Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

Sheryl Fines appealed a judgment that dismissed her action against Ressler Enterprises, Inc. (doing business as Ressler Siding and Windows (Ressler)). Fines argued the district court abused its discretion in dismissing her action against Ressler as a sanction for spoliation of evidence. She contended dismissal was not appropriate because the court erred in determining Ressler was prejudiced by the destruction of the evidence and the court failed to consider the availability of less severe sanctions. Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanction of dismissal and accordingly affirmed. View "Fines v. Ressler Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

Andrew Thomas appealed the district court's judgment entered after a jury awarded Randall and Shannon Bakke $25,000 plus interest for breach of contract, negligence and fraud. Thomas argued insufficient evidence existed to pierce the corporate veil of D&A Landscaping Company, LLC and hold him personally liable for breach of contract and fraud. Thomas also claimed that the district court committed plain error by failing to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proving fraud and that insufficient evidence existed to support the fraud verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the corporate veil was not pierced and the jury instruction on the burden of proof for fraud was law of the case. View "Bakke v. D & A Landscaping Co." on Justia Law

Steven and Connie Falkenstein appealed a district court judgment dismissing their claims against Jon W. Dill and Credico, Inc. for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). The Falkensteins received medical services from Medcenter One but failed to pay the total balance due. The debt was assigned to Credico, Inc. for collection. Dill, an in-house attorney and employee of Credico, Inc., communicated with the Falkensteins regarding the debt. In March 2009, judgment was entered in favor of Credico, Inc. for the amount of the Falkensteins' debt, including interest. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no error with the district court's dismissal and affirmed. View "Falkenstein v. Dill" on Justia Law

Shawn Knudson, individually and as a partner of Tri-K Farms, appealed and Randy Kyllo, individually and as a partner of Tri-K Farms, cross-appealed a judgment ordering Knudson to pay Kyllo $24,703.97 after a bench trial in an action involving the operation and dissolution of their farming partnership, Tri-K Farms. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the district court's findings of fact for the dissolution of the partnership were not clearly erroneous, but the court failed to make appropriate findings on Kyllo's claim for usurpation of a partnership opportunity. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Knudson v. Kyllo" on Justia Law

Quality Auto Body, Inc. and Bradley R. Huebner ("Quality Auto Body") appealed a trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment awarding immediate possession of leased premises, a money judgment for past due rent and late fees, and a money judgment for reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and disbursements to Working Capital #1, LLC. Although an order for judgment is not appealable, "an attempted appeal from an order for judgment will be treated as an appeal from a subsequently entered consistent judgment, if one exists." The Supreme Court treated this case as an appeal, and affirmed the trial court's judgment awarding Working Capital immediate possession of the leased premises, a money judgment for past due rent and late fees, and a money judgment for reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and disbursements. View "Working Capital #1 v. Quality Auto Body" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a majority group of limited partners of Magic 2 x 52 Limited Partnership appealed their post-judgment motion to pierce the corporate veil of several corporate Defendants and to recover punitive damages. The Limited Partners' investment in the Magic partnership did not go as planned, and they initiated this lawsuit, seeking to remove Magic Corporation as the general partner of the partnership and requesting monetary damages. The Limited Partners also sought to pierce the corporate veil of the corporate Defendants to hold Kenneth Herslip personally liable for the corporate Defendants' conduct and to recover punitive damages. May 2010 amended judgment awarded Magic Partnership $146,153.99 against Magic Corporation, B K Properties, and Herslip Construction; awarded Magic Partnership $144,263.80, and prejudgment interest of $77,783.88, against Magic Corporation and Herslip Construction; and awarded Magic Partnership costs and disbursements of $46,201.47 against Magic Corporation, B K Properties, and Herslip Construction. None of the parties appealed from the May 2010 judgment. The Limited Partners' subsequent efforts to collect on the judgment were unsuccessful. In June 2010, both Herslip Construction and Magic Corporation filed for bankruptcy under chapter 7. The district court denied the Limited Partners' post-judgment motion, concluding they had not shown an appropriate basis for granting their request to pierce the corporate veil and to recover punitive damages. The court stated its prior opinion after trial had specifically denied the plaintiffs' requests to pierce the corporate veil and to recover punitive damages with a detailed analysis. The court concluded the May 2010 amended judgment was final as to all issues decided by the court after trial and refused to revisit piercing the corporate veil and punitive damages. View "Watts v. Magic 2 x 52 Management, Inc." on Justia Law

