Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

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In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed a dispute between two Honduran nationals, Dennys Antonio Reyes Molina and Eny Adamy Mejia Rodriguez, over the wrongful removal of their daughter from Honduras to the United States by the father, Reyes. The mother, Rodriguez, petitioned for the child's return under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, as implemented by the United States in the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA). Reyes conceded wrongful removal, but argued that returning the child to Honduras would put her at grave risk of physical harm.The District Court found that Reyes had failed to prove such grave risk by clear and convincing evidence and ordered the child's return to Honduras. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court affirmed this decision. The court found that while Rodriguez had physically punished the child in the past, it was not "highly probable" that such punishment would continue upon the child's return to Honduras. The court also held that the injuries inflicted on the child by Rodriguez's past physical punishment did not indicate that the child would face a magnitude of physical harm that would allow the court to lawfully decline to return the child to Honduras.Reyes argued that the District Court erred by considering his actions in deciding the case. However, the Appeals Court concluded that the District Court did not rely on Reyes's actions in determining that he had not met his evidentiary burden. Therefore, the Appeals Court affirmed the District Court's decision to order the child's return to Honduras. View "Rodriguez v. Molina" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the conviction of John Ishmael Bradley, III, who was charged with second-degree assault and felony domestic assault for striking his girlfriend over the head with a broom handle. Bradley challenged his convictions, claiming the broom handle was not a dangerous weapon and that his two convictions for one assaultive act was improper.The court ruled that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the broom handle was a dangerous weapon. The court determined that an object is "likely to produce death or great bodily harm" if it is used in a manner where death or great bodily harm is a probable or reasonably expected result. Given the manner in which Bradley used the broom handle, the court found there was enough evidence to sustain this claim.The court also examined whether Bradley could be convicted of both second-degree assault and domestic assault for the same criminal act. The court rejected Bradley's argument that domestic assault is a "lesser degree" of second-degree assault. The court concluded that the term "degree" in the phrase "lesser degree of the same crime" in Minnesota Statutes section 609.04, subdivision 1(1), is an unambiguous technical term referring to offenses within an ordinal statutory scheme. Therefore, domestic assault is not a lesser degree of second-degree assault, and the court affirmed both convictions. View "State of Minnesota vs. Bradley" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled in a case involving allegations of child sexual abuse by a Roman Catholic priest. The plaintiffs alleged that the abuse occurred between 1971 and 1979 when they were aged between eight and fourteen. The defendants argued that the claims were subject to the one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions under former La. Civ. Code art. 3536(1).While this case was pending, the legislature amended La. R.S. 9:2800.9 to revive certain prescribed child sex abuse claims for a limited three-year period. However, the court found that the statutory enactment was contrary to the due process protections enshrined in the Louisiana Constitution and must yield to that supreme law. The court reversed and vacated the trial court's decision to the extent it found the statutory enactment to be constitutional.The court determined that once liberative prescription accrues, it becomes an accrued, vested right. It noted that the right to plead prescription in defense to a claim on the obligation itself is "property that cannot be taken from [the defendant]." Hence, when a party acquires the right to plead the defense of accrued prescription, his right becomes a vested property right protected by constitutional due process guarantees.The court concluded that the legislature lacked the authority to revive the prescribed claims set forth under the facts alleged in this case. However, the court remanded the case to the trial court to rule on the exception anew after plaintiffs have had an opportunity to raise any additional arguments regarding contra non valentem and the timeliness of their claims. View "BIENVENU VS. DEFENDANT 1" on Justia Law

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In this case, the petitioner, Tony Rogers, convicted of sexually assaulting his daughter, DAR, appealed his conviction alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Rogers claimed his trial lawyer failed to move for in-camera review of DAR’s medical records, which he believed contained information about her mental health that could have impacted the credibility of her testimony. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected Rogers's claim, and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied review.Rogers then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, asserting that the state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of established federal law. He contended that his trial counsel's failure to obtain DAR’s medical records or at least file a motion for in camera review violated his rights. The district court denied Rogers's petition, concluding that the state court decision did not contravene federal law and that the state court's application of the federal standard to Rogers's case was not unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court. It found that Rogers's counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a motion for in camera review of DAR’s medical records. The court held that such a motion would have been meritless because Rogers could not make the preliminary showing of the records’ materiality required under state law. The court also found that Rogers's claim that he made a plausible showing for in camera review of DAR’s medical records was based on speculation and devoid of context. The court held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law. View "Rogers v. Wells" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a legal dispute involving a man named Mitchel Wolfgram and a woman named Nadirah Davis-Perkins over the custody of a child, Genevieve, who Wolfgram helped raise but was later proven not to be the biological father. Wolfgram sought shared custody, arguing that it would be detrimental to the child's welfare to deny him custody. The Superior Court found him to be the child’s psychological parent but declined to consider his relationship with the child in its decision to award sole custody to the biological mother, Davis-Perkins.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska found that the Superior Court had erred in its application of the third-party custody framework by failing to consider the relationship between Wolfgram and Genevieve when determining whether it would be clearly detrimental to her to deny him custody. The Supreme Court made it clear that when a court finds that a third party qualifies as a psychological parent, it must consider evidence of the child’s relationship with the psychological parent when evaluating a custody claim.The Court therefore vacated the custody award given by the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to determine if Wolfgram had proven by clear and convincing evidence that it would be detrimental to Genevieve to deny him any level of custody or visitation. The court was also instructed to consider evidence of Genevieve’s relationship with Wolfgram in addition to evidence of her relationship with Davis-Perkins in making its determination. View "Wolfgram v. Davis-Perkins" on Justia Law

