Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around the petitioner, Tom Nichols, also known as Nikki, who is currently serving a prison sentence for sex crimes against children. Nikki, a transgender woman in the process of transitioning, filed a petition for a sealed-record name change, arguing that an open-record proceeding could jeopardize her safety due to her gender identity.The District Court of the Third Judicial District initially denied Nikki's petition. The court's decision was based on the fact that Nikki failed to demonstrate probable cause that her safety was at risk, a requirement under Section 27-31-201, MCA, for a petition to proceed on a sealed-record basis. The court also had to be satisfied that the petitioner was not attempting to avoid debt or hide a criminal record.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court noted that district courts have broad discretion to grant or deny a petition for a sealed-record name change. The Supreme Court would only reverse a district court decision if it was arbitrary or exceeded the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice. In this case, the Supreme Court found that Nikki failed to provide specific instances of abuse or explain why an open-record proceeding would change her circumstances at the Montana State Prison. Furthermore, Nikki did not provide any support for the alleged risk of harm from members of the public. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it determined the evidence was insufficient to support Nikki’s petition. View "In re Name Change of Nichols" on Justia Law

The defendant, Robert Wayne Cunningham, was convicted of provocative act murder and other offenses related to a 1995 shootout with the police. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, along with consecutive determinate sentences. The incident occurred when Cunningham and his accomplice, Soley, were under police surveillance due to suspicion of committing a series of armed robberies. The police followed them to a liquor store, where they committed a robbery. The police blocked their car, leading to a shootout initiated by Cunningham, which resulted in Soley's death and injuries to Cunningham and at least one police officer.Cunningham sought sentencing relief under Penal Code section 1172.6 but was unsuccessful. He appealed, arguing that provocative murder is based on the imputation of malice, which he claimed is now barred by the newly enacted Penal Code section 188, subdivision (a)(3). He also contended that the prosecutor's argument that he started the gun battle was equivalent to arguing the now discarded "natural and probable consequences" doctrine.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District disagreed with Cunningham's arguments. The court noted that provocative act murder has been a part of California law since the 1960s and that the legislature's failure to mention it in the new statute indicates it did not intend to discard this theory. The court also stated that the prosecutor's argument did not preclude the statute and that the jury's verdict was informed by the instructions given. The court cited a recent case, People v. Antonelli, where it held that the provocative murder doctrine survived recent legislative enactments. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, denying Cunningham's sentencing relief. View "People v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

The case involves Maria E. Garcia and Liang Guo Yu, who were convicted for money laundering. The charges stemmed from their involvement with the Villalobos drug trafficking organization (DTO) in Houston, Texas. The DTO was known for moving hundreds of kilograms of cocaine and making yearly profits in the millions. Garcia and Yu were implicated in the seizure of large sums of cash during two separate searches. They were charged with conspiring to launder monetary instruments and aiding and abetting money laundering. Both defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they committed the offenses.Prior to their trial, the defendants had their motions for a new trial and to suppress denied by the district court. At trial, the government presented testimony from ten witnesses and introduced dozens of exhibits. The jury found Garcia and Yu guilty of both charges. Post-trial, the district court denied all three motions for a new trial and for a judgment of acquittal. Garcia was sentenced to two concurrent 78-month terms of imprisonment and two concurrent 3-year terms of supervised release. Yu was sentenced to two concurrent 151-month terms of imprisonment and two concurrent 3-year terms of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district court. The court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove the defendants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also held that the district court did not err in assessing a sentencing enhancement for Garcia and in denying Yu's motion to suppress without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The court further held that the district court did not err in denying Yu's motion for a new trial as untimely. View "USA v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The case involves Kendall Len Burgess, who was convicted for aggravated sexual abuse and abusive sexual contact involving a seven-year-old victim, P.G. The primary issue was whether the district court erred in admitting a fifty-minute video recording of a forensic interview with P.G., conducted three days after the last incident of alleged sexual abuse. The interview was admitted under the residual exception to the rule against hearsay, after P.G., then aged nine, testified inconsistently at trial about the acts committed by Burgess.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma had convicted Burgess based on the evidence presented, including the video recording. The court found that P.G.’s statements during the recorded interview were trustworthy and more probative than any other evidence that could be obtained through reasonable efforts.