Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

Stillwater Mining Company filed suit against its directors’ and officers’ liability insurers to recover the expenses it incurred defending a Delaware stockholder appraisal action. The superior court granted the insurers’ motions to dismiss after it found that Delaware law applied to the dispute and the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in In re Solera Ins. Coverage Appeals (“Solera II”) precluded coverage for losses incurred in a stockholder appraisal action under a similar D&O policy. The primary issue on appeal was whether Delaware or Montana law applied to the claims in Stillwater’s amended complaint. Stillwater argued that the superior court should have applied Montana law because Montana had the most significant relationship to the dispute and the parties. If Montana law applied, according to Stillwater, it could recover its defense costs because Montana recognized coverage by estoppel, meaning the insurers were estopped to deny coverage when they failed to defend Stillwater in the appraisal action. Before the Delaware Supreme Court issued Solera II, the Solera I court held that D&O insureds could recover losses incurred in a stockholder appraisal action. Taking advantage of that favorable ruling, Stillwater argued in its complaint that Delaware law applied to the interpretation of the policies. Then when Solera II was issued, Stillwater reversed position and claimed that Montana law applied to the policies. Its amended complaint dropped all indemnity claims for covered losses in favor of three contractual claims for the duty to advance defense costs and a statutory claim under Montana law. In the Supreme Court's view, Stillwater’s amended claims raised the same Delaware interests that Stillwater identified in its original complaint – applying one consistent body of law to insurance policies that cover comprehensively the insured’s directors’, officers’, and corporate liability across many jurisdictions. It then held the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Stillwater's motions. View "Stillwater Mining Company v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA" on Justia Law

The Delaware Court of Chancery entered judgment in favor of appellee Sharon Hawkins on her request for a declaration that the irrevocable proxy which provided appellant W. Bradley Daniel (“Daniel”) with voting power over all 100 shares of N.D. Management, Inc. (“Danco GP”) (the “Irrevocable Proxy”), did not bind a subsequent owner of such Danco GP shares. The Court of Chancery also held that an addendum to the Irrevocable Proxy did not obligate the current owner of the Danco GP shares, MedApproach, L.P. (the “Partnership”), to demand that the buyer in a sale to an unaffiliated third party bind itself to the Irrevocable Proxy. Daniel appealed the Court of Chancery’s judgment that the Irrevocable Proxy did not run with the Majority Shares, arguing the court erred by: (1) rather than interpreting and applying the plain language of the Irrevocable Proxy as written, the court relied on the Restatement (Third) of Agency, which was not adopted until nearly a decade after the parties entered into the Irrevocable Proxy; (2) reading additional language into the Irrevocable Proxy in order to support its finding that the broad “catch-all” language that the parties included to prevent termination of the Irrevocable Proxy did not encompass a sale of the shares; and (3) not giving effect to all of the terms of the Irrevocable Proxy and improperly limiting the assignment clause of the Irrevocable Proxy so as not to bind assigns of the stockholder. Finding no reversible error, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery. View "Daniel v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

The Boardwalk Master Limited Partnership's (“MLP”) limited partnership agreement (the “Partnership Agreement”) disclaimed the general partner’s fiduciary duties, and included a conclusive presumption of good faith when relying on advice of counsel. At issue in this appeal was whether Boardwalk’s general partner properly exercised a call right to take the Boardwalk MLP private. Under the Partnership Agreement, the general partner could exercise a call right for the public units if it received an opinion of counsel acceptable to the general partner that a change in FERC regulations “has or will reasonably likely in the future have a material adverse effect on the maximum applicable rate that can be charged to customers.” The Boardwalk MLP general partner received an opinion of counsel from Baker Botts that a change in FERC policy met the call right condition. Skadden advised that: (1) it would be reasonable for the sole member, an entity in the Boardwalk MLP structure, to determine the acceptability of the opinion of counsel for the general partner; and (2) it would be reasonable for the sole member, on behalf of the general partner, to accept the Baker Botts Opinion. The sole member followed Skadden’s advice and caused the Boardwalk MLP general partner to exercise the call right and to acquire all the public units through a formula in the Partnership Agreement. The Boardwalk MLP public unitholders filed suit and claimed that the general partner improperly exercised the call right. In a post-trial opinion, the Delaware Court of Chancery concluded the general partner improperly exercised the call right because the Baker Botts Opinion had not been issued in good faith; the wrong entity in the MLP business structure determined the acceptability of the opinion; and the general partner was not exculpated from damages under the Partnership Agreement. After its review, the Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the Boardwalk entities that: (1) the sole member was the correct entity to determine the acceptability of the opinion of counsel; (2) that the sole member, as the ultimate decisionmaker who caused the general partner to exercise the call right, reasonably relied on Skadden’s opinion, and that the sole member and the general partner were therefore conclusively presumed to have acted in good faith in exercising the call right. Thus, the general partner and others were exculpated from damages under the Partnership Agreement. The Court of Chancery’s judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Boardwalk Pipeline v. Bandera Master Fund LP" on Justia Law

