Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

A Delaware superior court held that Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, two doctors who started a laboratory testing enterprise known as Bako Diagnostics (“Bako”), breached certain restrictive covenants when they left Bako to form a new, competing laboratory enterprise. Despite fee-shifting provisions in certain of the contracts, the trial court declined to award attorneys’ fees. The Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the superior court’s determinations that the two doctors breached certain of the restrictive covenants. But because it appeared that the superior court may have misapplied the formula that both sides employed for calculating damages, the Court remanded the case for the trial court to clarify how it derived its damages award and for any needed revisions. Further, the Supreme Court disagreed that no attorneys’ fees were warranted under certain of the contracts. View "Bako Pathology LP v. Bakotic" on Justia Law

This appeal involved a breach of contract claim arising out of an indemnitee’s refusal to repay money advanced pursuant to an LLC Agreement. Under the Agreement, a Person was entitled to indemnification if the Person acted in good faith and in a manner believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the Company. The indemnification payments were further conditioned on the Person’s written undertaking to repay all amounts advanced under the LLC Agreement if it was later determined that the Person did not satisfy the standard of conduct, and thus, was not entitled to indemnification. New Wood Resources operated a plywood and veneer manufacturing facility in Mississippi known as Winston Plywood & Veneer LLC (“WPV”). Dr. Richard Baldwin (“Baldwin”) served as a manager of New Wood starting in September of 2013, and served as a member of New Wood’s Board of Managers. Baldwin was asked to invest in New Wood, and to oversee the revitalization of a newly acquired plywood mill in Louisville, Mississippi. The WPV manufacturing facility in Louisville had been dormant for years and was in need of repair. New Wood began to make repairs so that it could operate a mill. However, prior to the WPV facility’s completion, the facility was destroyed by an EF-4 tornado. WPV received funding from FEMA, and Baldwin took the lead role on behalf of New Wood to restore the WPV facility and transform it into a functioning and profitable plywood manufacturing facility. In 2016, just before the WPV mill was set to begin operations, Baldwin was terminated from his position as the President and General Manager of WPV. The Delaware Court addressed the narrow issue of whether the LLC Agreement pertinent here contained an implied covenant of good faith that would require the determination of a Person’s entitlement to indemnification to be made in good faith. After review of the Agreement, the Court held that it did. It therefore reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Baldwin v. New Wood Resources LLC" on Justia Law

In negotiations leading up to a merger in which Brookfield Property Partners, L.P. and its affiliates acquired GGP, Inc., Brookfield became concerned over the number of GGP stockholders who might seek appraisal under 8 Del. C. § 262. Brookfield sought to include in the merger agreement an appraisal-rights closing condition that would allow it to terminate the transaction if a specified number of GGP shares demanded appraisal. But a special committee of GGP directors charged with negotiating the terms of the merger agreement opposed this condition, and Brookfield relented. According to former GGP stockholders, GGP’s directors, urged on by Brookfield, structured the merger so that the GGP stockholders’ appraisal rights were eviscerated. The GGP stockholders claimed that, by divorcing the appraisal remedy from the large pre-closing dividend and linking it to a meager “per share merger consideration,” Brookfield and the GGP directors led them to believe that a fair value determination in an appraisal proceeding would be limited to the value of post-dividend GGP. This description of appraisal rights, coupled with other descriptions of how the transaction was to be effected, led the stockholders to believe that their appraisal rights had either been eliminated or so reduced as to be meaningless. And by agreeing to do this, they said, the GGP directors, with the aid of Brookfield, breached their fiduciary duties. The stockholders sued. The Court of Chancery concluded that, because it could consider the pre-closing dividend as a “relevant factor” under the appraisal statute, the defendants’ structuring of the merger did not deny the stockholders their right to seek appraisal. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery: "the disclosures, having described the merger and appraisal rights in a confusing manner, did not provide the stockholders the information they needed to decide whether to dissent and demand appraisal. ... it is reasonably conceivable to us that GGP’s directors, aided and abetted by Brookfield, consciously crafted the transaction and the related disclosures in such a way as to deter GGP’s stockholders from exercising their appraisal rights." View "In Re GGP, Inc. Stockholder Litigation" on Justia Law

