Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

Anthony Pacchia brought an action challenging a transaction through which Activision Blizzard, Inc. and an entity controlled by Activision’s two senior officers acquired more than fifty percent of Activision’s outstanding shares from Vivendi S.A., its controlling stockholder. Several of the individual defendants who served on the Activision board of directors and approved the transaction were senior officers of Vivendi (“Vivendi Directors”). Vivendi objected to the document requests that Plaintiff served on the grounds that French law generally barred the production of discovery, noting that all of its electronic documents were housed on servers in Paris, France, and could not be produced. Plaintiff filed a motion to compel seeking an order requiring Vivendi and the Vivendi Directors to produce documents in their custody and control, wherever located, in accordance with the Court of Chancery Rules and without regard to any contrary provisions of French law. The Court of Chancery largely granted the motion and directed that discovery proceed in the manner described in this decision. View "In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholder Litig." on Justia Law

The parties in this dispute were Koninklijke Philips N.V. (“Philips N.V.”), a Netherlands holding company, and Carlo Vichi, an Italian businessman who had a longstanding business relationship with Philips N.V. Philips N.V. was a participant in a joint venture, LG.Philips Displays Holdings B.V. (LPD), that did business with Vichi and other entities. LPD approached Vichi for a substantial loan, which Vichi agreed to make. The joint venture eventually defaulted on the loan. Vichi filed a complaint against Philips N.V., claiming that Philips N.V. committed fraud by misrepresenting the joint venture’s financial condition and prospects and by falsely promising that it would stand behind LPD to ensure it could meet its financial obligations. The Court of Chancery held that Philips N.V. was not liable to Vichi on any of the claims he presented at trial and that Philips N.V. should not be held responsible for the loss Vichi suffered on the loan he made to LPD. View "Vichi v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs., N.V." on Justia Law

In 2013, the Board of Directors of Morgans Hotel Group Co. (the Company) approved a two-part recapitalization involving the Yucaipa Companies, LLC. Stockholder OTK Associates filed a complaint alleging that Yucaipa, three affiliated entities, the investor who controlled Yucaipa, and the directors who approved the recapitalization breached their fiduciary duties and engaged in acts of wrongdoing when pursuing and approving the recapitalization. Counts I-VIII of the complaint sought to recover from Defendants the damages the Company suffered, and Count IX sought a declaration that the agreements governing the recapitalization were invalid. Several defendants filed motions to dismiss. The Court of Chancery held (1) the motion to dismiss on the basis that Counts I-VIII were moot was denied because OTK could recover damages on the Company’s behalf; (2) Count IX was dismissed pursuant to Rule 23.1 to the extent it contended that Yucaipa and its affiliates repudiated the transaction agreements; and (3) two of the defendant directors’ motions to dismiss in reliance on an exculpatory provision in the Company’s certificate of incorporation was denied, as the Court could not apply the exculpatory provision summarily at the pleadings stage to enter judgment in their favor. View "OTK Assocs., LLC v. Friedman" on Justia Law

In 2009, Sirius SM Radio Inc. negotiated a capital infusion (the investment agreement) from Liberty Media Corporation in return for Liberty Media receiving preferred stock in Sirius. Under the investment agreement, Liberty Media secured the ability to take control of Sirius in 2012 without paying a premium to Sirius stockholders by purchasing additional shares needed to obtain control in the market. When Liberty Media announced in 2012 that it intended to acquire majority control, Plaintiffs sued, contending that the Sirius board had breached its fiduciary duties by adhering to the provisions of the investment agreement and that Liberty Media breached its fiduciary duties by purchasing shares on the open market to acquire majority control of Sirius without paying a premium. The Court of Chancery granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, holding (1) Plaintiffs' challenge to the investment agreement was time-barred, as it was filed after the three-year limitations period expired; and (2) Liberty Media's decision to give valuable consideration in exchange for the right to make open market purchases after the standstill period expired provided no basis for a cause of action against it. View "In Re Sirius XM S'holder Litig." on Justia Law

