Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

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The plaintiff, Dania Mateo, filed a case against Davidson Media Group Rhode Island Stations, LLC and several of its employees, which included 22 counts alleging violations of Rhode Island's Fair Employment Practices Act (RIFEPA) and Civil Rights Act (RICRA) as well as claims of sexual harassment, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, negligence, false imprisonment, defamation, and conspiracy to commit defamation. The case was pending for nearly 14 years.Mateo appealed a Superior Court decision granting partial summary judgment in favor of certain defendants. The defendants cross-appealed, arguing that the hearing justice erred in granting partial final judgment because he failed to make an express determination that there was no just reason for delay, as required by Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island found the defendants’ cross-appeal meritorious. The Court ruled that the hearing justice erred in granting partial final judgment because he failed to determine whether the criteria clearly set forth in Rule 54(b) had been satisfied. The Court held that the judgment must be vacated and the case remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings. As a result, the Court did not reach the issues raised in the plaintiff's appeal. View "Mateo v. Davidson Media Group Rhode Island Stations, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Louisiana considered whether an architect and contract administrator had duty of care towards an employee of a subcontractor under the terms of a construction contract. The employee, Gustavo Bonilla, had been injured during a demolition job and filed a suit alleging negligence against Verges Rome Architects (VRA) and Morphy Makofsky, Inc. (MMI). VRA had been hired as a consultant for design and contract administration services. The trial court ruled in favor of VRA, but the court of appeal reversed this decision.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Louisiana found that the contract terms were clear and unambiguous, and did not impose a duty on VRA to oversee, supervise, or maintain the construction site or Mr. Bonilla’s safety. VRA was required to make weekly site visits to ensure work was progressing according to specifications. However, the contract specifically stated that these visits should not be construed as supervision of actual construction. Responsibility for site safety and construction methods was allocated to the contractor.The Court concluded that VRA could not be held liable for failing to perform duties it was not contractually obligated to undertake. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's decision and reinstated the trial court's judgment, which granted summary judgment in favor of VRA. View "BONILLA VS. VERGES ROME ARCHITECTS" on Justia Law

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In this case, Officer Ashton Lambert struck and killed Gregory Graham with his police cruiser while responding to a call. Graham's estate sued Lambert, the City of Fayetteville, and the Fayetteville Police Department, alleging negligence, gross negligence, and wrongful death.The trial court denied the City and Lambert's motions for summary judgment, arguing that governmental and public officer immunity barred the estate's claims. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, leading to an appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals had improperly analyzed the summary judgment order. The Court of Appeals had focused on the sufficiency of the estate's complaint, rather than the presence of a genuine factual dispute. This was incorrect, as the court should have asked whether the evidence raised a genuine factual dispute on the existence and extent of the City’s waiver of immunity.The Supreme Court also found that the estate's claim that section 20-145 waived the city's governmental immunity failed as a matter of law. The statute, which exempts police officers from speed limits when chasing or apprehending criminal absconders, does not shield officers for their gross negligence. However, the statute does not contain clear language withdrawing immunity from a discrete government body.The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to analyze whether there was a genuine issue of material fact on whether the City waived governmental immunity by purchasing liability insurance. The court also clarified that section 20-145 does not waive the City’s governmental immunity for its officers’ grossly negligent driving. The Estate’s claim against the City remains intact unless otherwise waived by the purchase of liability insurance. View "Est. of Graham v. Lambert" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina dealt with the issue of whether a statute of limitations barred a defendant's counterclaim for negligence because it was filed one day after the three-year limitations period had expired. The court ruled that the counterclaim should be considered as having been filed on the same date that the plaintiff commenced his lawsuit, thus making it timely.The case originated from a two-automobile accident that occurred on 19 December 2015. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant over injuries he allegedly sustained in the accident on 19 December 2018. The defendant filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff for his own injuries on 20 December 2018, arguing that the plaintiff's own negligence caused the accident. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, asserting that the counterclaim should be dismissed under N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16) because it was filed outside the statute’s three-year limit for personal injury claims.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, arguing that his counterclaim filed on 20 December 2018 should be deemed to relate back to the filing of the original complaint by the plaintiff on 19 December 2018, and thus should be considered timely filed within the three-year statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment order dismissing the defendant’s counterclaim.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, reasoning that for purposes of the statute of limitations in N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16), the filing of a compulsory counterclaim relates back to the filing of the complaint. Therefore, the court held that N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16) did not bar the defendant’s compulsory counterclaim against the plaintiff. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Upchurch v. Harp Builders, Inc" on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs, Jennifer Zeno-Ethridge and Dennis Ethridge, appealed from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Comcast Corporation, Eustis Cable, and Green Mountain Flagging. The suit arose from an incident in which Jennifer witnessed a fatal accident involving a utility truck and a flagger while she was driving. Following the incident, she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression.Jennifer sued the defendants for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) and negligence, while Dennis filed a loss-of-consortium claim. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, determining that Jennifer's contact with the flagger’s blood and brain matter did not constitute a "physical impact from external force" necessary for a NIED claim. It also concluded that Jennifer's PTSD diagnosis did not satisfy the "actual injury" requirement for a negligence claim.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the act of Jennifer stepping in the flagger's blood and brain matter was not a physical impact from an external force. Furthermore, the court clarified that a PTSD diagnosis alone is insufficient to satisfy the “actual injury” requirement of a negligence claim, as it is a mental or emotional harm, rather than a physical one. Consequently, Jennifer's NIED and negligence claims failed as a matter of law. Therefore, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Dennis's loss-of-consortium claim, which was dependent upon the success of Jennifer's claims. View "Zeno-Ethridge v. Comcast Corporation" on Justia Law