In a final judgment, the Delaware Court of Chancery ordered NVIDIA Corporation (“NVIDIA” or the “Company”) to produce books and records to certain NVIDIA stockholders under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. In the underlying action, the stockholders alleged certain NVIDIA executives knowingly made false or misleading statements during Company earnings calls that artificially inflated NVIDIA’s stock price, and then those same executives sold their stock at inflated prices. As such, the stockholders sought to inspect books and records to investigate possible wrongdoing and mismanagement at the Company, to assess the ability of the board to consider a demand for action, to determine whether the Company’s board members were fit to serve on the board, and to take the appropriate action in response to the investigation. In resisting the request, NVIDIA argued the stockholders were not entitled to the relief they sought because: (1) the scope of the original demands failed to satisfy the form and manner requirements; (2) the documents sought at the trial were not requested in the original demands; (3) the stockholders failed to show a proper purpose; (4) the stockholders failed to show a credible basis to infer wrongdoing; and (5) the requests were overbroad and not tailored to the stockholders’ stated purpose. The Court of Chancery rejected these arguments and ordered the production of two sets of documents—certain communications with the CEO and certain specific sets of emails. The Delaware Supreme Court held: (1) the stockholders’ original demands did not violate Section 220’s form and manner requirements; (2) the stockholders did not expand their requests throughout litigation; (3) the Court of Chancery did not err in holding that sufficiently reliable hearsay evidence may be used to show proper purpose in a Section 220 litigation, but did err in allowing the stockholders in this case to rely on hearsay evidence because the stockholders’ actions deprived NVIDIA of the opportunity to test the stockholders’ stated purpose; (4) the Court of Chancery did not err in holding that the stockholders proved a credible basis to infer wrongdoing; and (5) the documents ordered to be produced by the Court of Chancery were essential and sufficient to the stockholders’ stated purpose. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Chancery is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "NVIDIA Corporation v. City of Westland Police & Fire Retirement System" on Justia Law

Kevin Diep, a stockholder of El Pollo Loco Holdings, Inc. (“EPL”), filed derivative claims against some members of EPL’s board of directors and management, as well as a private investment firm. The suit focused on two acts of alleged wrongdoing: concealing the negative impact of price increases during an earnings call and selling EPL stock while in possession of material non-public financial information. After the Delaware Court of Chancery denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the EPL board of directors designated a special litigation committee of the board (“SLC”) with exclusive authority to investigate the derivative claims and to take whatever action was in EPL’s best interests. After a lengthy investigation and extensive report, the SLC moved to terminate the derivative claims. All defendants but the private investment firm settled with Diep while the dismissal motion was pending. The Court of Chancery granted the SLC’s motion after applying the two-step review under Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). Diep appealed, but after its review of the record, including the SLC’s report, and the Court of Chancery’s decision, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the court properly evaluated the SLC’s independence, investigation, and conclusions, and affirm the judgment of dismissal. View "Diep v. Trimaran Pollo Partners, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The Delaware Supreme Court addressed whether approval of a corporation’s Class B stockholders was required to transfer pledged assets to secured creditors in connection with what was, in essence, a privately structured foreclosure transaction. Stream TV Network, Inc. (“Stream” or the “Company”), along with Mathu and Raja Rajan, argued that the agreement authorizing the secured creditors to transfer Stream’s pledged assets (the “Omnibus Agreement”) was invalid because Stream’s unambiguous certificate of incorporation (“Charter”) required the approval of Stream’s Class B stockholders. Stream’s Charter required a majority vote of Class B stockholders for any “sale, lease or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets or intellectual property of the company.” Stream argued the trial court erred by applying a common law insolvency exception to Section 271 in interpreting the Charter, and that the enactment of 8 Del. C. 271 and its predecessor superseded any common law exceptions. It contended that, in any event, such a “board only” common law exception never existed in Delaware. SeeCubic, Inc. argued the court correctly found that neither the Charter, nor Section 271, required approval of the Class B shares to effectuate the Omnibus Agreement. Because the Supreme Court agreed that a majority vote of Class B stockholders was required under Stream’s charter, it vacated the injunction, reversed the declaratory judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Steam TV Networks, Inc. v. SeeCubic, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2014, Elizabeth Elting, a co-founder of TransPerfect Global, Inc. (“TPG”), asked the Delaware Court of Chancery to appoint a custodian to sell the Company because of a hopeless deadlock between Elting and fellow co-founder, Philip Shawe. More than eight years later, Elting sold her shares to Shawe, who won a court-ordered auction supervised by Robert Pincus, a custodian duly appointed by the Court of Chancery. The parties executed the sale agreement (the “SPA”) in November 2017. A contentious relationship emerged between Shawe and Pincus, resulting in "seemingly endless" litigation in Delaware, New York and Nevada, millions in contested legal fees, and an inability to agree on any material aspect of Pincus' tenure as Custodian, up to and including his discharge. This case consolidated three challenges brought by Shawe and TPG to orders of the Court of Chancery, each implicating Pincus’ right to petition the trial court for reimbursement of fees and expenses under the SPA and various court orders. In sum, the Delaware Supreme Court: (1) reversed and vacated the Court of Chancery’s October 17, 2019 Contempt Order and Sanction only as they applied to Shawe; affirmed the Contempt Order and Sanction as they applied to TPG; (3) affirmed the court’s April 14, 2021 Discharge Order terminating the custodianship of Pincus; and (4) affirmed the April 30, 2021 Fee Order awarding Pincus $3,242,251 in fees, subject to the qualification that TransPerfect Global, Inc. was the only party liable for the $1,148,291 Contempt Sanction. View "Transperfect Global, Inc., et al. v. Pincus, et al." on Justia Law