Twenty-three plaintiffs (Plaintiffs) representing the interests of a stockholder faction challenged the validity of incumbent directorships elected at the corporation's annual meeting. The parties stipulated to holding a second stockholders' meeting, at which five directors were elected to the corporation's board. After three of the directors resigned their directorships, the two remaining directors executed written consents appointing a third director to the board. The three directors then appointed two more directors to fill the remaining vacancies. Plaintiffs petitioned the Chancery Court pursuant to Del. Code 8, 223(c) to order a new election through exercise of the stockholders' franchise rather than through appointment by the remaining directors. After noting that Plaintiffs bore the burden of persuasion under section 223(c), the Court held that the equities did not support a special meeting of the stockholders and that the directors appointed by the remaining elected directors continue in office until the election at the next annual meeting. View "Canmore Consultants Ltd. v. L.O.M. Med. Int'l, Inc. " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Costantini, Jr. and Kahn sought indemnification for their fees and costs in underlying litigation involving Swiss Farm. The court concluded that Costantini was entitled to indemnification under Article 14 of the Operating Agreement because he was a manager of Swiss Farm and was sued by Swiss Farm in that capacity and prevailed. However, the court concluded that, although Kahn was sued for breach of fiduciary duty and prevailed, he was not a member of the Board of Managers, an officer, an employee or an agent of the company and, therefore, was not entitled to indemnification under the Operating Agreement. Accordingly, the court granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings. View "Costantini, et al. v. Swiss Farm Stores Acquisition LLC" on Justia Law

Trusts that owned fifty percent of the common stock of nominal defendant IMS alleged that two of the company's three most senior officers mismanaged the company in breach of their fiduciary duties. Trusts moved to compel IMS to produce the senior officers' work email accounts. The senior officers asserted the attorney-client privilege but did not invoke the work product doctrine. The court concluded that the In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd. factors weighed in favor of production, absent a statutory override that could alter the common law result. Because IMS conducted its business in Maryland, the federal government and the State of Maryland were the sovereigns whose laws IMS must follow when dealing with its employees' email. The Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq.; the Federal Store Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2701; the Maryland Wiretap Act, Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. 10-401 to 10-414; and the Maryland Stored Communications Act, Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. 10-4A-01 to 10-4A-08, did not change the common law privilege analysis. Accordingly, the court granted the motion to compel. View "In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. Derivative Litigation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a derivative action on behalf of China Automotive alleging breaches of fiduciary duty, insider trading, and unjust enrichment against five members of China Automotive's Board. The court concluded that because plaintiffs have not alleged particularized facts showing that any of Defendants Richardson, Tung, or Xu were interested, not independent, or facing a substantial threat of personal liability at the time the derivative Complaint was filed, these three directors were entitled to consider demand. Therefore, under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, demand was not excused. The court rejected plaintiffs' remaining claims under Rule 23.1 and dismissed as to plaintiffs with prejudice. View "In re: China Automotive Systems Inc. Derivative Litigation" on Justia Law

R&D, a member of the Joint Venture, brought a books and records action under 6 Del. C. 18-305 and the Joint Venture's limited liability company agreement, seeking two categories of books and records that were in the possession and control of Investment Services. At issue was whether the court had jurisdiction over Investment Services, an Indiana corporation, under either Delaware's long-arm statute or its Limited Liability Company Act, 6 Del. C. ch. 18. The court concluded that R&D had not met its burden of making a prima facie showing of a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction over Investment Services under either Delaware's long-arm statute or Section 18-109 of the LLC Act. Therefore, R&D's claim against Investment Services must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court also concluded that the court did have jurisdiction over HDG Properties because of its contractual consent; R&D failed to allege any "reasonably conceivable" collection of facts upon which it could prevail against other HDG Defendants; and R&D's inspection claims against these HDG Defendants must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the motion to dismiss was granted as to all of the HDG Defendants. View "Florida R&D Fund Investors, LLC v. Florida BOCA/Deerfield R&D Investors, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

In 2000, Trados Inc. obtained venture capital (VC) to support a growth strategy that could lead to an initial public offering. The VC firms received preferred stock and placed representatives on the Trados board of directors (the Board). Trados, however, failed to satisfy its VC backers. The Board subsequently adopted a management incentive plan (MIP) that compensated management for achieving a sale even if the sale yielded nothing for the common stock. In 2005, SDL plc acquired Trados for $60 million. The merger constituted a liquidation that entitled the preferred stockholders to a liquidation preference of $57.9 million. Without the MIP, the common stockholders would have received $2.1 million. With the MIP, the common stockholders received nothing. Plaintiff contended that instead of selling to SDL, the board had a fiduciary duty to continue operating Trados independently to generate value for the common stock. The Court of Chancery held that Defendants proved the decision to approve the merger was fair, as the common stock had no economic value before the merger, making it fair for its holders to receive in the merger the substantial equivalent of what they had before. Likewise, the fair value of the common stock for purposes of appraisal was zero. View "In re Trados Inc. S'holders Litig." on Justia Law