Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around an employment dispute between Nelida Soltero and Precise Distribution, Inc. Soltero, who was placed at Precise Distribution by a temporary staffing agency, Real Time Staffing Services, filed a class action complaint against Precise Distribution for alleged failure to provide required meal periods and rest breaks to employees, among other claims. Precise Distribution sought to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement between Soltero and Real Time. However, Real Time was not a party to the lawsuit.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County denied Precise Distribution's motion to compel arbitration. Precise Distribution argued that it should be able to compel arbitration under the agreement between Soltero and Real Time, despite not being a party to it, based on theories of equitable estoppel, third-party beneficiary, or agency.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court concluded that Precise Distribution was not a party to the arbitration agreement between Soltero and Real Time and could not compel arbitration based on the theories it proposed. The court found that Soltero's claims against Precise Distribution were not dependent upon or founded in the underlying contractual obligations of the agreement containing the arbitration clause. Furthermore, Precise Distribution was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the arbitration agreement, and there was no evidence of an agency relationship between Precise Distribution and Real Time. Therefore, the court affirmed the order denying Precise Distribution's motion to compel arbitration. View "Soltero v. Precise Distribution" on Justia Law

Carlos Ramirez, an employee, filed a class action lawsuit against his former employer, Golden Queen Mining Company, alleging various violations of the Labor Code and unfair competition. The employer moved to compel arbitration, but the trial court denied the motion, stating that the employer failed to demonstrate the existence of an executed arbitration agreement. The employer appealed, arguing that it had made a prima facie showing that a written arbitration agreement existed and that Ramirez’s statements that he did not recall being presented with or signing an arbitration agreement were insufficient to rebut its initial showing.The Superior Court of Kern County had initially denied the employer's motion to compel arbitration on the grounds that the employer failed to demonstrate the existence of an executed arbitration agreement. The court found that the employer's evidence, which included an unsigned arbitration agreement and a handbook acknowledgement purportedly signed by Ramirez, was insufficient to establish the existence of an arbitration agreement.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court concluded that Ramirez did not provide sufficient evidence to rebut the employer’s initial showing that an arbitration agreement existed. The court found that Ramirez's failure to recall signing the document did not create a factual dispute about the signature’s authenticity. The court also noted that Ramirez’s declaration did not state whether he had reviewed the arbitration agreement or other documents purportedly signed by him, nor did it address whether he recalled signing the handbook acknowledgement, which included a statement that he agreed to the terms of the arbitration agreement. The court therefore reversed the order denying the motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case for further proceedings to address Ramirez’s unconscionability defense. View "Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Winston Mar and SierraConstellation Partners, LLC (Sierra) and Lawrence Perkins (collectively, Sierra defendants). Mar, who was a partner in Sierra, sought a buyout of his partnership interest. Sierra defendants moved to compel arbitration of Mar's action, based on an arbitration agreement included in Sierra's employee handbook. Mar had refused to sign the arbitration agreement, stating that he would not be bound by it and that Sierra could terminate his employment if it objected. Sierra argued that Mar's continued employment for 19 months after the introduction of the arbitration agreement constituted assent to the agreement.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Sierra defendants' motion to compel arbitration. The court found that Sierra defendants failed to meet their burden to establish the existence of an arbitration agreement because Mar clearly stated that he refused to sign the arbitration agreement and Sierra could terminate his employment if it objected.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that while an employee's continued employment can generally be taken as assent to an arbitration agreement, this is not the case when the employee promptly rejects the arbitration agreement and makes clear he or she refuses to be bound by the agreement. In this case, Mar promptly and unequivocally rejected the arbitration agreement, and thus, there was no mutual assent to arbitrate. View "Mar v. Perkins" on Justia Law

