Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between two parties who entered into a partnership agreement that specified the financial conditions under which the appellant would receive a distribution upon the sale of the partnership’s principal asset. The agreement set a net-sale-price threshold above which the appellant would receive a distribution, and it directed the general partner to calculate that net sale price by deducting certain categories of costs from the gross sales price. The general partner determined that the deductions reduced the net sale price below the minimum threshold for a distribution. The appellant challenged several of these deductions, particularly the costs incurred to defease the interest payments on the mortgage.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware reviewed the case and held that the deduction for the costs to defease the interest payments on the mortgage was proper under the partnership agreement. The court concluded that this deduction was outcome determinative and entered judgment in favor of the partnership. The court also noted that the general partner acted in good faith in calculating the net sale price, which eliminated any breach of contract claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Chancery’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the plain language of the partnership agreement and the formula used permitted the challenged deduction for defeasance costs. The court did not reach the effect or correctness of the Court of Chancery’s alternative holding regarding the general partner’s good faith. The Supreme Court concluded that the defeasance costs were properly deducted, which reduced the net resale price below the threshold required for the appellant to receive a distribution. View "Exit Strategy, LLC v. Festival Retail Fund BH, L.P." on Justia Law

A group of AIM ImmunoTech, Inc. stockholders believed the board was mismanaging the company and initiated a campaign to elect new directors. This effort included two felons convicted of financial crimes. The board rejected two nomination attempts under its bylaws, leading to a lawsuit. The Court of Chancery denied the insurgents' request for a preliminary injunction, citing factual disputes. The insurgents, led by Ted D. Kellner, made a third attempt to nominate directors. The board amended its bylaws to include new advance notice provisions and rejected Kellner's nominations for non-compliance. Kellner filed suit.The Court of Chancery invalidated four of the six main advance notice bylaws and reinstated a 2016 bylaw. The court upheld the board's rejection of Kellner's nominations for failing to comply with the remaining bylaws, including the reinstated 2016 provision. Kellner argued that the court improperly used the 2016 bylaw and that the amended bylaws were preclusive and adopted for an improper purpose. The defendants contended that the court erred in invalidating the bylaws and that they withstood enhanced scrutiny.The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found that the AIM board identified a legitimate threat to its information-gathering function but acted inequitably by adopting unreasonable bylaws to thwart Kellner's proxy contest. The court held that the board's primary purpose was to interfere with Kellner's nominations and maintain control. Consequently, the court declared the amended bylaws unenforceable. The judgment of the Court of Chancery was affirmed in part and reversed in part, closing the case. View "Kellner v. AIM ImmunoTech Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves NGL Energy Partners LP and NGL Energy Holdings LLC (collectively, "NGL") and LCT Capital, LLC ("LCT"). NGL, entities in the energy sector, engaged LCT, a financial advisory services provider, for services related to NGL's 2014 acquisition of TransMontaigne Inc. However, the parties failed to agree on payment terms, leading LCT to file a lawsuit in 2015. The Superior Court held a jury trial in July 2018, which resulted in a $36 million verdict in LCT's favor.NGL appealed the Superior Court's decision, challenging the $36 million final judgment and a set of evidentiary rulings. LCT cross-appealed, contesting the Superior Court's methodology for computing post-judgment interest. NGL argued that the Superior Court erred by admitting evidence and arguments about the value/benefit supposedly gained by NGL in the Transaction, asserting that such evidence is prejudicial and irrelevant to a quantum meruit claim. NGL also argued that the Superior Court erred by admitting evidence of benefit-of-the-bargain or expectancy damages when assessing the quantum meruit value of LCT’s services.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the Superior Court’s evidentiary rulings and rejected NGL's contention that the Superior Court incorrectly allowed LCT to recover benefit-of-the bargain/expectancy damages. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Superior Court’s post-judgment interest determination. The Supreme Court held that prejudgment interest is part of the judgment upon which post-judgment interest accrues under Section 2301(a). Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court as to this issue and remanded the case to the Superior Court for entry of judgment consistent with its opinion. View "NGL Energy Partners LP v. LCT Capital, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves BitGo Holdings, Inc. and Galaxy Digital Holdings Ltd., who entered into a merger agreement. BitGo, a technology company, was required to submit audited financial statements to Galaxy, the acquirer, by a specified date. When BitGo submitted the financial statements, Galaxy claimed they were deficient because they did not apply recently published guidance from the Securities and Exchange Commission’s staff. BitGo disagreed, but submitted a second set of financial statements. Galaxy found fault with the second submission and terminated the merger agreement. BitGo then sued Galaxy for wrongful repudiation and breach of the merger agreement.The Court of Chancery sided with Galaxy and dismissed the complaint. The court found that the financial statements submitted by BitGo did not comply with the requirements of the merger agreement, providing Galaxy with a valid basis to terminate the agreement.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the decision of the Court of Chancery. The Supreme Court found that the definition of the term “Company 2021 Audited Financial Statements” in the merger agreement was ambiguous. The court concluded that both parties had proffered reasonable interpretations of the merger agreement’s definition. Therefore, the court remanded the case for the consideration of extrinsic evidence to resolve this ambiguity. View "BitGo Holdings, Inc. v. Galaxy Digital Holdings Ltd., et al." on Justia Law