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In a case before the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the plaintiff, David Beavers, brought civil claims for alienation of affection and criminal conversation against his ex-wife’s alleged lover, John McMican. The main issues revolved around the interpretation of N.C.G.S. § 52-13 which specifies that post-separation conduct cannot give rise to liability, and whether the trial court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of McMican.The court determined that the Rodriguez v. Lemus decision, regarding what evidence is relevant to prove pre-separation conduct, was consistent with the legislative intent of N.C.G.S. § 52-13. The court held that evidence of post-separation conduct may be used to corroborate pre-separation conduct, as long as the pre-separation conduct gives rise to more than mere conjecture.However, the court found that the evidence of pre-separation conduct in this specific case did not rise above mere conjecture regarding the identity of Mrs. Beavers’ paramour. Consequently, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. McMican. No sufficient evidence was presented to support the essential elements of Beavers’s claims against McMican, namely the sexual intercourse element of the criminal conversation claim, or the malice prong of the alienation of affection claim. View "Beavers v. McMican" on Justia Law

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This case arises from a parental rights termination appeal in Texas. The father had been the primary caregiver for his three children, including one-year-old twins and a three-year-old daughter. However, the father tested positive for methamphetamine and the children were removed by the Department of Family and Protective Services due to the father's drug use and homelessness. Although the father initially complied with a service plan, which included drug testing and treatment, he eventually refused further treatment and missed subsequent drug tests. The trial court terminated the father's parental rights, but the court of appeals reversed the decision, arguing that the Department had failed to prove harm to the children as a direct result of their father's drug use.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation of "endanger" in the context of illegal drug use. It held that a parent's endangering conduct does not need to be directed at the child or result in actual injury to the child. Instead, endangerment encompasses a larger array of conduct that exposes a child to loss or injury, or jeopardizes the child's physical or emotional well-being. The court argued that the father's pattern of drug use, coupled with his homelessness, employment instability, and almost complete abandonment of his children for the six months preceding the trial, posed a substantial risk to the children's emotional well-being. Therefore, legally sufficient evidence supported the trial court's determination that the father's conduct endangered the children. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for a best-interest determination. View "In re R.R.A." on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of sisters Tierzah, Charis, and Elisa Mapson in connection with a shooting incident. The victims were Joshua Thornton, the father of Tierzah's daughter, and his wife. The government charged the sisters with interstate domestic violence, interstate stalking, discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and conspiracy to commit these offenses. The jury found that the shooting was part of a scheme by the sisters to kill Mr. Thornton over a child custody dispute.In their appeal, the sisters argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts. Charis also challenged the admission of testimony that she once owned a firearm, claiming it was prejudicial hearsay. Elisa and Charis contested the admissibility of data obtained from automated license plate readers (ALPRs), arguing that its acquisition constituted a warrantless search in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.The court of appeals found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdicts. The court also rejected Charis's challenge to the hearsay evidence, ruling it was admissible as an admission by a party opponent. The court further concluded that the ALPR data was admissible because the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied, and its introduction did not require expert testimony. View "United States v. Mapson" on Justia Law

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In a divorce case, the Supreme Court of Nevada was asked to consider whether a law firm, established by one spouse before the marriage and incorporated under a different name during the marriage, constitutes that spouse’s separate property. Robert Draskovich, a practicing criminal lawyer since 1997, married Laurinda Draskovich in 2012, at which point he had a 65% ownership stake in a firm. In 2018, that firm dissolved, and Robert incorporated the Draskovich Law Group (DLG) as his wholly owned corporation.During their divorce proceedings in 2022, DLG was the primary asset in dispute. The district court concluded that DLG was community property, based on the fact that DLG was incorporated during the marriage. The district court also rejected Laurinda’s request for alimony, in part because it determined that the share of community assets distributed to Laurinda would provide sufficient support through passive income.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the district court erred in determining that the law firm was entirely community property. The court found that the law firm was a continuation of the spouse’s original, separate property law practice, and thus, the presumption of community property does not properly apply. Therefore, the Court reversed the portion of the divorce decree pertaining to the DLG interests and remanded for further proceedings. The Court also vacated the district court’s alimony determination to be reconsidered in light of the changed circumstances surrounding DLG. View "Draskovich v. Draskovich" on Justia Law

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Christine M. Nordgren's parental rights were terminated in a Minnesota state court. Instead of appealing this decision, she filed a federal lawsuit against the Minnesota Department of Human Services, Hennepin County, and various other parties involved in her case, alleging a range of constitutional, federal, and state claims. She sought multiple forms of damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs. The district court dismissed all federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims. Nordgren then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the district court interpreted as a request to reconsider and amend her pleadings, and denied it. Nordgren appealed this decision.The Hennepin County defendants moved to dismiss Nordgren's appeal as untimely, arguing that she did not appeal the judgment in a timely manner and that the district court's order denying her motion for reconsideration was not separately appealable and did not extend the appeal period. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed with the defendants, determining that Nordgren's motion did not qualify as an appealable motion under Rule 59(e), which is designed to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. As such, the appeal period began on the date the judgment was entered, and Nordgren's notice of appeal, filed beyond the 30-day appeal period, was untimely.Therefore, the Court of Appeals dismissed Nordgren's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Nordgren v. Hennepin County" on Justia Law