A Delaware superior court held that Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, two doctors who started a laboratory testing enterprise known as Bako Diagnostics (“Bako”), breached certain restrictive covenants when they left Bako to form a new, competing laboratory enterprise. Despite fee-shifting provisions in certain of the contracts, the trial court declined to award attorneys’ fees. The Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the superior court’s determinations that the two doctors breached certain of the restrictive covenants. But because it appeared that the superior court may have misapplied the formula that both sides employed for calculating damages, the Court remanded the case for the trial court to clarify how it derived its damages award and for any needed revisions. Further, the Supreme Court disagreed that no attorneys’ fees were warranted under certain of the contracts. View "Bako Pathology LP v. Bakotic" on Justia Law

This appeal involved a breach of contract claim arising out of an indemnitee’s refusal to repay money advanced pursuant to an LLC Agreement. Under the Agreement, a Person was entitled to indemnification if the Person acted in good faith and in a manner believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the Company. The indemnification payments were further conditioned on the Person’s written undertaking to repay all amounts advanced under the LLC Agreement if it was later determined that the Person did not satisfy the standard of conduct, and thus, was not entitled to indemnification. New Wood Resources operated a plywood and veneer manufacturing facility in Mississippi known as Winston Plywood & Veneer LLC (“WPV”). Dr. Richard Baldwin (“Baldwin”) served as a manager of New Wood starting in September of 2013, and served as a member of New Wood’s Board of Managers. Baldwin was asked to invest in New Wood, and to oversee the revitalization of a newly acquired plywood mill in Louisville, Mississippi. The WPV manufacturing facility in Louisville had been dormant for years and was in need of repair. New Wood began to make repairs so that it could operate a mill. However, prior to the WPV facility’s completion, the facility was destroyed by an EF-4 tornado. WPV received funding from FEMA, and Baldwin took the lead role on behalf of New Wood to restore the WPV facility and transform it into a functioning and profitable plywood manufacturing facility. In 2016, just before the WPV mill was set to begin operations, Baldwin was terminated from his position as the President and General Manager of WPV. The Delaware Court addressed the narrow issue of whether the LLC Agreement pertinent here contained an implied covenant of good faith that would require the determination of a Person’s entitlement to indemnification to be made in good faith. After review of the Agreement, the Court held that it did. It therefore reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Baldwin v. New Wood Resources LLC" on Justia Law

In negotiations leading up to a merger in which Brookfield Property Partners, L.P. and its affiliates acquired GGP, Inc., Brookfield became concerned over the number of GGP stockholders who might seek appraisal under 8 Del. C. § 262. Brookfield sought to include in the merger agreement an appraisal-rights closing condition that would allow it to terminate the transaction if a specified number of GGP shares demanded appraisal. But a special committee of GGP directors charged with negotiating the terms of the merger agreement opposed this condition, and Brookfield relented. According to former GGP stockholders, GGP’s directors, urged on by Brookfield, structured the merger so that the GGP stockholders’ appraisal rights were eviscerated. The GGP stockholders claimed that, by divorcing the appraisal remedy from the large pre-closing dividend and linking it to a meager “per share merger consideration,” Brookfield and the GGP directors led them to believe that a fair value determination in an appraisal proceeding would be limited to the value of post-dividend GGP. This description of appraisal rights, coupled with other descriptions of how the transaction was to be effected, led the stockholders to believe that their appraisal rights had either been eliminated or so reduced as to be meaningless. And by agreeing to do this, they said, the GGP directors, with the aid of Brookfield, breached their fiduciary duties. The stockholders sued. The Court of Chancery concluded that, because it could consider the pre-closing dividend as a “relevant factor” under the appraisal statute, the defendants’ structuring of the merger did not deny the stockholders their right to seek appraisal. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery: "the disclosures, having described the merger and appraisal rights in a confusing manner, did not provide the stockholders the information they needed to decide whether to dissent and demand appraisal. ... it is reasonably conceivable to us that GGP’s directors, aided and abetted by Brookfield, consciously crafted the transaction and the related disclosures in such a way as to deter GGP’s stockholders from exercising their appraisal rights." View "In Re GGP, Inc. Stockholder Litigation" on Justia Law