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the recorded interview. The court also rejected Burgess's other arguments, including allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and cumulative error. The court held that the prosecutor's questions and closing argument did not warrant reversing Burgess's convictions. Therefore, the court affirmed both of Burgess's convictions. View "United States v. Burgess" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the issue of when a non-eyewitness can testify to a jury that the defendant is the person depicted in a photo or video. The incident in question occurred on June 10, 2015, when a man was captured on police cameras in Syracuse firing three shots into a van. The defendant, Farod Mosley, was indicted for the shooting in September 2015, but the indictment was dismissed as legally insufficient. In July 2016, an assistant district attorney showed the video of the shooting to Detective Steven Kilburn, who identified Mosley as the shooter in the video. This identification led to a new indictment against Mosley.The trial took place in February 2018, with the key issue being the identification of the shooter in the video. The prosecution relied on Kilburn to provide lay, non-eyewitness identification testimony that he believed Mosley was the shooter in the video. The jury ultimately convicted Mosley of two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree. Mosley argued that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Kilburn's testimony.The Appellate Division rejected Mosley's contention, holding that the People demonstrated Kilburn was more likely than the jury to correctly identify Mosley in the video. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the People failed to establish that Kilburn's testimony would aid the jury in making an independent assessment regarding whether the person in the video was Mosley. The court ruled that such testimony may be admitted where the witness is sufficiently familiar with the defendant that their testimony would be reliable, and there is reason to believe the jury might require such assistance in making its independent assessment. In this case, there was no showing that the proffered witness was sufficiently familiar with the defendant to render his testimony helpful, or that the jury faced an obstacle to making the identification that the witness's testimony would have overcome. View "People v Mosley" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Corey Dunton, who was convicted of attempted murder, assault, criminal possession of a weapon, and reckless endangerment after he opened fire at a skating rink, injuring two individuals. Dunton had a history of violent outbursts and disruptive behavior, both in and out of the courtroom. During the announcement of the verdict, Dunton, who was handcuffed for security reasons, disrupted the proceedings with verbal outbursts directed at the jury. As a result, the court ordered his removal from the courtroom.The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed Dunton's conviction. However, following a similar case (People v Antoine), Dunton's appellate counsel contacted the Office of the Appellate Defender (OAD) regarding filing a writ of error coram nobis on Dunton's behalf. The OAD filed the writ, arguing that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain claims, including that the trial court violated Dunton's constitutional and statutory right to be present during the rendering of the verdict when it removed him from the courtroom without prior warning. The Appellate Division granted the writ, reversed the judgment, and ordered a new trial.The case was then brought before the Court of Appeals. The court held that the trial court's removal of Dunton from the courtroom was appropriate given his history of violent outbursts and disruptive behavior. The court rejected the argument that any error was de minimis based on the timing of Dunton's removal from the courtroom. The court also held that the Appellate Division erroneously concluded that the trial court violated Dunton's right to be present, and therefore incorrectly granted Dunton's writ of error coram nobis on the sole ground that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this meritless claim on direct appeal. The court reversed the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of issues raised but not determined by that Court. View "People v. Dunton" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Kenneth Fisher, who was convicted of three counts of third-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance, based on two controlled buy operations. He was sentenced to nine years in prison. During the trial, one of the jurors believed that Fisher had followed her home after the first day of jury selection. She did not immediately inform the court of her concern but waited until the case was submitted to the jury, and then expressed her safety concern to the other jurors during deliberations.The trial court deemed the juror's belief likely unfounded and, despite some assurances that the juror could put aside her concerns, the court decided to retain her. Fisher's attorney moved for a mistrial on the basis that he did not have a fair and impartial jury, but the court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision, and a Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.The Court of Appeals found that the juror's belief that she had been followed home by Fisher was a prejudicial belief about the defendant that was not based on the evidence at trial. The court noted that the juror's fear was not about witnesses or collateral matters, but about the defendant's character. The court also noted that the juror had violated the court's instructions by failing to inform the court promptly about her beliefs about the defendant and instead introduced those beliefs into jury deliberations. The court concluded that the juror was "grossly unqualified" and should have been dismissed, and a mistrial granted. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and ordered a new trial. View "People v Fisher" on Justia Law

