An imposter posing as investment advisor Daniel Corey Payne of Lifetime Financial, Inc. stole over $300,000 from Mark Frank Harding. Prior to this, Lifetime had received several inquiries about a potential imposter posing as Payne but did not post a warning or take significant action. Harding sued Lifetime and others for negligence, arguing that as registered investment advisors, they had a duty to post a warning about the imposter on their website and report the complaints to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). Harding claimed that had they done so, he would not have transferred funds to the imposter.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that they owed no duty to Harding. The court noted that Harding was not a client of the defendants and that there was no fiduciary relationship between them. The court also found that there was no statutory or case authority imposing a duty on the defendants to warn nonclients about an imposter.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the defendants did not owe a duty to Harding to report the imposter on their website or to FINRA. The court found that FINRA Rule 4530 did not apply because the defendants were not the subject of any written customer complaint involving allegations of theft or misappropriation of funds. The court also found that FINRA Rule 2210 did not impose an affirmative duty to warn the general public about a third-party impersonator. The court concluded that the defendants did not owe a duty to Harding and affirmed the summary judgment. View "Harding v. Lifetime Financial, Inc." on Justia Law

A husband and wife divorced after 19 years of marriage, with six children, including four adopted minors. The wife, a nurse practitioner, challenged the superior court's division of marital assets, particularly the valuation of the husband's law practice, which the court found lacked marketable goodwill. She also disputed the treatment of a $75,000 payout as a pre-distribution rather than interim support and the offsetting of adoption subsidies against the husband's child support obligation.The superior court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, held a four-day custody trial and a five-day property trial. The court awarded 50/50 shared physical custody and divided the marital estate 60/40 in favor of the wife. The court valued the husband's law firm based on its net assets, excluding goodwill, and found the Wasilla office building was not a marital asset. The court also calculated the husband's child support obligation but reduced it to account for the adoption subsidies received by the wife.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. It affirmed the superior court's decision, holding that only marketable goodwill may be divided on divorce, and the evidence showed the law firm lacked such goodwill. The court found no error in the superior court's other decisions, including the pre-distribution in lieu of interim spousal support and the temporary adjustment of the child support obligation. The court also upheld the superior court's valuation of the law firm, the classification of the Wasilla office building, and the finding that the law firm had no excess cash. The Supreme Court concluded that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award interim spousal support, in its treatment of post-separation earnings, or in its decision not to award long-term spousal support, above-guidelines child support, or additional attorney's fees. The property division, including the award of the marital home to the husband, was found to be equitable. View "May v. Petersen" on Justia Law

Two business partners, Anthony Bertucci and Eugene Watkins, developed low-income housing projects through various entities. Bertucci provided funding, while Watkins managed the projects. Watkins managed the entities' funds through a separate account, which led to concerns about mismanagement and personal use of funds. After Bertucci's health declined, his son Christopher, acting under power of attorney, discovered potential mismanagement and removed Watkins from his roles. This led to a legal dispute involving claims of breach of fiduciary duty and other violations.The probate court granted summary judgment in favor of Watkins on all claims. Bertucci, represented by his son Christopher as executor of his estate, appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas reversed the summary judgment on some claims, finding fact issues regarding fiduciary duties and limitations, but affirmed the judgment on the derivative claims, concluding that Bertucci failed to adequately brief those claims.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Bertucci waived his appeal on the derivative claims due to inadequate briefing. The Supreme Court also found that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that fact issues precluded summary judgment on Bertucci's individual breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that fact issues precluded summary judgment on Watkins's limitations defense and correctly resolved disputes regarding an expert report and the Dead Man's Rule. The Supreme Court reinstated the probate court's summary judgment on the individual breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address the derivative claims. View "Bertucci v. Watkins" on Justia Law