In August 2020, Governor Gavin Newsom and the California Department of Public Health (CDPH) introduced the Blueprint for a Safer Economy, a color-coded, risk-based framework for managing restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Blueprint included restrictions on business activities, including customer capacity limitations. Plaintiffs, Central California businesses and their owners, filed suit against the Governor and others responsible for creating and enforcing the Blueprint, alleging that its creation and enforcement were unlawful. They claimed that the Governor and CDPH lacked statutory authority to implement the Blueprint, and that broadly interpreting the Emergency Services Act (ESA) and Health and Safety Code section 120140 conferred unfettered discretion on defendants to impose restrictions on businesses, violating the California Constitution’s non-delegation doctrine.The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Blueprint. On appeal, the court dismissed the appeal as moot because the Governor had rescinded the Blueprint. After this, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted defendants’ motion and denied plaintiffs’ motion, holding that the Third District Court of Appeal’s decision in Newsom v. Superior Court (Gallagher) had rejected the same challenges to the Governor’s emergency powers that plaintiffs assert. The court entered judgment in defendants’ favor.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District affirmed the judgment. The court followed Gallagher and concluded it governs the outcome of this appeal. The court held that the ESA permitted the Governor to amend or make new laws and did not violate the constitutional separation of powers by delegating quasi-legislative power to the Governor in an emergency. The court also found that the ESA contained several safeguards on the exercise of the power, including that the Governor must terminate the state of emergency as soon as possible and that the Legislature may terminate the emergency by passing a concurrent resolution. View "Ghost Golf, Inc. v. Newsom" on Justia Law

A Lyft driver, Abdu Lkader Al Shikha, was attacked by a passenger who had a criminal record. Al Shikha sued Lyft for negligence, arguing that the company should conduct criminal background checks on all passengers, not just drivers. The trial court granted Lyft's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Lyft had no legal duty to conduct background checks on passengers.Al Shikha appealed, but the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Three affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found that Al Shikha failed to establish that Lyft's legal duty to its drivers extends to conducting criminal background checks on all riders. The court reasoned that such a duty would be highly burdensome and would not necessarily prevent violent attacks on drivers. The court also noted that the foreseeability of a passenger attacking a driver was not sufficiently high to warrant imposing this duty on Lyft.The court further noted that imposing a duty on Lyft to conduct criminal background checks on all passengers would raise significant concerns about consumer privacy and the potential for discrimination. The court concluded that Al Shikha's complaint failed to allege facts demonstrating that the type of harm he suffered was highly foreseeable, or that the failure to conduct criminal background checks on all passengers is sufficiently likely to result in a violent, unprovoked attack on a driver. View "Shikha v. Lyft, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Leah Lorch, who filed a peremptory challenge against Judge Timothy B. Taylor, who was newly assigned to preside over her trial. Lorch's challenge was denied by Judge Taylor, who ruled that the challenge was untimely under the master calendar rule. This rule requires a party to file a challenge to the judge supervising the master calendar not later than the time the cause is assigned for trial. After the denial of the challenge, Judge Taylor proceeded with a two-day jury trial, which resulted in a defense verdict and judgment in favor of the defendant, Kia Motors America, Inc. Lorch then filed a petition within the statutory 10-day period, arguing that her challenge was timely because it was filed before the trial started.The trial court denied Lorch's peremptory challenge, ruling that it was untimely under the master calendar rule. The court also refused to stay the trial, and Judge Taylor immediately began a two-day jury trial, which resulted in a defense verdict and judgment in favor of Kia Motors America, Inc. Lorch then filed a petition within the statutory 10-day period, arguing that her challenge was timely because it was filed before the trial started.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, held that Lorch's section 170.6 challenge was timely filed before the commencement of the trial and rejected Kia's laches argument. The court also concluded that the Superior Court of San Diego County's local rule, which purports to provide any superior court judge with the power to act as a master calendar department for purposes of assigning cases for trial, is inconsistent with section 170.6 and case law interpreting the statute. The court granted the petition with directions to vacate the void orders and judgment entered by Judge Taylor after denying the peremptory challenge. View "Lorch v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a lawsuit filed by Masimo Corporation against John Bauche, BoundlessRise, LLC (Boundless), and Skyward Investments, LLC (Skyward), represented by The Vanderpool Law Firm (Vanderpool). The lawsuit was based on Bauche's misappropriation of corporate funds while he was a Masimo employee. Bauche had fraudulently engaged Boundless, a company he solely owned, as an "outside vendor" for Masimo, and later transferred the money paid for fraudulent vendor services to Skyward, another company he solely owned. Masimo's attempts to obtain substantive discovery responses from the defendants were met with boilerplate objections, leading to a motion to compel responses and a request for discovery sanctions.The case was stayed twice, first due to Bauche's appeal from the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion, and then to allow a federal criminal case against him to be resolved. The referee supervising discovery recommended that the motion to compel be granted and Masimo be awarded $10,000 in discovery sanctions. The trial court agreed and entered an order to that effect, awarding sanctions against Vanderpool and the three defendants.