Pursuant to the Ownership Interest Purchase Agreement dated April 23, 2014 (the “Agreement”), Appellant North American Leasing, Inc. purchased Appellant NASDI, LLC, and Appellant Yankee Environmental Services, LLC. NASDI was in the business of providing demolition and site redevelopment services throughout the United States. The seller was Appellee NASDI Holdings, LLC, which before the sale, possessed all ownership interests in NASDI and Yankee. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Corporation (“Great Lakes”), the parent company of NASDI Holdings, agreed that performance and payment bonds on existing projects being performed by NASDI and Yankee at the time of the sale would remain in place for the duration of each project. The Agreement also provided that North American Leasing, NASDI, Yankee, and Appellant Dore & Associates Contracting, Inc. (“Dore”), would indemnify NASDI Holdings and its affiliates for any losses arising from those bonds that Great Lakes agreed would remain in place on existing projects. After the sale of NASDI and Yankee was completed, Great Lakes incurred losses from performance and payment bonds on a project known as the Bayonne Bridge project. The Defendants have taken the position throughout this litigation that they have no obligation to indemnify the Plaintiffs because the Plaintiffs’ claims notices were untimely under the Agreement. The Court of Chancery rejected the Defendants’ contention and entered judgment against the Defendants for the total amount of the Plaintiffs’ claim. Finding no reversible error in this judgment, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. View "North American Leasing, Inc. v. NASDI Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

In March 2012, First Solar, Inc. stockholders filed a class action lawsuit against the company alleging that it violated federal securities laws by making false or misleading public disclosures ("Smilovits Action"). National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (“National Union”) provided insurance coverage for the Smilovits Action under a 2011–12 $10 million “claims made” directors and officers insurance policy. While the Smilovits Action was pending, First Solar stockholders who opted out of the Smilovits Action filed what has been referred to as the Maverick Action. The Maverick Action alleged violations of the same federal securities laws as the Smilovits Action, as well as violations of Arizona statutes and claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. In this appeal the issue presented for the Delaware Supreme Court's review was whether the Smilovits securities class action, and a later Maverick follow-on action were related actions, such that the follow-on action was excluded from insurance coverage under later-issued policies. The Superior Court found that the follow-on action was “fundamentally identical” to the first-filed action and therefore excluded from coverage under the later-issued policies. The Supreme Court found that even though the court applied an incorrect standard to assess the relatedness of the two actions, judgment was affirmed nonetheless because under either the erroneous “fundamentally identical” standard or the correct relatedness standard defined by the policies, the later-issued insurance policies did not cover the follow-on action. View "First Solar, Inc. v. National Union First Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute over a Stock Purchase Agreement (“SPA”) formed between Valley Joist BD Holdings, LLC (“VJ Holdings”) and EBSCO, Industries Inc. (“EBSCO”). In December 2017, EBSCO sold all of its stock in Valley Joist, Inc. to VJ Holdings. After closing, VJ Holdings discovered structural defects in one of the buildings acquired as part of the transaction. In July 2018, VJ Holdings sought indemnification from EBSCO through the procedure outlined in the SPA. Two years after receiving no response to the notice, VJ Holdings filed suit in the Superior Court for breach of contract and fraud in the inducement. The Superior Court granted EBSCO’s motion to dismiss the fraud claim for failure to plead sufficient facts to satisfy Superior Court Civil Rule 9(b). The court also dismissed the breach of contract claim as barred under the SPA’s one-year contractual statute of limitations. VJ Holdings appealed: (1) challenging whether it pled sufficient facts to show pre-closing knowledge of fraud; and (2) challenged whether the Superior Court properly relied on a bootstrapping doctrine to dismiss the fraud claim. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, finding that the allegations in the complaint, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, lead to a reasonable inference that EBSCO knew of the structural defects in the building at the time of closing the SPA, contrary to its representation in the SPA that the building was in good operating condition and repair. As for the bootstrapping argument, the Supreme Court determined the Superior Court did not rely on a bootstrapping doctrine to dismiss the fraud claim. View "Valley Joist BD Holdings, LLC v. EBSCO Industries, Inc." on Justia Law