In December 2016, an undercover police officer purchased heroin through an intermediary during a buy-and-bust operation in Manhattan. The officer did not meet the seller face-to-face but followed several feet behind the intermediary and the seller. The officer was far enough away that he could not hear their conversation. After the transaction, the officer reported to his team that the dealer was wearing specific clothing. Minutes later, the police arrested the defendant nearby, and the undercover officer identified him as the seller. The defendant filed a motion arguing that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him and that the court should suppress the undercover officer's identification, the prerecorded buy money, and the defendant's cell phone.The Supreme Court ordered a hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to arrest the defendant. The undercover officer testified about his observations during the operation and his subsequent identification of the defendant. After the hearing, the court ruled that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant and suppressed the undercover officer's identification and the physical evidence recovered from the defendant. The defendant then moved for an independent source hearing to determine whether the undercover officer would be allowed to identify him at trial. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the undercover's testimony at the probable cause hearing provided clear and convincing evidence for an in-court identification of the defendant at trial. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to six years in prison.The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, concluding that the court had exercised its discretion appropriately in denying the defendant's request for a separate independent source hearing. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and ordered a new trial to be preceded by an independent source hearing. The court held that the trial court erred in admitting the undercover officer's in-court identification without a hearing record sufficient to support an independent source determination for the identification. The court found that the testimony at the probable cause hearing did not provide enough evidence to support an independent source determination. The court concluded that the defendant was entitled to an independent source hearing, as requested. View "People v Williams" on Justia Law

Rodger Freeman, convicted of a felony in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, was sentenced to imprisonment followed by a term of supervised release. After completing his federal prison sentence, Freeman was transferred to New York State custody to face a pending indictment. The New York Appellate Division vacated Freeman’s state convictions due to procedural error and ordered a new trial. Freeman was held in state custody for over four years pending retrial. The state eventually dismissed the charges against Freeman and released him from pre-trial detention.The District Court held that Freeman's term of supervised release began only after his release from state custody, not upon his release from federal custody. The court based its decision on United States v. Johnson, which established that a term of federal supervised release does not begin until a defendant’s imprisonment has ended.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court's interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), which states that a term of supervised release commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment. The court held that Freeman's term of supervised release began on the day he was released from state custody, not federal custody. The court did not address the question of whether Freeman’s federal term of supervised release was “tolled” during his years in state custody following the vacatur of his state convictions. View "United States v. Freeman" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Carlos Rubén Boyrie-Laboy, a Puerto Rico Police officer, who was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951, 371, and 641 for his involvement in a conspiracy to commit robbery and theft of government property. Boyrie-Laboy was part of the Humacao Drugs Division, responsible for seizing illegal weapons, drugs, and other contraband. In 2015, Officer Gabriel Maldonado-Martínez joined the division and began working with Boyrie-Laboy. Maldonado-Martínez later became an undercover FBI informant to identify corrupt police officers. Boyrie-Laboy was involved in two thefts of fireworks and was present during two FBI operations designed to catch corrupt officers. However, he did not accept any stolen goods or money from these operations.The government indicted Boyrie-Laboy and three other officers based on these activities. Boyrie-Laboy was charged with conspiracy to commit robbery, conspiracy to steal and convert government property, and theft and conversion of government property. He proceeded to a five-day jury trial, where the jury found him guilty on all counts. Boyrie-Laboy appealed the convictions, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support them.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Boyrie-Laboy's counsel had declined the opportunity to move for a judgment of acquittal twice during the trial and did not make a post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal. As a result, the court applied the "clear and gross injustice" standard of review. The court found that the evidence sufficiently supported the jury's findings and that upholding Boyrie-Laboy's convictions did not result in a clear and gross injustice. Therefore, the court affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Boyrie-Laboy" on Justia Law