Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

Judgment creditor PAL I, LLC levied and executed upon collateral in which KeyBank had a perfected security interest. PAL argued that because KeyBank did not file a third-party claim to the collateral in accordance with I.C. 11-203, it waived its interest in the collateral. The district court held that a perfected security interest survives a creditor's failure to comply with the statute, that KeyBank's security interest extended to the proceeds PAL realized from the sheriff's sale of the collateral, and that KeyBank was entitled to judgment against PAL in that amount. PAL appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Keybank Nat'l Assoc v. Pal I, LLC" on Justia Law

At the heart of this appeal was a mechanic's lien filed against the Black Rock North Development in Coeur d?Alene, Idaho, and an uncompleted golf course community development. American Bank (the Bank) was the lender to BRN Development, Inc. (BRN). BRN hired Wadsworth Golf Construction Company of the Southwest (Wadsworth) to construct a golf course. BRN failed to pay Wadsworth for a portion of the work it performed, and Wadsworth filed a mechanic's lien against the property. BRN defaulted on the loan, and the Bank initiated foreclosure proceedings. Wadsworth's claim of lien was subordinate to the Bank's mortgage interest in the property. In order to proceed with a foreclosure sale, the Bank posted a lien release bond in order to secure the district court's order releasing Wadsworth's lien. The Bank was the successful bidder at the foreclosure sale. The district court ruled that priority of the parties? claims against the property was irrelevant once the property was replaced by the lien release bond as security for Wadsworth's claim and the Bank (by way of the bond) was responsible for payment of Wadsworth's lien claim. The Bank appeals that decision, arguing that Wadsworth should have been prevented from recovering against the lien release bond because its interest would have been extinguished if it had attempted to foreclose its mechanic's lien and the bond merely served as substitute security in place of the property. Wadsworth cross-appealed, arguing the district court erred in holding that Wadsworth waived its right to file a lien for the unpaid retainage on the contract. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court allowing Wadsworth to recover against the lien release bond and vacated the district court's judgment in favor of Wadsworth. View "Americn Bank v. Wadsworth Golf" on Justia Law

The underlying dispute in this matter centered on the sale and demolition of a bridge across the Ohio River between West Virginia and Ohio. Advanced Explosives Demolition, Inc. (AED) entered a contract to sell the bridge to KDC Investments, LLC (KDC) for $25,000. AED alleged that it also entered into another contract in which KDC hired it to perform explosive demolition work prior to removal of the bridge. After the bridge sale was complete, KDC terminated its relationship with AED and hired another demolition contractor. AED brought an action for fraud and breach of contract against KDC and asked the district court to rescind the sales contract. The district court denied the request for rescission and granted summary judgment in favor of KDC on the fraud and breach of contract claims, holding that AED had provided no evidence of fraud and concluding that the demolition contract was illegal because AED did not have the necessary West Virginia contractor's license when it entered into the contract. AED appealed the district court's denial of its request. The Supreme Court held that AED waived the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in striking certain affidavits presented at trial. However, the Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of KDC and the district court's order quieting title to a Toll Bridge in KDC. View "AED, Inc v. KDC Investments" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from Native Wholesale Supply Company's (NWS) cigarette sales to Warpath, Inc. NWS is an Indian retailer organized under the tribal laws of the Sac and Fox Nation. It operates on the Seneca reservation in New York. Warpath is an Idaho corporation that operates on the Coeur d'Alene reservation. The State of Idaho brought suit against NWS for acting as a cigarette wholesaler without a permit and for selling cigarettes that are unlawful for sale in Idaho. The district court enjoined NWS from selling wholesale cigarettes in Idaho without a wholesale permit and assessed civil penalties in the amount of $214,200. NWS appealed that decision, arguing the State did not have subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The Court found that NWS's sales to Warpath were exempt from Idaho taxation, and NWS was not required to obtain a wholesale permit. Furthermore, the State had subject matter over NWS's importation of non-compliant cigarettes into the State of Idaho, and that the State could validly exercise personal jurisdiction over NWS. View "Idaho Tax Commission v. Native Wholesale Supply" on Justia Law