Stewart Dubose took over Radco Fishing and Rental Tools, Inc. from his father, John Dubose Sr., and sought to increase the company's cash flow by engaging Commercial Resources, Inc. for an accounts receivable line of credit. Stewart personally guaranteed the debt. Commercial Resources advanced over two million dollars to Radco, but payments ceased in 2015. John Dubose later took control of Radco and began liquidating its assets. Stewart and John settled a separate dispute, agreeing to sell Radco to Dynasty Energy Services, LLC, which assumed Radco's liabilities.Commercial Resources filed a lawsuit against Radco, Stewart, and Dynasty for the outstanding debt. Radco and Dynasty counterclaimed, alleging various defenses and claims against Commercial Resources. The case proceeded to trial, where the court granted a directed verdict against Radco and Stewart, finding them liable for the debt. The jury found Dynasty liable for $448,528.60 but awarded zero damages against Radco and Stewart. The trial court later amended the judgment to hold Radco, Stewart, and Dynasty jointly liable for the debt.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decisions. The court found no error in the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment dismissing Radco and Dynasty's affirmative defenses due to their delay in pursuing them. The court also upheld the trial court's decision to admit parol evidence, finding the Purchase Agreement ambiguous. The court affirmed the directed verdict against Radco and Stewart, agreeing that Stewart had authority to enter the agreement and that Radco ratified it. The court found no error in the jury instructions or the trial court's denial of post-trial motions. The court also upheld the trial court's award of attorneys' fees to Commercial Resources, finding it appropriate under the contractual provisions. View "Radco Fishing and Rental Tools, Inc. v. Commercial Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, representing a putative class, filed an antitrust lawsuit against Grubhub Inc., Postmates Inc., and Uber Technologies, Inc. (collectively, "Defendants"). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and its state analogues by entering into no-price competition clauses (NPCCs) with restaurants, which prevented the restaurants from offering lower prices through other channels. The plaintiffs claimed that these NPCCs led to artificially high prices for restaurant meals. The class included customers who purchased takeout or delivery directly from restaurants subject to NPCCs, customers who dined in at such restaurants, and customers who used non-defendant platforms to purchase from these restaurants.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the defendants' motion to compel arbitration. The court held that the scope of the arbitration clauses was an issue for the court to decide and that the clauses did not apply to the plaintiffs' claims as they lacked a nexus to the defendants' Terms of Use. The court also found that the plaintiffs had not agreed to Grubhub's Terms of Use.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision in part, ruling that the question of arbitrability for the plaintiffs' claims against Grubhub is for the court to decide and that Grubhub's arbitration clause does not apply to the plaintiffs' antitrust claims. However, the court reversed the district court's decision in part, finding that Grubhub had established an agreement to arbitrate with the plaintiffs and that the threshold question for the plaintiffs' claims against Uber and Postmates is for the arbitrator to decide. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Davitashvili v. Grubhub" on Justia Law

Six4Three, LLC developed an app called "Pikinis" that allowed users to search for photos of people in bathing suits on Facebook. Six4Three sued Facebook, Inc. and six individuals, alleging a "bait-and-switch" scheme where Facebook initially provided developers with access to data but later restricted it. Six4Three claimed this restriction harmed their business.The case began in April 2015, with Six4Three filing against Facebook. Facebook responded with demurrers, leading to multiple amended complaints. The trial court allowed new causes of action but not new defendants. Six4Three filed a third amended complaint and sought to add individual defendants through a writ of mandate. The trial court sustained some demurrers and granted summary adjudication on certain damages. Six4Three's fourth amended complaint included eight causes of action against Facebook. Facebook filed an anti-SLAPP motion, and the trial court initially denied it as untimely but granted the individual defendants' anti-SLAPP motion. On appeal, the denial of Facebook's motion was affirmed, but the individual defendants' motion was remanded for reconsideration.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering Facebook's untimely anti-SLAPP motion after granting the individual defendants' motion. The court also held that Six4Three failed to demonstrate the commercial speech exception to the anti-SLAPP statute and did not show a probability of prevailing on its claims. The court affirmed the trial court's orders granting the anti-SLAPP motions and awarding $683,417.50 in attorney fees to the defendants. The court concluded that section 230 of the Communications Decency Act barred Six4Three's non-contract claims and that Six4Three did not show a probability of prevailing on its breach of contract claim. View "Six4Three v. Facebook" on Justia Law