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three, Vanderpool appealed the order, arguing that it had substituted out of the case as counsel before the motion to compel was filed and was therefore unsanctionable. The court rejected this argument, stating that it is not necessary to be counsel of record to be liable for monetary sanctions for discovery misuse. The court affirmed the order, concluding that Vanderpool and its clients were liable for discovery misuse. The court also criticized Vanderpool for its lack of civility in the proceedings. View "Masimo Corporation v. The Vanderpool Law Firm, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Symons Emergency Specialties (Symons), a provider of ambulance services, and the City of Riverside. The City regulates ambulance services within its limits under the Riverside Municipal Code (RMC), which requires operators to obtain a valid franchise or permit. Symons filed a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City, arguing that the RMC section requiring a permit is invalid under the Emergency Medical Services System and Prehospital Emergency Medical Care Act (EMS Act). The dispute centered on whether the City had regulated nonemergency ambulance services as of June 1, 1980, which would allow it to continue doing so under the EMS Act's grandfathering provisions.The trial court found in favor of the City, concluding that Symons had failed to meet its burden of proof. Symons appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting certain testimonies, that the court's factual finding was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the RMC section violated federal anti-trust law.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found no error in the admission of testimonies, concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings, and rejected Symons's anti-trust argument. The court held that the City's regulation of ambulance services did not violate the EMS Act or federal anti-trust law. View "Symons Emergency Specialties v. City of Riverside" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between plaintiffs Michelle Beverage and Joseph Mejia, and defendant Apple, Inc. The plaintiffs filed a class action complaint alleging that Apple's restrictive contractual terms and coercive conduct towards software developers on its App Store constituted unlawful and unfair practices that violated the Cartwright Act and the Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The plaintiffs specifically focused on Apple's treatment of one developer, Epic Games, Inc., and its gaming application, Fortnite. The trial court sustained a demurrer brought by Apple without leave to amend, applying the Colgate doctrine and the holding of Chavez v. Whirlpool Corporation. The court determined that the plaintiffs did not and could not state causes of action under either legal regime as a matter of law.The trial court's decision was based on the application of the Colgate doctrine and the holding of Chavez v. Whirlpool Corporation. The court found that the plaintiffs did not and could not state causes of action under either the Cartwright Act or the UCL as a matter of law. The plaintiffs appealed only one aspect of the trial court's ruling, arguing that the court erred by relying on Chavez to sustain the demurrer to their UCL cause of action alleging unfair practices by Apple towards Epic Games.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court disagreed with the plaintiffs' argument that Chavez was inconsistent with the California Supreme Court’s decision in Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Company. The court found that the trial court correctly relied on Chavez to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend. The court held that the plaintiffs did not state a claim as a matter of law under the "unfair" prong of the UCL, considering the trial court's ruling that Apple's practices constituted permissible unilateral conduct. View "Beverage v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

Dr. Ryan Kime, an emergency medicine physician, applied for privileges in the emergency department of two hospitals owned by Dignity Health, Inc. (Dignity) while he was under disciplinary proceedings by the Medical Board of California. The proceedings resulted in a public reprimand. Dignity stopped processing Kime’s application a few days after the reprimand took effect. Kime sued Dignity for injunctive relief and damages, alleging that Dignity violated his common law and statutory rights by denying his application without offering him a hearing. Dignity moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had a policy not to consider applicants with disciplinary histories for emergency department privileges, and that no hearing is required when privileges are denied due to such a policy. The trial court granted Dignity’s motion for summary judgment and denied Kime’s motion for summary adjudication.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found that Dignity's policy of not considering applicants with disciplinary histories for emergency department privileges was a quasi-legislative decision, which did not require a hearing under the common law right to fair procedure. The court also found that Dignity's decision to deny Kime's application did not require a hearing under the statutory right set forth in the Business and Professions Code, as the decision was not made by a peer review body and did not require the filing of a report under section 805 of the Code. The court concluded that Kime had no right to a hearing under either the common law or statutory law. View "Kime v. Dignity Health, Inc." on Justia Law