Albar, Inc. owned a convenience store, gas station and marina on the Pen Orielle River. In 2003, one of its three underground storage tanks leaked gasoline into the surrounding soil. The tanks were insured through the State's Petroleum Storage Tank Fund. Albar ultimately entered into a consent agreement with the State Department of Environmental Quality to remediate the property and any impacted adjacent properties. In 2005, Albar put the businesses up for sale. Albar made a disclosure regarding the 2003 leak, but that statement would later be found false. JLZ Enterprises was interested in purchasing the property, and relied on the false disclosure. In 2007, JLZ Enterprises sued Albar to recover damages for fraud and breach of contract; to rescind the contract; and to recover damages for negligence against the real estate agent and the broker. The matter was tried to the district court. After hearing the evidence, the court declined to rescind the real estate contract, but found that Albar had breached the contract. The court entered a judgment forclosing the deed of trust on the property and ordering its sale. Albar appealed the grant of JLZ's motion to disallow its costs and attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court's decision finding Albar breached the contract was supported by substantial and competent evidence, and that it was not an error for the court to disallow Albar's costs and fees. View "Echo Vanderwal v. Albar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Advanced Medical Diagnostics entered into a contract for services with Defendant Imaging Center of Idaho, LLC. Defendant stopped making payments and Plaintiff sued for damages for breach of contract. The matter was tried to a jury and the jury returned a special verdict finding that Plaintiff had proved its claim but was not entitled to damages because Defendant proved its affirmative defense. The trial court determined that Defendant was the prevailing party, and was awarded costs and attorney fees. Plaintiff appealed that award to the Supreme Court. After its review, the Supreme Court found no error in the trial court's decision and affirmed. View "Adv Medical Diagnostics v. Imaging Center of Idaho" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the grant of summary judgment dismissing an action to enforce an oral agreement to guaranty the debt of another on the ground that the agreement was barred by the statute of frauds. Sunshine Secretarial Services subleased office space from Accelerated Paving, Inc., and at times provided it with secretarial services. Accelerated Paving owed Plaintiff-Appellant Mickelsen Construction, Inc. money ($34,980.00) for providing asphalt to an Accelerated jobsite. Mickelsen threatened to file a materialmen’s lien against the real property on which the work was being done, and Accelerated's vice president asked that it not do so because that would delay the receipt of payment for the construction job. The vice president offered to pay the debt with an American Express credit card, but Mickelsen responded that it did not accept American Express credit cards. There was disagreement as to what happened next: Accelerate's vice president said there was not enough credit on the card to fund the payment, but when Accelerated received payment for the project it would pay down the balance so that there was enough credit to pay Mickelsen with the card. Mickelsen agreed not to file the lien if Accelerated could find someone to guaranty the payment by the credit card. Defendant-Respondent Lesa Horrocks of Sunshine agreed to do so and gave Mickelsen a check in the amount owed, drawn on Sunshine's account. Sunshine had a credit card machine that was capable of transacting with several credit cards including American Express credit cards. They told her that American Express had approved the transaction and asked her to use Sunshine credit card machine to run the transaction. It appeared to her that the transaction had been approved by American Express. issued the check. Several days later, Accelerated informed her that American Express had not approved the transaction. Accelerated then filed for bankruptcy. Mickelsen then sued Ms. Horrocks and Sunshine alleging that they had agreed to guaranty the credit card payment and so issued the check. The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the alleged guaranty was barred by the statute of limitations in Idaho Code section 9-505. In response, Mickelsen argued that the check was a sufficient writing under the statute of frauds and, if not, that the transaction was governed by Idaho Code section 9-506 and therefore exempt from the statute of frauds. The district court held that the check was an insufficient writing and that section 9-506 did not apply because the Defendants did not receive any direct benefit. The court granted the motion for summary judgment and entered a judgment dismissing this action. Mickelsen then appealed. Finding no error with the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mickelsen Const v. Horrocks" on Justia Law

Glenn Mosell was a commercial real estate broker in investment sales and a land developer who owned about 290 acres of property in Canyon County. He planned to develop this property and other land that he had an option to purchase into a destination resort which would include, among other things, resort-based residences; a state-of-the-art winery; a luxury 4-star boutique hotel; a world class day spa; a gourmet restaurant; an event and business conference center; polo fields; an equestrian center; a sporting and athletic club; and an amphitheater for music events and concerts. He contacted restaurateur John Berryhill to see if he would be interested in building the restaurant in the development. Berryhill was the owner and president of Berryhill & Company, which operated a restaurant and catering business. Berryhill agreed to participate in the proposed development, but not to build the restaurant. In 2007, Berryhill & Company signed a lease of space in downtown Boise in order to move his restaurant from a strip mall to that space. Mosell and Berryhill both signed a personal guaranty of Berryhill & Company's obligations under the lease. Berryhill & Company then began making tenant improvements to the leased property. Mosell Equities paid Berryhill & Company by check. The word "loan" was written on the memo line of the check. Over the next ten months, Mosell Equities issued nine additional checks to Berryhill & Company, each had the word "loan" written on the memo line except for two. The restaurant opened in August 2007. Because of the economic downturn, Mosell decided not to proceed with the polo project and did not launch the intended sales effort in 2008. Later that year, Mosell Equities stopped paying the rent on additional space, and Mosell and Berryhill ended their relationship. In 2009, Mosell Equities filed suit against Berryhill & Company on multiple claims: (1) breach of an express contract; (2) breach of an implied contract; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) conversion; (5) fraud; and (6) piercing the corporate veil. The case was tried to a jury, and the verdict was in favor of Berryhill. Mosell moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict citing insufficient evidence, and the district court granted that motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict, and that the district court erred in granting the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Mosell Equities v. Berryhill & Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Gary Duspiva, a well driller, filed suit against Defendants-Appellees Clyde and John Fillmore to recover money that he claimed was owed to him for well drilling services. The Fillmores counterclaimed, alleging Duspiva violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (ICPA). The matter proceeded to trial. The district court found that Duspiva's conduct violated the ICPA and granted judgment in favor of the Fillmores. Duspiva appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Duspiva v. Fillmore" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case arose from a commercial lease dispute. Boise Mode, LLC leased space in its building to Donahoe Pace & Partners, Ltd. (DPP). Timothy Pace executed a personal guarantee for the lease. During the term of the lease, Boise Mode remodeled part of the building for another tenant. After raising concerns to Boise Mode about the adverse effects of the construction to its business, DPP eventually stopped paying rent and vacated the premises prior to the end of the lease. Boise Mode then brought an action against DPP, alleging breach of contract, and against Pace for breaching the guarantee. DPP counterclaimed, alleging that the disruption caused by the construction constituted breach of contract and constructive eviction. After Boise Mode moved for summary judgment on all claims and counterclaims, DPP requested a continuance to complete discovery. The district court denied DPP's motion and ultimately granted Boise Mode's motion for summary judgment. DPP appealed the grant of summary judgment as well as the district court's denial of its request for a continuance. Upon review, and finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace" on Justia Law