In 2016, Tucker Cianchette secured a multimillion-dollar judgment in Maine Superior Court against his father, step-mother, and two LLCs after they backed out of a 2015 agreement that would have given him sole control of a Ford dealership. Following this, in 2021, Eric and Peggy Cianchette, along with Cianchette Family, LLC, and Better Way Ford, LLC, filed a lawsuit alleging that Ford Motor Company violated state and federal laws during the failed 2015 negotiations and through false testimony by Ford employees in Tucker's 2016 suit.The 2021 lawsuit was initially filed in Maine Superior Court but was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Maine. The District Court dismissed all claims against Ford, leading the plaintiffs to appeal. The plaintiffs argued that Ford's actions during the 2015 negotiations and the 2016 lawsuit constituted violations of Maine's civil perjury statute, the Dealers Act, the federal Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, and also amounted to breach of contract and tortious interference with contract.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that Ford made any false representations or that any reliance on such representations was justified. The court also found that the plaintiffs' claims under the Dealers Act were barred by res judicata due to a prior ruling by the Maine Motor Vehicle Franchise Board. Additionally, the court concluded that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing did not apply to the breach of contract claims under Michigan law, as the SSA explicitly granted Ford the right to approve changes in ownership. View "Better Way Ford, LLC v. Ford Motor Company" on Justia Law

Two brothers, Roland and Robert, ran an automotive business together under Guieb Inc. Their relationship deteriorated when Robert made decisions that Roland disagreed with, including using their company for his own benefit and allegedly stealing the trade name and most profitable shop for his personal companies. Roland sued Robert, alleging unfair and deceptive trade practices, unfair methods of competition, and deceptive trade practices under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 480-2 and 481A-3. He also sought punitive damages for fraud, misrepresentation, nondisclosure, and breach of fiduciary duty.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted Robert’s motion for partial summary judgment (MPSJ) and dismissed Roland’s claims under count 12, finding no genuine issue of material fact. The court also granted Robert’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on punitive damages, preventing the jury from considering them. Additionally, the court ruled that brotherhood did not establish a fiduciary duty, granting Robert’s MPSJ on that issue as well.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reversed the circuit court on three issues. It held that Roland’s unfair and deceptive trade practices claim should have gone to the jury, as there was evidence that Robert represented Guieb Inc. and Guieb Group as the same entity. The ICA also held that the jury should have considered punitive damages, given the evidence of Robert’s actions that could justify such damages. Lastly, the ICA found that brotherhood created a kinship fiduciary duty, which should have been considered by the jury.The Supreme Court of Hawaii agreed with the ICA that the jury should have considered Roland’s claims under count 12 and punitive damages. However, it disagreed that kinship created a fiduciary duty, affirming the circuit court’s MPSJ on that issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Guieb v. Guieb" on Justia Law

Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (ISS), a proxy advisory firm, challenged the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) interpretation of the term “solicit” under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC had begun regulating proxy advisory firms by treating their voting recommendations as “solicitations” of proxy votes. ISS argued that its recommendations did not constitute “solicitation” under the Act.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia agreed with ISS and granted summary judgment in its favor. The court found that the SEC’s interpretation of “solicit” was overly broad and not supported by the statutory text. The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), an intervenor supporting the SEC’s position, appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the ordinary meaning of “solicit” does not include providing proxy voting recommendations upon request. The court concluded that “solicit” refers to actively seeking to obtain proxy authority or votes, not merely influencing them through advice. The SEC’s definition, which included proxy advisory firms’ recommendations as solicitations, was found to be contrary to the statutory text of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act. View "Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. v. SEC" on Justia Law