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In the Supreme Court of Mississippi, two interlocutory appeals were consolidated, both arising from the same wrongful-death lawsuit. Beverly Butts, on behalf of the wrongful-death beneficiaries of John Albert Hemphill, Sr., alleged that four years prior to Hemphill's death, Dr. Reese Lindsey failed to remove part of a bladder catheter, leading to recurring infections and ultimately Hemphill's death. Additionally, she claimed that the staff at Greenwood Leflore Hospital, where Lindsey treated Hemphill, provided substandard care.Regarding Lindsey, the court found that he had not been lawfully served with process. Despite multiple summons, Butts failed to comply with the Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4, which outlines the requirements for serving process. As a result, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Lindsey, leading the Supreme Court to reverse the trial court's decision and render judgment dismissing Lindsey from the lawsuit.Concerning the Hospital, the court found that Butts had failed to provide the necessary medical expert testimony to support her medical negligence claim against the Hospital. Despite her argument that the Hospital's summary judgment motion was preemptive as no scheduling order had been set, the court noted that a defendant can file for summary judgment at any time. Given Butts's failure to present necessary expert testimony, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the Hospital. View "Lindsey v. Butts" on Justia Law

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In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a verdict from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiffs, C. Sidney Johnston and Danette Johnston, had sued Ferrellgas, Incorporated after Mr. Johnston was injured using a propane tank manufactured by Ferrellgas. A jury had found Ferrellgas liable for a manufacturing defect and negligence and awarded the Johnstons $7 million, which the district court reduced to $1.7 million. On appeal, Ferrellgas contended that the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law because there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict.The Court of Appeals agreed with Ferrellgas. The Court found that there was no substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that the tank was defective when it left Ferrellgas's possession, a crucial element of a manufacturing defect claim. The Court also found that the negligence claim must fail, as it was dependent on the tank having a manufacturing defect.The Court therefore reversed the district court's denial of Ferrellgas's motion for judgment as a matter of law on both the manufacturing defect and negligence claims, and rendered judgment for Ferrellgas. View "Johnston v. Ferrellgas" on Justia Law

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This case revolves around the fatal shooting of Daniel Hernandez by Officer Toni McBride of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). Hernandez's estate and family members filed a lawsuit against McBride, the LAPD, and the City of Los Angeles, alleging violations of Hernandez's Fourth Amendment rights, the family members' Fourteenth Amendment rights, and several state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the force McBride used in her final two shots was excessive, but she was entitled to qualified immunity because she did not violate clearly established law. The court explained that while the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim could proceed to trial, McBride was protected by qualified immunity because no prior case law established that her conduct was unlawful.The court also dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment claim, stating that plaintiffs failed to show that McBride acted with a purpose to harm without regard to legitimate law enforcement objectives. The court further ruled that the Monell claim against the City of Los Angeles and the LAPD failed because even if there was an underlying constitutional violation, plaintiffs failed to provide any basis for holding the City and LAPD liable for McBride’s actions.However, the court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' state law claims for assault, wrongful death, and violation of the Bane Act, determining that the reasonableness of McBride's final shots presented a question for a trier of fact. The court thus sent these claims back to the district court for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of Hernandez v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

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In a lawsuit between two competitors in the shipping logistics industry, Project44, Inc. and FourKites, Inc., Project44 alleged that FourKites agents sent defamatory emails to Project44's chief revenue officer and two members of its board of directors. FourKites argued that there was no publication to a third party because the emails were sent to members of the corporation who were, in effect, the corporation itself. The Cook County circuit court agreed with FourKites and dismissed Project44's complaint for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the decision of the appellate court, holding that there is publication to a third party when an allegedly defamatory statement is communicated to a member of a corporation’s executive leadership team. It was determined that a corporation has a distinct reputation from that of its management-level employees and an interest in protecting that reputation among its employees and the public at large. Therefore, defamatory statements made to corporate employees, even those with the power to act on behalf of the corporation, can harm the corporation’s business reputation among those employees. Communication of a defamatory statement regarding the corporation to these employees establishes the publication element for a defamation action brought by the corporation against the party that publishes the statement. View "Project44, Inc. v. FourKites, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Michigan Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, addressed the applicability of the Recreational Land Use Act (RUA) and the owner-liability provision of the Michigan Vehicle Code to a case involving a fatal off-road vehicle (ORV) accident. The accident occurred on private land owned by the defendants, also the grandparents and vehicle owners, and involved their 12-year-old granddaughter. The plaintiff, mother of the deceased, sought to hold the defendants liable.The court held that the RUA, which limits a landowner's liability for injuries occurring during recreational activity on their property to instances of gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct, applies in this case. It found that the RUA applies to the plaintiff's proposed owner-liability claim, which is premised on the defendants' ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident. The court reasoned that the longstanding nature of owner liability when the RUA was enacted, the RUA's detailed provisions and lack of an exception for owner liability, and the optimal effect given to both statutes under this interpretation, indicate that the legislature intended the RUA to limit owner liability under the Michigan Vehicle Code.Since the plaintiff did not challenge the lower court's finding that there was no factual support for gross negligence on the part of the defendants, the court affirmed the trial court's decision granting the defendants' motion for summary disposition and denying the plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint. View "Estate Of Riley Robinson v. Robinson" on Justia Law