Justia Business Law Opinion SummariesArticles Posted in Missouri Supreme Court
Naylor Senior Citizens Housing, LP v. Sides Constr. Co.
John Dilks filed a pro se petition to recover damages he suffered as a result of a flood. The “Plaintiffs” identified in the allegations of the petition were Dilks, individually, and Naylor Senior Citizens Housing, LP and Naylor Senior Citizens Housing II, LP (collectively, “Partnerships”), both of which were Missouri statutory limited partnerships. The trial court dismissed the Partnerships’ claims on the ground that, because Dilks was not a licensed attorney and he attempted to assert claims on behalf of the Partnerships, the petition was a nullity and had no legal effect for purposes of asserting claims on behalf of the Partnerships. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, as statutory entities, the Partnerships may not appear in Missouri court except through a licensed attorney, and because Dilks was not a licensed attorney, his attempt to assert claims on behalf of the Partnerships constituted the unauthorized practice of law and may not be given effect. View "Naylor Senior Citizens Housing, LP v. Sides Constr. Co." on Justia Law
Cent. Trust & Inv. Co. v. SignalPoint Asset Mgmt., LLC
After Central Trust and Investment Company purchased Springfield Trust & Investment Company (STC), Central Trust filed an action against SignalPoint Asset Management, LLC, a registered investment advisor, for affiliating with STC’s ex-employee, who had acquired STC’s client list and had become an independent advisor representative of SignalPoint. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of SignalPoint on its claims for misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with business relations, and civil conspiracy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Central Trust did not demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether SignalPoint “misappropriated” Central Trust’s client list as that term is defined by the Missouri Uniform Trade Secrets Act; (2) this failure also justified the grant of summary judgment against Central Trust’s claim of tortious interference with business relations; and (3) Central Trust’s civil conspiracy claim was moot. View "Cent. Trust & Inv. Co. v. SignalPoint Asset Mgmt., LLC" on Justia Law
Western Blue Print Co. v. Roberts
While Myrna Roberts (Myrna) worked for Western Blue, a document printing and management service company, Myrna oversaw a contract with the University of Missouri. In the meantime, Mel Roberts (Mel) operated Graystone Properties, which was named part owner of DocuCopy. Acting on Western Blue's behalf, Myrna hired DocuCopy as a subcontractor for the university contract. Neither Myrna nor Mel disclosed their interest in DocuCopy to Western Blue. After Western Blue was purchased, Myrna and a large number of staff left their employment with Western Blue and began working for DocuCopy. Thereafter, the university awarded DocuCopy rather than Western Blue the renewal of its contract. As a result of losing the university contract, Western Blue lost another contract and was forced to close a branch office. Western Blue filed a petition against Myrna, Mel, DocuCopy, and Graystone Properties (Appellants), alleging breach of fiduciary duties, tortious interference with a valid business expectancy, computer tampering, and civil conspiracy. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Western Blue and awarded attorneys fees. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment finding Myrna owed Western Blue a fiduciary duty and affirmed in all other respects. Remanded.
Emerson Elec. Co. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos.
Insured appealed the circuit court's grant of judgment on the pleadings to Broker on Insured's claims that Broker violated a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Insured by not disclosing that Broker received contingent commissions from Insurers for directing Insured's business to them and that Broker kept all interest earned on the premiums Insured sent it between the time Broker received them and the time they were forwarded to the Insurers. In addition, Insured argued that Broker breached a duty to find it the least costly policy possible. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) brokers do not have a duty to find insureds the lowest possible cost insurance available to meet their needs; (2) Missouri law specifically authorizes a broker to receive commissions from the insurer and to deposit premiums in an account pending their payment to the insurer or refund to the insured; but (3) the trial court erred by dismissing the petition because it could not be said as a matter of law that Emerson could not recover on one or more of its claims. Remanded.
CACH, LLC v. Askew
CACH, LLC, a debt collector, brought an action against Jon Askew for an alleged outstanding debt owed by Askew. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of CACH and against Askew. Askew appealed, contending that CACH did not properly demonstrate that it had been assigned the debt in question and that the circuit court improperly admitted an exhibit based on the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the disputed exhibit was erroneously admitted into evidence by the circuit court under the business records exception; (2) without admission of the exhibit into evidence, CACH failed to provide any competent evidence of the alleged assignment of Askew's account to CACH; and (3) without evidence of the validity of this assignment, CACH did not demonstrate it had standing to pursue the claim.
Kansas City Premier Apartments, Inc. v. Mo. Real Estate Comm’n
Tiffany Lewis and Ryan Gran, neither of whom had a real estate brokerage license, founded Kansas City Premier Apartments, a business devoted to assisting owners of rental property in locating prospective renters. After the Missouri Real Estate Commission informed Lewis that KCPA was conducting real estate activity without a Missouri real estate license in violation of Missouri law, KCPA filed a lawsuit requesting a declaratory judgment that Mo. Rev. Stat. 339 did not encompass its business activities, that it was exempted from licensure requirements, and that the Commission's interpretation of chapter 339 violated KCPA's rights under the United States and Missouri constitutions. The Commission filed a petition for a preliminary injunction, and the two cases were consolidated. The trial court issued an injunction against KCPA. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) KCPA failed to meet its burden that it qualified for an exemption; (2) the challenged provisions of chapter 339 did not violate KCPA's freedom of speech under either the Missouri or United States constitutions; (3) the exemptions listed in chapter 339 did not violate the equal protection clause of the Missouri Constitution; and (5) the challenged provisions of the law were not unconstitutionally vague.