TM Wood Products, M Wood Products, Inc., Marty Wood, and Kim Whitlow (collectively, “TM Wood”) appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion to set aside the judgment under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). Marietta Wood Supply, Inc., and Marietta Dry Kiln, LLC (collectively, “Marietta”), contracted with TM Wood to sell lumber. TM Wood acted as broker and agreed to sell Marietta’s green lumber and dry kiln for a $10-$40 commission per thousand feet. Under the agreement, TM Wood also hired or employed various trucking companies to haul the lumber after it was sold. Marietta filed a complaint against TM Wood alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty, as well as fraudulent inducement, concealment, misrepresentation, and negligence. Marietta alleged that TM Wood had been wrongfully billing both the purchaser and the seller for shipping costs. It also alleged that TM Wood had been charging and receiving extra commissions on the lumber units TM Wood sold for Marietta from 2004 to 2012. After a bench trial, the court entered a final judgment in favor of Marietta in the amount of $800,000. The trial court found that TM Wood had been properly served at the addresses provided in an Agreed Order Allowing Withdrawal of Counsel. Marietta alleged that it sent a copy of the final judgment to Wood and Whitlow the following day. Marietta then hired an attorney in Arkansas to collect the judgment. TM Wood retained new counsel the following business day and served its motion to set aside the Mississippi judgment. TM Wood argued on appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court that its right to a jury trial was violated, that it failed to receive notice of the bench trial, and that the judgment was excessive. The Supreme Court found the circuit clerk failed to send notice of the impending trial to TM Wood in accordance with Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 40(b), therefore, it reversed the trial court’s decision. View "TM Wood Products v. Marietta Wood Supply, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Hillarie and Keith Levy appealed the dismissal of their lawsuit filed against defendant, Only Cremations for Pets, Inc. Plaintiffs alleged it agreed to cremate individually two of their dogs, but then intentionally sent them random ashes instead. Plaintiffs sought recovery of emotional distress damages under contract and tort law. The Court of Appeal determined: the complaint failed to state a cause of action under any contract theory; and there were no factual allegations showing the existence of any contract between plaintiffs and defendant. Plaintiffs’ veterinarian, not plaintiffs, contracted with defendant. However, the complaint adequately pled two tort theories: trespass to chattel and negligence. The Court found allegations here "fit comfortably" in a cause of action for trespass to chattel claim, which permitted recovery of emotional distress damages. The allegations also supported a negligence cause of action because defendant advertised its services as providing emotional solace, and thus it was foreseeable that a failure to use reasonable care with the ashes would result in emotional distress. The Court reversed and remanded, giving plaintiffs an opportunity to plead more fully a third-party beneficiary cause of action. View "Levy v. Only Cremations for Pets, Inc." on Justia Law

Quidel Corporation (Quidel) petitioned for a writ of mandate and/or prohibition to direct the trial court to vacate its order granting summary adjudication. Quidel contended the trial court incorrectly concluded a provision in its contract with Beckman Coulter, Inc. (Beckman) was an invalid restraint on trade in violation of Business and Professions Code, section 16600. Quidel argued the trial court improperly extended the holding from Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal.4th 937 (2008) beyond the employment context to a provision in the parties’ 2003 BNP Assay Agreement (the Agreement). In its original, published opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded it was not, granted the petition and issued a writ instructing the trial court to vacate the December 2018 order granting summary judgment on the first cause of action. The California Supreme Court then granted review of the Court of Appeal's opinion and ordered briefing deferred pending its decision in Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen, Inc., S256927. On August 3, 2020, the Supreme Court issued Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen, Inc., 9 Cal.5th 1130 (2020), which held “a rule of reason applies to determine the validity of a contractual provision by which a business is restrained from engaging in a lawful trade or business with another business.” The Quidel matter was transferred back to the Court of Appeals with directions to vacate its previous opinion and reconsider the case in light of Ixchel. The appellate court issued a new opinion in which it concluded the trial court’s decision was incorrect. The trial court was directed to vacate the December 7, 2018 order granting summary adjudication on the first cause of action. View "Quidel Corporation v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2003, Richard Howell invented a binding that has a “special, patented heel release designed to mitigate knee injuries . . . that are common in downhill skiing.” Howell formed a business relationship with John Springer-Miller, and the two signed transaction documents, which included an employment agreement, a stock-purchase agreement, an investor-rights agreement, and an amended certificate of incorporation. Howell and Springer-Miller’s working relationship “began to deteriorate almost immediately,” and the KneeBinding board voted to terminate Howell as president in September 2008. In prior proceedings, the Vermont Supreme Court in large part affirmed an August 2016 trial court decision, but reversed a decision to dissolve a March 2009 permanent injunction, and remanded the court’s award of attorney’s fees to KneeBinding, Inc. with directions to consider additional evidence of legal fees. On remand in August 2019, the trial court: (1) awarded additional attorney’s fees to KneeBinding; (2) issued a sanction for a May 23, 2018 finding that Richard Howell violated an August 10, 2017 injunction that was in place while "KneeBinding II" was pending; and (3) found Howell in contempt for violating the March 2009 permanent injunction that the Supreme Court restored in KneeBinding II. On appeal, Howell challenged the May 23, 2018, finding that he violated the August 2017 injunction and the August 2019 finding that he violated the March 2009 permanent injunction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kneebinding, Inc. v. Howell" on Justia Law

