Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

Boschetti sued Pacific Bay, Sparks, and others, alleging that Boschetti and Sparks owned commercial real property through membership in limited liability companies and partnerships, that defendants provide real property management services for the real estate portfolio, and that Pacific Bay paid itself improper distributions in violation of its fiduciary duty to Boschetti. Sparks and Pacific Bay cross-complained, seeking dissolution of six of the out-of-state LPs and LLCs because Sparks and Boschetti could not coexist effectively given the litigation. Boschetti sought to avoid dissolution by buy-outs. When an action is brought to dissolve a California LP or LLC, the other partners or members may avoid the dissolution by purchasing, for cash, the interests owned by the party seeking dissolution, Corp. Code 15908.02(b), 17707.03(c)(1). These “buyout” provisions do not apply to an action to dissolve a general partnership, sections 16801–16807. An amended cross-complaint alleged that Boschetti and Sparks have a general partnership and sought an order dissolving that partnership. The out-of-state LPs and LLCs hold title to property owned by the general partnership. Boschetti again sought to avoid dissolution and moved to stay the dissolution of the LPs and LLCs. The court of appeal held that the trial court lacks authority to order the dissolution of the out-of-state entities. View "Boschetti v. Pacific Bay Investments Inc." on Justia Law

A default judgment may not be entered for an amount in excess of the demand in the operative pleadings when the plaintiff seeks an accounting or valuation of a business. A comparison of whether a default judgment exceeds the amount of compensatory damages demanded in the operative pleadings are to be examined on an aggregate basis, rather than on a claim-by-claim or item-by-item basis.The Court of Appeal held, in this case, that the default judgment awarding compensatory damages of $2,806,532 exceeded the $987,500 in compensatory damages specified in the operative complaint. Therefore, the default judgment was void to the extent of the coverage. The court remanded for the trial court to determine whether to give plaintiff the option to accept a modified default judgment in this reduced amount or to amend her complaint to demand greater relief. View "Sass v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff engaged Pinel to sell his Danville home in 2008. In 2015 he filed a putative class action lawsuit on behalf of California residents who, in 2004-2011, used Pinel to buy or sell a home in California and had utilized TransactionPoint, Fidelity's real estate software program, alleging Pinel had entered into unlawful sublicensing agreements with Fidelity subsidiaries, allowing those entities to contract their settlement services to Pinel clients using TransactionPoint, and the Fidelity defendants paid unlawful sublicensing fees to Pinel for the TransactionPoint-generated business. The defendants cited the arbitration clause in plaintiff’s listing agreement, which contained a notice provision required by Code of Civil Procedure 1298(c) with spaces for the client’s and broker’s initials. Pinel produced a copy of plaintiff's listing agreement. The 1298(c) notice on the copy showed plaintiff’s initials; the space for Pinel’s initials was blank. Pinel submitted a declaration that the original listing agreement was destroyed in accordance with Pinel’s normal document retention policy; that the copy was obtained from the listing agent; that it was Pinel’s policy to allow a client to elect whether to assent to the arbitration provision by initialing paragraph 19B; that Pinel “would as a matter of policy and custom and practice adopt the election of the client and initial Paragraph 19B.” The court of appeal affirmed the denial of Pinel’s motion. Pinel failed to establish that it had initialed the arbitration provision. The language of that provision contemplated mutual agreement and that each would indicate assent by initialing the provision. View "Juen v. Alain Pinel Realtors, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants, Sorokine and Koudriavtseva, are husband and wife. DBS and Kornach are California licensed contractors; DBS worked on their San Rafael house, while Kornach did not. Kornach, a longtime friend of Sorokine’s, had purchased materials for DIY projects at the property because of the discounts afforded to licensed general contractors. Sorokine does not speak English; Kornach often interpreted for Sorokine. After Koudriavtseva fired DBS, she hired unlicensed builders to complete the work and remedy alleged defects. DBS sued, alleging breach of contract and foreclosure of mechanic’s lien. Appellants’ response named as cross-defendants DBS, Komach, and ACIC, which had issued a surety bond to Kornach. The court of appeal reversed a directed verdict against appellants on a claim they violated an Internal Revenue Code provision and awarding $20,000 in sanctions and $122,995 in attorney fees against them. There was no evidence that appellants knew that 1099s issued to Komach were incorrect. The court also reversed directed verdicts against appellants on claims they had asserted against others; appellants were unable to prove damage because the trial court had granted a motion in limine preventing appellants from introducing evidence of payments made to an unlicensed contractor. The court also reversed an award of cost of proof damages to Kornach based on requests for admissions propounded by a different party. View "Design Built Systems v. Sorokine" on Justia Law