Sheila Prato, the plaintiff, and her company, Prato Properties, LLC, filed a civil complaint against Thomas John Gioia and Lee & Associates Commercial Real Estate Services, Inc. (the Lee Firm) for breach of fiduciary duty and intentional interference with contract. The case was dismissed without prejudice due to the plaintiffs' failure to appear at trial. At the time of the trial, Prato's attorney, Timothy McFarlin, had been rendered inactive and ineligible to practice law by the State Bar of California due to pending disciplinary proceedings. Prato was unaware of her attorney's status, but the defendants and their counsel were aware and did not inform her or the court.The Superior Court of Orange County dismissed the case without prejudice and subsequently awarded over $70,000 in attorney fees against Prato and her company. The trial court granted the defendants' motions for attorney fees despite Prato's opposition, which argued that the defendants failed to provide the required notice under section 286 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which mandates that a party whose attorney has been removed or suspended must be given written notice to appoint another attorney or appear in person before further proceedings can be taken against them.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the defendants' counsel failed to provide the required notice under section 286 before the trial, which prejudiced Prato. The court held that an attorney who has been rendered inactive and ineligible to practice law meets the definition of an attorney who has been "removed or suspended" for purposes of section 286. The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to the defendants without considering the lack of notice and the circumstances surrounding Prato's unrepresented status.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider the defendants' motions for attorney fees in light of section 286. View "Prato v. Gioia" on Justia Law

Southern Methodist University (SMU), a nonprofit corporation, was founded by predecessors to the South Central Jurisdictional Conference of the United Methodist Church (the Conference). Historically, SMU’s articles of incorporation indicated that the university was owned and controlled by the Conference, requiring Conference approval for amendments. In 2019, SMU’s board of directors amended the articles without Conference approval, removing all references to the Conference. The Conference sued, seeking a declaration that the amendments were void and asserting claims for breach of contract and filing a materially false instrument.The trial court dismissed the Conference’s claims for declaratory judgment and breach of contract under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a and granted summary judgment on the false-filing claim. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas reversed the trial court’s decision in relevant part, allowing the Conference to pursue its claims.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the Conference has statutory authority to sue SMU to enforce its rights under the articles of incorporation and the Texas Business Organizations Code. The court also held that the Conference could pursue its breach-of-contract claim as a third-party beneficiary of SMU’s articles of incorporation. However, the court agreed with SMU that it was entitled to summary judgment on the false-filing claim, as the certificate of amendment did not constitute a materially false instrument.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment in part, allowing the declaratory judgment and breach-of-contract claims to proceed, and reversed it in part, upholding the summary judgment on the false-filing claim. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY v. SOUTH CENTRAL JURISDICTIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH" on Justia Law

The defendants, Richard Maike, Doyce Barnes, and Faraday Hosseinipour, were involved in a company called Infinity 2 Global (I2G), which the FBI determined to be a pyramid scheme. The company collected approximately $34 million from investors, most of whom lost money. After a 25-day trial, a jury convicted the defendants of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud. The defendants appealed their convictions, presenting numerous arguments for reversal.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky initially handled the case, where the jury found the defendants guilty on both counts. The defendants were sentenced to varying prison terms: Maike received 120 months, Barnes 48 months, and Hosseinipour 30 months. The defendants then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions, among other issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and rejected all the defendants' arguments. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdicts on both counts. The court also determined that the jury instructions were appropriate and did not mislead the jury. The court affirmed the criminal judgments of Maike and Barnes. For Hosseinipour, the court affirmed her criminal judgment but vacated the district court's denial of her Rule 33 motion for a new trial, remanding her case for reconsideration of that motion. View "United States v. Maike" on Justia Law

In 2021, Xeriant, Inc., an aerospace company, sought financing for a joint venture and connected with Auctus Fund LLC, a hedge fund. Auctus agreed to lend approximately $5 million through a convertible promissory note, allowing Auctus to convert the debt into shares of Xeriant's common stock if the loan was not repaid in cash. When Xeriant failed to repay the loan, Auctus attempted to convert the debt into stock, but Xeriant rejected the request and filed a lawsuit seeking to void the contract under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, claiming Auctus was not a registered securities dealer.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Xeriant's complaint, holding that the contract did not obligate Auctus to act as a dealer, and thus, the agreement was not void under Section 29(b) of the Exchange Act. The court found that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), not private parties, enforces the registration requirement under Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Xeriant failed to allege a sufficient claim for rescission under Section 29(b) because the contract did not require Auctus to engage in unlawful dealer activity. The court concluded that the contract could be performed lawfully and was not inherently illegal. Therefore, the contract could not be rescinded under Section 29(b) of the Exchange Act. The court also held that Xeriant's claim was timely filed, as the facts underlying Auctus's alleged status as an unregistered dealer were not appreciable until the SEC filed its complaint in June 2023. View "Xeriant, Inc. v. Auctus Fund LLC" on Justia Law