The case involves a group of pension funds (plaintiffs) who filed a lawsuit against Inovalon Holdings, Inc., and its board of directors (defendants), challenging an acquisition of Inovalon by a private equity consortium led by Nordic Capital. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties and unjustly enriched themselves through the transaction. They also alleged that the company's charter was violated because the transaction treated Class A and Class B stockholders unequally.In the lower court, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, the defendants moved to dismiss the case. They argued that the transaction satisfied the elements of a legal framework known as MFW, which would subject the board's actions to business judgment review. The Court of Chancery granted the defendants' motions to dismiss in full.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed the decision of the Court of Chancery. The Supreme Court found that the lower court erred in holding that the vote of the minority stockholders was adequately informed. The Supreme Court determined that the proxy statement issued to stockholders failed to adequately disclose certain conflicts of interest of the Special Committee’s advisors. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the transaction did not comply with the MFW framework, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Sarasota Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Inovalon Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a shareholder lawsuit challenging the fairness of IAC/InterActiveCorp’s separation from its controlled subsidiary, Match Group, Inc. The plaintiffs alleged that the transaction was unfair because IAC, a controlling shareholder of Match, received benefits in the transaction at the expense of the Match minority shareholders. The defendants claimed that business judgment review applied because they followed the MFW framework, which included approval by an independent and disinterested “separation committee” and a majority of uncoerced, fully informed, and unaffiliated Match shareholders. The Court of Chancery agreed and dismissed the complaint.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware concluded that in a suit claiming that a controlling shareholder stood on both sides of a transaction with the controlled corporation and received a non-ratable benefit, entire fairness is the presumptive standard of review. The controlling shareholder can shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff by properly employing a special committee or an unaffiliated shareholder vote. But the use of just one of these procedural devices does not change the standard of review. If the controlling shareholder wants to secure the benefits of business judgment review, it must follow all MFW’s requirements. The court reversed the lower court's finding that the separation committee functioned as an independent negotiating body. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Match Group, Inc. Derivative Litigation" on Justia Law

This appeal pertains to a merger between TerraForm Power, Inc. (“TerraForm”) and affiliates, officers, and other executives of Brookfield Asset Management Inc. (“Brookfield”). The plaintiffs, former TerraForm stockholders, filed a lawsuit alleging breach of fiduciary duty by the defendants. The case involves the application of the legal framework established in Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp. (MFW), which provides for business judgment review if certain conditions are met.The trial court dismissed the case, holding that the merger satisfied the MFW conditions, thus entitling the transaction to business judgment review rather than the more stringent "entire fairness" review. The trial court also found that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately allege coercion under MFW and had failed to adequately plead that the stockholder vote was not fully informed.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware concluded that the trial court correctly dismissed the coercion claim. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's conclusion on the disclosure issues. The Supreme Court held that it was reasonably conceivable that the proxy statement's failure to disclose certain of the special committee’s advisors’ conflicts of interest and certain management fees Brookfield anticipated from the merger was a material omission that rendered the minority stockholders' vote uninformed.Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and held that the case should not have been dismissed. View "City of Dearborn Police and Fire Revised Retirement System v. Brookfield Asset Management Inc." on Justia Law

In the State of Delaware, a lawsuit was brought by two non-profit organizations against multiple public officials, including tax collectors in Delaware's three counties. The organizations sought increased funding for Delaware’s public schools. The Court of Chancery held that the organizations were entitled to attorneys’ fees and expenses. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that the Court of Chancery erred in its application of the "common benefit doctrine" and its expansion of a precedent case, Korn v. New Castle County, beyond taxpayer suits. The Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court's award of expenses, but reversed the award of attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court held that the litigation brought by the organizations was to compel the defendant county governments to comply with the law, a benefit that did not warrant an exception to the "American Rule" which states that each party bears its own attorneys' fees, absent certain exceptions. The Court also held that, even if this case were a taxpayer suit, it does not meet the standard set forth in Korn because there was not a quantifiable, non-speculative monetary benefit for all taxpayers. View "In re Delaware Public Schools Litigation" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., a global financial services company, appealed a decision by the Court of Chancery. The case involved the company's contractual provisions that allowed it to withhold distributions otherwise owed to a partner who leaves the partnership and then competes with the partnership. The plaintiffs were six former partners who had their distributions, ranging from under $100,000 to over $5 million, withheld after they left Cantor Fitzgerald and joined competing businesses.The lower court held that these "forfeiture for competition" provisions were unenforceable, ruling they were unreasonable restraints on trade. However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision. It ruled that, under Delaware law, courts should enforce such agreements absent unconscionability, bad faith, or other extraordinary circumstances. The court emphasized the importance of freedom of contract, particularly in the context of sophisticated parties entering into a limited partnership agreement. It argued that public policy considerations favored enforcing the agreement, particularly as the parties had voluntarily agreed to the terms. As such, it held that Cantor Fitzgerald was within its rights to withhold the distributions based on the plaintiffs' competitive activities. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Ainslie" on Justia Law

In 2022, Fox Corporation and Snap Inc. amended their corporate charters to exculpate their officers from damages liability for breaches of the duty of care. The amendments were authorized by recent Delaware legislation. The companies' Class A non-voting common stockholders claimed that these amendments deprived them of their power to sue officers for damages for duty of care violations and, thus, a separate class vote was required to approve the amendments. However, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision that a separate class vote was not required. The court held that the ability to sue directors or officers for duty of care violations was a general right of the stockholders, not a class-based power stated in the corporate charter. Therefore, it was not a "power, preference, or special right" of the Class A common stock under Section 242(b)(2) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which requires a separate class stockholder vote to amend a corporate charter if the amendment would adversely affect the powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares of such class. The holding was based on long-standing precedent and the court's interpretation of related sections of the Delaware General Corporation Law. View "In re Fox Corporation/Snap Inc. Section 242 Litigation" on Justia Law