In a final judgment, the Delaware Court of Chancery ordered NVIDIA Corporation (“NVIDIA” or the “Company”) to produce books and records to certain NVIDIA stockholders under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. In the underlying action, the stockholders alleged certain NVIDIA executives knowingly made false or misleading statements during Company earnings calls that artificially inflated NVIDIA’s stock price, and then those same executives sold their stock at inflated prices. As such, the stockholders sought to inspect books and records to investigate possible wrongdoing and mismanagement at the Company, to assess the ability of the board to consider a demand for action, to determine whether the Company’s board members were fit to serve on the board, and to take the appropriate action in response to the investigation. In resisting the request, NVIDIA argued the stockholders were not entitled to the relief they sought because: (1) the scope of the original demands failed to satisfy the form and manner requirements; (2) the documents sought at the trial were not requested in the original demands; (3) the stockholders failed to show a proper purpose; (4) the stockholders failed to show a credible basis to infer wrongdoing; and (5) the requests were overbroad and not tailored to the stockholders’ stated purpose. The Court of Chancery rejected these arguments and ordered the production of two sets of documents—certain communications with the CEO and certain specific sets of emails. The Delaware Supreme Court held: (1) the stockholders’ original demands did not violate Section 220’s form and manner requirements; (2) the stockholders did not expand their requests throughout litigation; (3) the Court of Chancery did not err in holding that sufficiently reliable hearsay evidence may be used to show proper purpose in a Section 220 litigation, but did err in allowing the stockholders in this case to rely on hearsay evidence because the stockholders’ actions deprived NVIDIA of the opportunity to test the stockholders’ stated purpose; (4) the Court of Chancery did not err in holding that the stockholders proved a credible basis to infer wrongdoing; and (5) the documents ordered to be produced by the Court of Chancery were essential and sufficient to the stockholders’ stated purpose. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Chancery is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "NVIDIA Corporation v. City of Westland Police & Fire Retirement System" on Justia Law

Kevin Diep, a stockholder of El Pollo Loco Holdings, Inc. (“EPL”), filed derivative claims against some members of EPL’s board of directors and management, as well as a private investment firm. The suit focused on two acts of alleged wrongdoing: concealing the negative impact of price increases during an earnings call and selling EPL stock while in possession of material non-public financial information. After the Delaware Court of Chancery denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the EPL board of directors designated a special litigation committee of the board (“SLC”) with exclusive authority to investigate the derivative claims and to take whatever action was in EPL’s best interests. After a lengthy investigation and extensive report, the SLC moved to terminate the derivative claims. All defendants but the private investment firm settled with Diep while the dismissal motion was pending. The Court of Chancery granted the SLC’s motion after applying the two-step review under Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). Diep appealed, but after its review of the record, including the SLC’s report, and the Court of Chancery’s decision, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the court properly evaluated the SLC’s independence, investigation, and conclusions, and affirm the judgment of dismissal. View "Diep v. Trimaran Pollo Partners, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The Delaware Supreme Court addressed whether approval of a corporation’s Class B stockholders was required to transfer pledged assets to secured creditors in connection with what was, in essence, a privately structured foreclosure transaction. Stream TV Network, Inc. (“Stream” or the “Company”), along with Mathu and Raja Rajan, argued that the agreement authorizing the secured creditors to transfer Stream’s pledged assets (the “Omnibus Agreement”) was invalid because Stream’s unambiguous certificate of incorporation (“Charter”) required the approval of Stream’s Class B stockholders. Stream’s Charter required a majority vote of Class B stockholders for any “sale, lease or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets or intellectual property of the company.” Stream argued the trial court erred by applying a common law insolvency exception to Section 271 in interpreting the Charter, and that the enactment of 8 Del. C. 271 and its predecessor superseded any common law exceptions. It contended that, in any event, such a “board only” common law exception never existed in Delaware. SeeCubic, Inc. argued the court correctly found that neither the Charter, nor Section 271, required approval of the Class B shares to effectuate the Omnibus Agreement. Because the Supreme Court agreed that a majority vote of Class B stockholders was required under Stream’s charter, it vacated the injunction, reversed the declaratory judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Steam TV Networks, Inc. v. SeeCubic, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2014, Elizabeth Elting, a co-founder of TransPerfect Global, Inc. (“TPG”), asked the Delaware Court of Chancery to appoint a custodian to sell the Company because of a hopeless deadlock between Elting and fellow co-founder, Philip Shawe. More than eight years later, Elting sold her shares to Shawe, who won a court-ordered auction supervised by Robert Pincus, a custodian duly appointed by the Court of Chancery. The parties executed the sale agreement (the “SPA”) in November 2017. A contentious relationship emerged between Shawe and Pincus, resulting in "seemingly endless" litigation in Delaware, New York and Nevada, millions in contested legal fees, and an inability to agree on any material aspect of Pincus' tenure as Custodian, up to and including his discharge. This case consolidated three challenges brought by Shawe and TPG to orders of the Court of Chancery, each implicating Pincus’ right to petition the trial court for reimbursement of fees and expenses under the SPA and various court orders. In sum, the Delaware Supreme Court: (1) reversed and vacated the Court of Chancery’s October 17, 2019 Contempt Order and Sanction only as they applied to Shawe; affirmed the Contempt Order and Sanction as they applied to TPG; (3) affirmed the court’s April 14, 2021 Discharge Order terminating the custodianship of Pincus; and (4) affirmed the April 30, 2021 Fee Order awarding Pincus $3,242,251 in fees, subject to the qualification that TransPerfect Global, Inc. was the only party liable for the $1,148,291 Contempt Sanction. View "Transperfect Global, Inc., et al. v. Pincus, et al." on Justia Law