In 2011, Richmond issued the city's first medical marijuana collective permit to RCCC. Other permits were later issued to the defendants. The ordinance governing the permits was amended in 2014, to reduce the number of dispensary permits from six to three, and to provide that if a permitted dispensary did not open within six months after the issuance of a permit, the permit would become void. RCCC lost its permit. RCCC sued, claiming that defendants, acting in concert, encouraged and paid for community opposition to RCCC’s applications and purchased a favorably zoned property. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, which provides that a claim 'arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech ... in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike," unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established a probability of success on the merits. One defendant admitted: “Our group declared war on RCCC. We conspired to prevent RCCC from getting any property in Richmond.“ The court ultimately determined that the defendants failed to show how the allegations were protected activity and denied the anti-SLAPP motion. The court of appeal affirmed, stating that the appeal had no merit and will delay the plaintiff’s case and cause him to incur unnecessary attorney fees. View "Richmond Compassionate Care Collective v. 7 Stars Holistic Foundation, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that recording secret business conversations and using the recordings in an arbitration were not in connection with a judicial or official proceeding authorized by law, and therefore they were not protected activities under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute).In this case, after defendant, the president of Tang Energy Corp., secretly recorded conversations with Sherman Xuming Zhang, president of AVIC International USA, defendant introduced the recordings as evidence in contractual arbitration. When the arbitrators decided the issue in favor of Tang Energy, Zhang and AVIC filed suit against defendant for invasion of privacy and eavesdropping on or recording confidential communications in violation of Penal Code sections 632 and 637.2. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's special motion to strike under section 425.16. View "Zhang v. Jenevein" on Justia Law

When O'Gara Coach moved to disqualify Richie Litigation from representing its former senior executive, Joseph Ra, in litigation, O'Gara Coach argued that Darren Richie had been a client contact for outside counsel investigating the charges of fraudulent conduct that ultimately led to an action alleging that O'Gara Coach and Ra had committed fraud in connection with Marcelo Caraveo's acquisition of luxury vehicles from O'Gara Coach.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order denying the motion to disqualify Richie Litigation. The court held that Darren Richie could not act as Ra's counsel because he obtained privileged information relating to the pending litigation as O'Gara Coach's President and CEO. Furthermore, Richie Litigation, not just Richie, must be disqualified under established rules for vicarious disqualification. View "O'Gara Coach Co. v. Ra" on Justia Law

1st Century was a Delaware corporation headquartered in Los Angeles; its shares were publicly traded on the NASDAQ. 1st Century and Midland announced merger plans. Midland was to acquire 1st Century for $11.22 in cash per share, a 36.3 percent premium over 1st Century’s closing share price on March 10, 2016. The merger was subject to approval by the holders of a majority of 1st Century’s outstanding shares. A shareholder vote on the proposed merger was scheduled. 1st Century’s certificate of incorporation authorized its directors “to adopt, alter, amend or repeal” the company’s bylaws, “subject to the power of the stockholders of the Corporation to alter or repeal any Bylaws whether adopted by them or otherwise.” 1st Century’s board of directors exercised that power when it approved the merger agreement, adding a forum selection bylaw providing that, absent the corporation’s written consent, Delaware is “the sole and exclusive forum for” intra-corporate disputes, including any action asserting a breach of fiduciary duty claim. The trial court stayed a putative shareholder class action, concluding that the bylaw’s forum selection clause was enforceable. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that a forum selection bylaw adopted by a Delaware corporation without stockholder consent is enforceable in California. View "Drulias v. 1st Century Bancshares, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment denying Acco's petition for writ of mandamus seeking review of an administrative decision adopted by the Registrar, finding Acco in violation of Business and Professions Code section 7110 for failing to obtain a building permit before replacing a boiler. The court held that the Legislature's use of the term "willful" in section 7110 only requires a showing of general intent. The court also held that there was substantial evidence to support the Administrative Judge's determination that Acco willfully violated the applicable building laws. The court noted that the fact that an individual employee may not have been aware of a specific local permit requirement does not excuse a corporate licensee from complying with the building laws. View "Acco Engineered Systems v. Contractors' State License Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, the Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut, and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (collectively, Travelers) filed this action against certain subcontractors to recover attorneys’ fees and costs Travelers incurred in defending developers Westlake Villas, LLC and Meer Capital Partners, LLC (collectively, Westlake) in a prior construction defect action. Travelers' claims were based on alleged subrogation to the rights of its additional insured, Westlake. The Westlake entities were suspended corporations under Revenue and Taxation Code section 23301, and could not assert these claims on their own behalf. Defendant Engel Insulation, Inc. moved for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that Travelers was also barred under this statute from prosecuting these claims. On appeal, Travelers contended the trial court erred in granting Engel’s motion without leave to amend. The Court of Appeal disagreed: an insurer could not file its own action to assert claims solely as a subrogee of a suspended corporation. View "Travelers Property Casualty Co. of Amer. v. Engel Insulation, Inc." on Justia Law