled stock appreciation rights (SSARs). Plaintiff acknowledged that the issuance of the spring-loaded SSARs complied with the terms of the company’s compensation plan but that it violated the underlying “spirit” of the plan. Plaintiff also alleged that the company’s Compensation Committee members breached their fiduciary duties and wasted corporate assets. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case without prejudice, holding that because spring-loading SSARs did not constitute a per se violation of USANA’s compensation plan, Plaintiff failed to allege any facts supporting the inference that Defendants intended to harm or actually harmed the corporation. View "Rawcliffe v. Anciaux" on Justia Law

Wiseman filed suit seeking to recover "carrying charges" it paid Southern on the theory that those charges were not permitted by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. The trial court ruled that the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (Department) has exclusive jurisdiction over Wiseman's claims because its allegations directly implicate the sale of alcohol. The Court of Appeal held that, although the Department does have exclusive jurisdiction to issue, deny, suspend and revoke alcoholic beverage licenses according to terms of the ABC Act and regulations adopted pursuant to it, the consequences of committing a violation of the ABC Act by imposing charges of the type collected by Southern from Wiseman in this case were not limited to those which the Department may impose on its licensees and did not bar the contract, unfair competition and declaratory relief claims alleged in Wiseman's complaint. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order sustaining Southern's demurrer and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wiseman Park v. Southern Glazer's Wine and Spirits" on Justia Law

McGann, who is blind and deaf, requested from Cinemark an American Sign Language (ASL) tactile interpreter so that he could experience a movie in his local Cinemark theater during one of its regular showings. Cinemark denied his request. McGann filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 ADA. After a bench trial in which the parties stipulated to all relevant facts, the district court entered Judgment in favor of Cinemark. It reasoned that McGann’s requested tactile interpreter was not an auxiliary aid or service under the ADA and that the ADA did not require movie theaters to change the content of their services or offer “special” services for disabled patrons. The Third Circuit vacated. The tactile interpreter McGann requested is an “auxiliary aid or service.” A a public accommodation may avoid ADA liability for failure to provide an auxiliary aid or service only if it shows that the aid or service in question “fundamentally alter[s] the nature” of its goods or services, or “would result in an undue burden, i.e., significant difficulty or expense.” The court remanded for consideration of CInemark’s possible defense. View "McGann v. Cinemark USA Inc" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of prohibition to halt an action for an assignment for the benefit of a disbarred attorney’s creditors (the ABC action) pending before a Hamilton County probate judge. In 2004, nineteen judgment creditors filed a lawsuit alleging that the attorney at issue had stolen millions of dollars in settlement funds while representing them. A Kentucky trial court ruled that the attorney was jointly and severally liable for $42 million. The court of appeals affirmed. In 2013, the Kentucky Supreme Court permanently disbarred the attorney for his conduct in the underlying representation. In 2015, a Boone County circuit court judge ordered the attorney to transfer his beneficial interest in a company, which were held in trust for the purpose of winding up operations, to the creditors. The attorney did not transfer the shares to the creditors, and the shares were later transferred. The Supreme Court granted the creditors’ motion for a peremptory writ of prohibition barring further proceedings in the ABC action, holding that the necessary elements for a writ of prohibition to issue were all present in this case. View "State ex rel. McGirr v. Winkler" on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery denied the appeal of Philip Gentile from the determination that Gentile’s claim for $497,739 against Fund.com Inc. (the Company) was time-barred. After a Receiver was appointed for the Company, it commenced a process for marshaling the Company’s assets, determining its liabilities, and winding up its affairs. Gentile, the Company’s former CEO, contended that he was entitled to recover the amount sought as a result of various breaches of his employment agreement with the company. The Receiver rejected the claim as time-barred. The Court of Chancery adopted the Receiver’s determination as a decision of the court, holding that the Receiver correctly determined that Gentile’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. View "B.E. Capital Management Fund LP v. Fund.com Inc." on Justia Law

SCAD appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sportswear in an action where SCAD asserted a number of claims against Sportswear, including service mark infringement under 15 U.S.C. 1114; unfair competition and false designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. 1125; and unfair competition under O.C.G.A. 10-1-372. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that this case did not involve the alleged infringement of a common-law trademark, and as a result the date of SCAD's first use of its marks on goods was not determinative. Therefore, Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975), controls, as it extends to protection for federally-registered service marks to goods. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Savannah College of Art and Design, Inc. v. Sportswear, Inc." on Justia Law

Titanium dioxide is a commodity-like product with no substitutes, the market is dominated by a few firms, and there are substantial barriers to entry. Valspar, a large-scale titanium dioxide purchaser, alleges that suppliers conspired to increase prices, beginning when DuPont—the largest American supplier—joined the Titanium Dioxide Manufacturers Association (TDMA) in 2002. DuPont then announced a price increase. Within two weeks, DuPont’s price increase was matched by other suppliers. During the next 12 years, the alleged conspirators announced price increases 31 times. Because Valspar claims it was overcharged by $176 million. In 2010, a class of titanium dioxide purchasers filed a price-fixing action. Valspar opted out of that class action, which settled. Valspar then filed its own claim and settled except against DuPont. The Third Circuit affirmed the summary judgment in favor of DuPont. Valspar’s characterization of the suppliers’ price announcements “neglects the theory of conscious parallelism” and is contrary to the doctrine that in an oligopoly “any rational decision must take into account the anticipated reaction of the other . . . firms.” Price movement in an oligopoly is interdependent and frequently will lead to successive price increases, because oligopolists may “conclude that the industry as a whole would be better off by raising prices.” Valspar did not show that the suppliers’ parallel pricing went “beyond mere interdependence [and was] so unusual that in the absence of advance agreement, no reasonable firm would have engaged in it.” View "Valspar Corp v. E I Du Pont De Nemours & Co" on Justia Law