Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Louisiana Supreme Court
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McLane Southern, Inc. is a Mississippi wholesaler of tobacco products that sells smokeless tobacco to retail establishments in Louisiana. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the company was liable for excise taxes pursuant to the state Tobacco Tax Law. Finding that the law imposes an excise tax on smokeless tobacco products be paid by the dealer who first sells, uses, consumes, handles or distributes the product in Louisiana, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

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This case involved a legal malpractice claim brought by Plaintiff MB Industries, LLC (MBI) against attorneys Steven Durio and John Weinstein. The attorneys represented MBI in an ultimately unsuccessful lawsuit against former MBI employees. Rather than appeal the unfavorable judgment, MBI chose to sue its former attorneys. The issues before the Supreme Court were: (1) whether a party's failure to appeal an underlying judgment waived any right to bring a legal malpractice claim based on that judgment; and (2) whether summary judgment was properly granted in light of MBI's failure to introduce expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of care which would have demonstrated the attorneys' actions fell below that standard. After careful review, the Court found that Louisiana law does not impose a "per se" rule requiring an appeal before a client can sue his former attorney. Furthermore, the Court found that a party alleging legal malpractice must introduce expert testimony to establish a standard of care "except in those rare cases involving malpractice so egregious that a lay jury could infer the defendant's actions fell below any reasonable standard." The Court found that under the particular facts of this case, there were no genuine issues of material fact, and that MBI failed to establish it could satisfy its evidentiary burden of proof at trial. The attorneys were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's original judgment in favor of the attorneys.

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Plaintiff Silver Dollar Liquor, L.L.C. ("Silver Dollar") owns the Silver Dollar Liquor Store located within District 6 of Red River Parish. Silver Dollar filed a declaratory judgment action against Defendant Red River Parish Police Jury ("Police Jury"), seeking to have Section 3-18 declared invalid because there has never been a local option election in District 6 pursuant to La. R.S. 51:191. The Police Jury answered that it had authority under La. R.S. 26:493 to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages. Relying on La. R.S. 26:493, the appellate court found in favor of the Police Jury, holding Section 3-18 to be valid. Finding the appellate court's decision created a split in the circuits, the Supreme Court granted Silver Dollar's certiorari application to resolve the split. Upon review, the Court surmised the heart of this case involved the interpretation and applicability of La. R.S. 51:191, which requires a local-option election in order to authorize a Sunday-closing law; and La. R.S. 26:493, which delegates to political subdivisions the power to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages. After review, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision.

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In 1995, Charles and Charlene Ebinger contracted with Venus Construction Corporation to build a home. The couple moved into their new residence in 1997. In 2003, the Ebingers filed suit against Venus alleging defects in the home's foundation. Venus sought indemnification from one of its subcontractors. At issue in this case is whether the construction company's third-party demand against its subcontractor was time-barred by state law that established a peremptive period for actions against residential building contractors. The peremptive period was established originally at ten years, but subsequent amendments shortened its duration. A 1999 amendment reduced the period to seven years; a 2003 amendment reduced it to five years. Upon consideration of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the latest version of the statute applied in this case (2003). Consequently, the court held that the construction company's right to indemnity from its subcontractor was extinguished and its third party demand was perempted.