The trial court found defendants Peng Xufeng and Jia Siyu filed a frivolous anti-SLAPP motion against Changsha Metro Group Co., Ltd. (Changsha). Changsha sued defendants for: (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) constructive fraud; (3) aiding and abetting; (4) unjust enrichment; and (5) a constructive trust. Defendants responded with an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court ordered defendants to pay Changsha $61,915 for Changsha’s attorney’s fees in opposing the anti-SLAPP motion. Defendants contended the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to Changsha because: (1) defendants were not given a 21-day safe harbor period; and (2)Changsha requested attorney’s fees in its opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion, rather than in a separate motion. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Changsha Metro Group Co. v. Xufeng" on Justia Law

In this action pleading claims for suit on account and account stated the Supreme Court reversed and vacated the judgment of the circuit court in favor of DiGregorio Food Products, Inc., holding that the circuit court erred in declaring the law in determining that Mo. Rev. Stat. 516.110(1)'s ten-year statute of limitations applied to the underlying claims.DiGregorio was an ingredient supplier for John Racanelli, who operated pizza restaurants. When Racanelli stopped making payments, DiGregorio ended its business relationship with Racanelli and his restaurants. DiGregorio later brought this action, asserting claims for suit on account and account stated. The circuit court declared that the ten-year statute of limitations contained in section 516.110(1) applied and that Racanelli was responsible for the amount of unpaid invoices as damages. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) even assuming that DiGregorio proved its claims, this case was governed by the five-year statute of limitations contained in Mo. Rev. Stat. 516.120(1); and (2) therefore, DiGregorio's lawsuit was time barred. View "Di Gregorio Food Products, Inc. v. Racanelli" on Justia Law

Defendants Garrett Reed, Reilly Reed, Element Services, LLC, Jhenna Reed, Reedesign Concepts, and Robert Kubistek appealed a district court order remanding this case from federal district court to Colorado state court due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff Elite Oil Field Enterprises, Inc. (Elite) moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Plaintiff Elite was a Colorado corporation formed in March 2012 to provide roustabout services for the oil field industry. Immediately after its formation, Elite formed two subsidiaries: Elite Oil Field Services, Inc. and Elite Oil Field Equipment, Inc. At some point after the formation, Reilly Reed (Reilly) became upset that he only had a 25% ownership interest in Elite and believed that he was entitled to a 50% share. Reilly and his brother Garrett Reed (Garrett), allegedly devised a scheme for Reilly to form, surreptitiously, a competing company known as Element Services, LLC (Element), and for Element to improperly lure away Elite’s customers and employees with the intent of economically harming Elite and rendering Elite unable to continue its operations. As part of the scheme, Reilly filed a civil lawsuit in Colorado federal district court against Elite, its two subsidiaries, his former business partner Dustin Tixier, and business manager Jason Whisenand, alleging in pertinent part, Elite's corporate documents were altered such that Reilly owned only 25% of the total outstanding corporate stock rather than the originally agreed upon 50%. Plaintiffs moved to transfer and consolidate the multiple civil suits and counterclaims to Colorado state court. The Tenth Circuit determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal, thereby granting Elite's motion to dismiss this appeal. View "Elite Oil Field Enterprises v. Reed" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting judgment in favor of an accountant and his new firm on his claims against his former firm, holding that the judgment was not in error.After Plaintiff left one firm to join another, he sued Defendant, his former firm, with whom he was a shareholder and officer. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant failed to perform a mandatory provision in the shareholder agreement to buy out a departing shareholder's corporate shares at a price that accounted for lost billings by virtue of clients following a departing shareholder. Defendant brought counterclaims for breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation of confidential information and third-party claims against Plaintiff's new firm, including tortious interference with business expectations. All claims presented to the jury were determined in favor of Plaintiff and his new firm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that all claims were correctly decided in favor of Plaintiff and his new firm. View "Dick v. Koski Professional Group, P.C." on Justia Law

Two powerful friends decided to take out significant loans in order to invest in a purported business opportunity overseas. The business opportunity was in reality, a scam. The friends offered as collateral assets which were not theirs to encumber. The third party to whom the assets belonged had no idea the assets were being so encumbered. And the "lender" was another investor in the scam intent on recouping its investment. The opportunity was "a complete bust," and the friends were unable to pay the loans back. The lender sued to collect what was owed and foreclose on its secured interest in the offered collateral. The friends failed to answer the lawsuit, and a default judgment was obtained. The lender then began to execute on its judgment. The issues presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on two main issues: (1) whether the default judgment was void; and (2) assuming it was valid, whether the trial court should have vacated the default and default judgment under its statutory and equitable powers. The Court determined the order denying the motion to vacate default judgment should have been reversed, and the matter remanded for the trial court to vacate the default, default judgment and an assignment order (entered April 30, 2018). View "Luxury Asset Lending v. Philadelphia Television Network" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants with respect all of Plaintiff's claims except for counts four and five, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment.This litigation arose from Aqreva, LLC's purchase of medical practice management service from Eide Bailly, LLP. Aqreva sued Eide Bailly, Shelly Kampmann, Lee Brandt, and LJB, Inc. claiming breach of contract and various torts, alleging that Defendants violated non-compete, non-solicitation, and confidentiality clauses in several contracts and that Defendants committed, among other torts, civil conspiracy and fraud. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants with respect to all claims except for those concerning Kampmann's employment agreement and the alleged tortious interference with a contract by Brandt and LJB. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the the circuit court properly granted summary judgment on counts one through three and six through nine. View "Aqreva, LLC v. Eide Bailly, LLP" on Justia Law