Claimants appealed the denial of civil claims under the Settlement Program that was established following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Claimants submitted Individual Economic Loss (IEL) claims for lost wages as employees of their architectural firm. The firm had already received a Business and Economic Loss (BEL) award under the Settlement Program. The Fifth Circuit held that the BEL framework, by compensating the business for the owners' lost wages through the fixed-cost designation of their wages, precluded compensating those same owners for the same wages through an IEL claim. Because the Settlement Program did not contemplate the requested compensation, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In Re: Deepwater Horizon" on Justia Law

SemGroup purchased oil from producers and resold it to downstream purchasers. It also traded financial options contracts for the right to buy or sell oil at a fixed price on a future date. At the end of the fiscal year preceding bankruptcy, SemGroup’s revenues were $13.2 billion. SemGroup’s operating companies purchased oil from thousands of wells in several states and from thousands of oil producers, including from Appellants, producers in Texas, Kansas, and Oklahoma. The producers took no actions to protect themselves in case 11 of SemGroup’s insolvency. The downstream purchasers did; in the case of default, they could set off the amount they owed SemGroup for oil by the amount SemGroup would owe them for the value of the outstanding futures trades. When SemGroup filed for bankruptcy, the downstream purchasers were paid in full while the oil producers were paid only in part. The producers argued that local laws gave them automatically perfected security interests or trust rights in the oil that ended up in the hands of the downstream purchasers. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the downstream purchasers; parties who took precautions against insolvency do not act as insurers to those who took none. View "In re: SemCrude LP" on Justia Law

In this business dispute, Plaintiff K’s Merchandise Mart, Inc. challenged orders by the district judge granting summary judgment for Defendants William Weinstein and Frank Morton and requiring Plaintiff to pay Defendants $35,000 in sanctions. The First Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rulings but vacated the sanctions order and remanded for reconsideration of the sanctions matter, holding (1) summary judgment was properly granted on Plaintiff’s claims for fraudulent inducement, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of contract; and (2) the judge erred when he ordered sanctions against Plaintiff rather than against its attorneys. View "Eldridge v. Gordon Brothers Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Alan Miller, acting “individually and in the right of” and for the benefit of SAM Miller, Inc. (SMI), filed a second amended complaint against Miller’s Lobster Company, Inc. (MLC), Steve Miller, and Mark Miller (collectively, the Millers) seeking injunctive relief and damages arising out of the lease of wharf property by SMI to MLC. The court granted the Millers’ and SMI’s motions for summary judgment, concluding that Alan Miller’s claims were barred on limitations grounds. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Alan’s action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that Alan did not meet his burden to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the limitations period was nevertheless tolled or otherwise inapplicable. View "Miller v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Delaware Court of Chancery granted in part a motion for summary judgment in a breach of contract dispute regarding Duffield's involvement in the design of a wastewater treatment system. The court granted the motion as to Count I against defendants Don Lockwood and John Stanton, holding them jointly and severally liable for the total amount of $82,153.17 plus pre- and post-judgment interest; imposed a constructive trust over the assets transferred to defendants, ordered a full accounting of the proceeds of the distributions, and ordered disgorgement of any profits or proceeds from the transfers; denied the motion as it related to Count I claims against Pamala Stanton; and held that the motion for rule to show cause was moot. View "Duffield Associates, Inc. v. Lockwood Brothers, LLC" on Justia Law

The Delaware Court of Chancery held that, under 8 Del. C. 202, in order for a stockholder to be bound by stock transfer restrictions that are not "noted conspicuously on the certificate or certificates representing the security," he must have actual knowledge of the restrictions before he acquires the stock. If the stockholder does not have actual knowledge of the stock transfer restrictions at the time he acquires the stock, he can become bound by the stock transfer restrictions after the acquisition of the stock only if he affirmatively assents to the restrictions, either by voting to approve the restrictions or by agreeing to the restrictions. In this case, plaintiff did not have actual knowledge of the restrictions prior to acquiring his stock and the company must produce the requested documents as they are necessary to effectuate the stockholder's stated purpose. View "Henry v. Phixios Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

This dispute arose from the winding-down of a limited liability company formed as a real estate sales venture between two realtors. The Delaware Court of Chancery granted in part and denied in part defendants' partial motion to dismiss. The court dismissed with respect to the breach of fiduciary duty count because non-conclusory allegations in support of a relationship creating such a duty were lacking on the face of the complaint; denied the motion to dismiss with respect to the breach of an implied contract/estoppel claim because promissory estoppel was adequately alleged; and dismissed with respect to the constructive trust claim because it was waived. View "Beach to Bay Real Estate Center LLC v. Beach to Bay Realtors Inc." on Justia Law

The creditors shipped goods via common carrier from China to World Imports in the U.S. “free on board” at the port of origin. One shipment left Shanghai on May 26, 2013; World took physical possession of the goods in the U.S. on June 21. Other goods were shipped from Xiamen on May 17, May 31, and June 7, 2013, and were accepted in the U.S. within 20 days of the day on which World filed its Chapter 11 petition. The creditors filed Allowance and Payment of Administrative Expense Claims, 11 U.S.C. 503(b)(9), allowable if: the vendor sold ‘goods’ to the debtor; the goods were "received" by the debtor within 20 days before the bankruptcy filing; and the goods were sold in the ordinary course of business. Section 503(b)(9) does not define "received." The Bankruptcy Court rejected an argument that the UCC should govern and looked to the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). The CISG does not define “received,” so the court looked to international commercial terms (Incoterms) incorporated into the CISG. Although no Incoterm defines “received,” the incoterm governing FOB contracts indicates that the risk transfers to the buyer when the seller delivers the goods to the common carrier. The Bankruptcy Court and the district court found that the goods were “constructively received” when shipped and denied the creditors’ motions. The Third Circuit reversed; the word “received” in 11 U.S.C. 503(b)(9) requires physical possession. View "In re: World Imports Ltd" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellants’ motion to recover attorney fees and costs incurred in this litigation. Three sisters filed claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims in this dispute over the numerous entities their parents formed to manage their significant holdings for the benefit of their daughters. The district court sorted out the claims after a bench trial. Appellants then filed a motion to recover costs and attorney fees. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, when this case is viewed as a whole, the district court could reasonably conclude that Appellants were not prevailing parties. View "Acorn v. Moncecchi" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, holders of Petrobras equity, filed a class action against various defendants after the multinational oil and gas company was involved in money-laundering and kickback schemes. The district court certified two classes: the first asserting claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.; and the second asserting claims under the Securities Act of 1933,15 U.S.C. 77a et seq. The Second Circuit clarified the scope of the contested ascertainability doctrine and held that a class is ascertainable if it is defined using objective criteria that establish a membership with definite boundaries. That threshold requirement was met in this case. The court held that the district court committed legal error by finding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement was satisfied without considering the need for individual Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010), inquiries regarding domestic transactions. Therefore, the court vacated this portion of the Certification Order. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the Exchange Act class met their burden under Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), with a combination of direct and indirect evidence of market efficiency.  Accordingly, the court affirmed as to this issue. View "In re Petrobras Securities" on Justia Law