In 2008, Kelly James Schnorenberg formed KJS Marketing, Inc. to secure funding and recruit agents for insurance companies. Between 2009 and 2015, KJS solicited over $15 million from approximately 250 investors, promising a 12% annual return. Schnorenberg failed to disclose to investors his past legal and financial troubles, including a lawsuit by the Colorado Division of Securities, a permanent injunction from selling securities in Colorado, a bankruptcy filing, and unpaid civil judgments.Schnorenberg was charged with twenty-five counts of securities fraud under section 11-51-501, with twenty-four counts based on materially false statements or omissions and one count based on a fraudulent course of business. He planned to defend himself by arguing that he acted in good faith reliance on the advice of his securities lawyer, Hank Schlueter. However, the trial court denied his motions for a continuance to secure Schlueter's testimony and excluded Schnorenberg's testimony about the specific advice he received, ruling it as hearsay.The Colorado Court of Appeals vacated seven of Schnorenberg's convictions as time-barred, reversed the remaining convictions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding Schnorenberg's testimony about his lawyer's advice and in not instructing the jury that good faith reliance on the advice of counsel could negate the mens rea element of the securities fraud charges.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the mens rea of "willfully," synonymous with "knowingly," applies to each element of securities fraud under subsections 11-51-501(1)(b) and (c). The court concluded that Schnorenberg's testimony about his lawyer's advice was relevant to whether he had the requisite mens rea and that the trial court erred in excluding this testimony. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for a new trial. View "People v. Schnorenberg" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of in-state and out-of-state precious metal traders and their representatives (the "Bullion Traders") challenging Minnesota Statutes Chapter 80G, which regulates bullion transactions. The Bullion Traders argued that the statute violated the dormant Commerce Clause due to its extraterritorial reach, as defined by the term "Minnesota transaction."The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota initially found that Chapter 80G violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The case was then remanded by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit for a severability analysis. The district court concluded that striking portions of the "Minnesota transaction" definition cured the extraterritoriality concern and complied with Minnesota severability law.The Bullion Traders appealed, arguing that the severed statute still applied extraterritorially and that the district court erred in applying Minnesota severability law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the severed definition of "Minnesota transaction" no longer regulated wholly out-of-state commerce and that the statute, as severed, was complete and capable of being executed in accordance with legislative intent.The Eighth Circuit held that the district court correctly severed the extraterritorial provisions from Chapter 80G, and the remaining statute did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The court also agreed that the severed statute complied with Minnesota severability law, as the valid provisions were not essentially and inseparably connected with the void provisions, and the remaining statute was complete and executable. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Styczinski v. Arnold" on Justia Law

Crabar/GBF, Inc. (Crabar) sued Mark Wright, Wright Printing Co. (WPCO), Mardra Sikora, Jamie Frederickson, and Alexandra Kohlhaas for trade secret violations and related claims. Crabar alleged that after purchasing WPCO's folder business, WPCO retained and used confidential information, including customer lists and sales data, to launch a competing folder business. Crabar also claimed that former employees Kohlhaas and Frederickson took and used Crabar's confidential information to aid WPCO's new business.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska held an eleven-day trial, where the jury found all defendants liable on each count, awarding Crabar over five million dollars in compensatory and exemplary damages. Post-trial motions led to a final amended judgment of roughly four million dollars against the defendants. Defendants appealed, challenging several of the district court’s rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decisions, including the denial of WPCO's motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding a contractual damages limitation, finding WPCO waived the argument by not raising it in the final pretrial order. The court also upheld the enforceability of confidentiality agreements signed by Frederickson and Kohlhaas, and found sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings on trade secret misappropriation, tortious interference, and causation of damages.The Eighth Circuit also ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony on damages, as the expert's assumptions were not fundamentally unsupported. The court found no error in the jury's award calculations, rejecting the argument of double recovery and affirming the sufficiency of evidence linking defendants' actions to Crabar's damages. The court concluded that the jury's awards were not excessive or the result of passion or prejudice. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Crabar/GBF, Inc. v. Wright" on Justia Law