Real Time Medical Systems, LLC provides analytics services to skilled nursing facilities by accessing health records from PointClickCare Technologies, Inc., which operates a system hosting patients’ electronic health records. Real Time uses automated bots to access these records. PointClickCare, citing security and performance concerns, blocked users suspected of using bots. Real Time sued to stop PointClickCare from restricting its access, and the district court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of Real Time.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted Real Time a preliminary injunction, finding that PointClickCare’s actions likely constituted information blocking under the 21st Century Cures Act. The court concluded that Real Time was likely to succeed on the merits of its claims for unfair competition and tortious interference with contracts. The court also found that Real Time would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, that the balance of equities favored Real Time, and that the public interest supported granting the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit agreed that Real Time was likely to succeed on the merits of its unfair competition claim, as PointClickCare’s actions likely violated the Cures Act’s prohibition on information blocking. The court found that PointClickCare failed to demonstrate that any exceptions to the information-blocking provision applied. The court also agreed that Real Time would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, that the balance of equities favored Real Time, and that the public interest supported the injunction. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. View "Real Time Medical Systems, Inc. v. PointClickCare Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between several car dealers (Thornhill Auto Group, Moses Ford, and Astorg Ford of Parkersburg) and Ford Motor Company. The dealers had renovated their facilities to meet Ford's Trustmark standards under a voluntary Facility Assistance Program, which provided matching funds up to $750,000. These renovations included specific franchisor image elements required and approved by Ford. Later, Ford introduced the Lincoln Commitment Program (LCP), which offered additional incentives for dealers who constructed exclusive Lincoln facilities, known as Vitrine facilities. The dealers did not meet the new LCP standards and thus did not receive the full incentives.The dealers filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, arguing that Ford's actions violated West Virginia Code section 17A-6A-10(1)(i). This statute prohibits manufacturers from requiring dealers to replace or substantially alter franchisor image elements installed within the preceding ten years if those elements were required and approved by the manufacturer. The district court found that the issue was a question of first impression and certified the question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the ten-year grandfather clause in West Virginia Code section 17A-6A-10(1)(i) applies to the dealers. The Court found that the dealers' renovations under the Facility Assistance Program, which included franchisor image elements required and approved by Ford, fell within the statute's protection. Therefore, Ford could not require the dealers to replace or substantially alter those elements within ten years of their installation. The Court answered the certified question in the affirmative and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "West Virginia Automobile and Truck Dealers' Association v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

John Cassimus, Jason T. Carrick, and Ryan McAllister were members of several limited-liability companies operating retail-liquidation stores, which have since closed. Carrick and McAllister alleged that Cassimus misused corporate assets for personal gain, while Cassimus claimed that Carrick and McAllister enriched their own company, Xcess Limited, at the expense of the stores. Carrick and McAllister sued Cassimus and his associates in the Shelby Circuit Court, asserting various claims including breach of fiduciary duty and fraud.The Shelby Circuit Court denied the Cassimus defendants' motion to dismiss the derivative claims, appointed a special master to oversee discovery, and dismissed claims against East Hampton Advisors, LLC, based on the abatement statute. The Cassimus defendants and Carrick and McAllister sought mandamus review of these orders in the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the petitions. In case no. SC-2024-0284, the court denied the Cassimus defendants' petition, holding that the question of whether Carrick and McAllister could fairly and adequately represent the companies was a fact-intensive inquiry not suitable for mandamus review at the pleading stage. In case no. SC-2024-0318, the court dismissed the Cassimus defendants' petition as untimely because it was filed outside the presumptively reasonable time without a statement of good cause. In case no. SC-2024-0349, the court denied Carrick and McAllister's petition, holding that they had another adequate remedy through a Rule 54(b) appeal, which they did not pursue.The court lifted the stay previously entered and directed the trial court to resume proceedings. View "Ex parte Cassimus" on Justia Law

Golden Gate/S.E.T. Retail of Nevada, LLC, purchased an underground storage tank from Modern Welding Company of California, Inc. in 2008, which came with a one-year express warranty. In 2016, Golden Gate discovered a crack in the tank and sought replacement under the warranty, but Modern refused, citing the expired warranty. Golden Gate sued Modern, among others, initially for negligence and breach of express warranty, later amending the complaint to include a breach of implied warranty claim.The Second Judicial District Court in Washoe County granted summary judgment in favor of Modern, finding that both the express and implied warranty claims were time-barred. The court also awarded Modern attorney fees and costs. Golden Gate appealed, arguing that the discovery rule should toll the statute of limitations for the implied warranty claim.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that discovery tolling does not apply to breach of implied warranty claims under the Nevada Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The court emphasized that NRS 104.2725(2) specifies that a cause of action for breach of warranty accrues upon delivery of the goods, regardless of the buyer's knowledge of the breach. Therefore, Golden Gate's implied warranty claim, filed in 2019, was time-barred as the statute of limitations expired in 2012.Additionally, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's award of attorney fees to Modern. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, including the summary judgment and the post-judgment award of attorney fees. View "Golden Gate/S.E.T. Retail of Nevada, LLC v. Modern Welding Co. of California, Inc." on Justia Law