Sisters of Mary of the Presentation Long Term Care, d/b/a Ave Maria Village ("Sisters of Mary"), appealed, and Northern Excavating Co., Inc. ("Northern") cross-appealed a trial court's judgment awarding Northern $81,694.23 plus interest at 1.5 percent and costs at $743.33, and awarding Sisters of Mary $3,231.00 in attorney's fees. In October of 2009, Sisters of Mary and Northern executed a contract wherein Northern agreed to repair a water main break on Sisters of Mary's property for the cost of its "[t]ime and [m]aterials[.]" The contract did not contain a specific price. Following completion of the repairs, Northern submitted a bill for $103,244.11 to Sisters of Mary. Sisters of Mary found the bill excessive and refused to pay, asserting the repairs only had a value of approximately $40,000. Northern filed a construction lien covering the repaired property and sued Sisters of Mary seeking $98,806.98 for breach of contract and foreclosure of the lien. Sisters of Mary answered and counterclaimed alleging breach of contract, unlawful sales practices, and invalid construction lien/slander of title. Sisters of Mary also sought a jury trial. By stipulation, issues relating to the foreclosure of the construction lien were reserved and not submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict awarding Northern $81,694.23 plus interest at 1.5 percent for time and materials provided under the contract. After the verdict was rendered, Sisters of Mary applied for its costs and attorney's fees. In its post-trial brief, Sisters of Mary claimed it successfully challenged Northern's lien and argued the court was required to award it all of its attorney's fees and costs associated with the action. In its own post-trial brief, Northern argued it was unreasonable to require lienholders to pay costs and attorney's fees when a lienholder does not recover the precise amount claimed in a lien. The trial court ultimately awarded Sisters of Mary a portion of its attorney's fees, explaining it was a reasonable award given Sisters of Mary failed to specify "any fees that were directly related to the construction lien issue[.]" The trial court also found Northern was the prevailing party and awarded its costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Legislature intended to award an owner literally all of the costs and attorney's fees arising out of a lawsuit when challenging a lien was not the only disputed cause of action: "[t]here is nothing in the statute or the legislative history to support that conclusion. We recognize that Sisters of Mary must provide the court with an itemization of its attorney's fees and costs in order for the trial court to determine those related to the successful contest of the accuracy of the lien." The Court reversed the award of attorney's fees and costs and remanded that issue to the trial court. Because the district court misconstrued the fees and costs statute, the Court reversed in part and remanded for the district court to determine the reasonable amount of attorney's fees associated with contesting the accuracy of the construction lien.

Appellant Richard Dregseth appealed a district court's judgment that dismissed his equitable claims against Appellee Randy Brown. Appellant argued that the district court erred in failing to make findings of fact, failed to reject testimony and dismissed his promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel and unjust enrichment claims. In 1999, Appellant left his job at Bremer Bank to work for Appellee Brown at Capital Harvest, Inc., a captive finance company for AGSCO, Inc., a corporation owned Brown. Appellant worked for Brown until 2003, first at Capital Harvest then at AGSCO. In 2005, Appellee and two former Capital Harvest employees, John D. Erickson and Jon A. Ramsey, sued Brown and Capital Harvest for breach of contract, fraud, deceit, promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel, unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duty. Appellee claimed he was entitled to be paid the value of an ownership interest in Capital Harvest that Brown promised to provide as part of his compensation. Prior to trial, the district court dismissed all of Appellant's claims except for breach of contract and fraud. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part of the first appeal. The case was remanded for further proceedings on Appellant's deceit and equitable claims. On rehearing, the district court then dismissed the remaining claims, and the Supreme Court affirmed. In this case before the Supreme Court, the Court found that the district court's findings and conclusions were based on evidence from all of the witnesses, including Appellant, Brown and the economists who testified on behalf of both parties. Therefore the Court concluded the district court did not err relying on that evidence, nor did it err concluding under the facts of this case that Brown was not unjustly enriched by not paying Appellant for the value of the ownership interest in Capital Harvest that was not transferred by Brown. The Court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding no error to make findings of fact, to reject testimony or in dismissing Appellant's claims.

Appellants Cendak Development Corporation and Fort Rice Bar & Grill, Inc. (Cendak), appealed a judgment entered in favor of Plaintiffs-Appellees Richard and Mary Bendish, which cancelled the Bendishes' contract for deed with James Castillo and held Cendak had no right to redeem the property under a lease purchase agreement. This issue in this case centered on the cancellation of a contract for deed. In 2003, Bendishes owned land in Fort Rice where they operated a business called the "Outpost." In March 2003, the Bendishes entered into a contract for deed to sell the property to Castillo for $40,400. Castillo made a down payment of $7,500 and was to make monthly payments of $620.86 on the contract for deed, with an annual interest rate of five percent. Castillo made regular payments on the contract for deed through January 1, 2005. In 2006, Richard Bendish, Castillo, and Ivan Gange, on behalf of Cendak, executed a "Lease Purchase Agreement," which included handwritten notations initialed by each of the parties. The agreement was not filed with the Morton County Register of Deeds. Castillo and then Gange operated the Fort Rice Bar & Grill on the premises. After January 2005, Bendishes received sporadic payments from Castillo and then Gange. In 2010, the Bendished sued Castillo alleging default under the terms of the contract for deed. Cendak answered the suit, alleging that Castillo had assigned the contract to Cendak, the Bendishes accepted the assignment and accepted payments from Cendak pursuant to the contract. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the district court erred when it failed to give Cendak a period of redemption in the action to cancel the contract for deed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "Based upon the language of the Lease Purchase Agreement and the equities of the situation, we cannot say that the district court acted in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or that its decision was not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination. We therefore conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Cendak a redemption period."

The Industrial Commission and Slawson Exploration Company appealed a district court judgment that reversed the Commission's assessment of a risk penalty against Gadeco, LLC. The issue in this case arose from a challenge to the validity of an invitation to participate in the cost of drilling a well which resulted in the Commission's assessment of a 200 percent risk penalty. Because the Supreme Court was unable to discern the basis for the Commission's decision, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the Commission for the preparation of findings that explain the reasons for its decision.