Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

In April 2013, Randy Holkesvig petitioned the district court for a disorderly conduct restraining order against a business, Dakota Spas. Holkesvig's petition essentially alleged that after buying a hot tub cover from Dakota Spas: employees "order[ed] the wrong color of a hot tub cover" and "refus[ed] to send [him] receipts in a timely fashion;" a Dakota Spas individual "yelled" at him, he was told he needed a credit card receipt even though he claimed he was never given one; Dakota Spas "harassed" him by failing to give him an immediate credit back on his credit card and by requiring him to order a new hot tub cover to correct their alleged error; and Dakota Spas was dishonest with him and initiated unwanted telephone calls and sent unsolicited mail to him. Holkesvig appealed the district court order denying his motion for reconsideration of his petition and his request for an "oral hearing." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding a disorderly conduct restraining order cannot be issued against a business, only natural persons. View "Holkesvig v. Dakota Spas" on Justia Law

Ford Motor Credit Company appealed a district court order dismissing its action to renew a prior judgment. Ford sued Jeremy Halvorson in Minnesota on a contract matter. A judgment was entered in Minnesota against Halvorson. Halvorson moved from Minnesota to North Dakota, and the Minnesota judgment was registered in North Dakota in 2011. Halvorson did not pay the judgment. In 2013, Ford commenced this action to renew the judgment by personal service of the summons and complaint upon Halvorson. Halvorson did not respond to the summons and complaint, and Ford moved for entry of a default judgment against Halvorson. The district court, on its own motion, denied the motion for default judgment and instead dismissed Ford's complaint with prejudice, concluding that Ford's action was an improper duplicate action on the original debt and that the proper method to renew a judgment was by affidavit under the procedure provided in N.D.C.C. 28-20-21. Ford moved for reconsideration of the order dismissing its action, and the court entered an order affirming dismissal of the action. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order dismissing Ford's action on the judgment. Because there was no reason apparent on the record to deny the default judgment, the Court remanded the case to the district court with directions to enter a default judgment in favor of Ford in its action to renew the prior judgment. View "Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Halvorson" on Justia Law

James Leach, IDA Marketing Corporation, and IDA of Moorhead Corporation appealed a judgment holding them jointly and severally liable to Reed Danuser for claims involving Danuser's termination as president and chief executive officer of the corporations and Leach's breach of a fiduciary duty to Danuser and requiring IDA Moorhead to pay Danuser for loans he made to IDA Moorhead. Upon careful analysis of the inter-company agreements and facts presented at the district court, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding: (1) James Leach was responsible for freezing out Danuser's interests in the corporations, which, as found by the court, involved more than just the wrongful termination of Danuser's employment; (2) Leach was not a party to a stock buy-sell agreement, and under the circumstances of this case as found by the district court involving the freeze out of Danuser's interests in the intertwined corporations, the court's determination of damages was not a misapplication of the law and was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable; (3) both James Leach and IDA Moorhead gained from James Leach's actions, which were attributable to the corporation. The district court decided James Leach had control of the corporations when he breached his fiduciary duties to Danuser. Therefore, the district court did not misapply the law in deciding James Leach and the corporations were jointly and severally liable for Danuser's damages and the court's decision was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. View "Danuser v. IDA Marketing Corp." on Justia Law

McColl Farms, LLC appealed district court orders that dismissed its claims against Lisa Pflaum for unjust enrichment, misappropriation, racketeering, and conversion and ordering McColl Farms and its attorney to pay her attorney's fees. McColl Farms is a limited liability company with three members. Aaron McColl and Katie Watson held minority interests. Aaron McColl worked for the farm and was married to Pflaum until they divorced in December 2009. In December 2011, McColl Farms and Aaron McColl sued Pflaum for unjust enrichment, coercion, conversion, misappropriation, and racketeering. They alleged that Pflaum, individually or in concert with Aaron McColl, converted and misappropriated more than $650,000 from McColl Farms between 2007 and 2009. Pflaum moved to dismiss the action or alternatively for summary judgment. Pflaum also moved for sanctions against her opponents. McColl Farms and Aaron McColl then moved for partial summary judgment, which was accompanied by an affidavit from DeWayne Johnston, McColl Farms and Aaron McColl's attorney, with exhibits attached, including documents related to Aaron McColl and Pflaum's banking records. Pflaum objected to the admission of Johnston's affidavit. Later, Aaron McColl and Cynthia McColl (the LLC's majority partner) also filed affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment. Ultimately the trial court granted Pflaum's motion and dismissed all of the claims against Aaron McColl and Pflaum. After careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the claims for misappropriation, racketeering, and conversion. However, it reversed the district court's dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, and one that granted Pflaum's request for sanctions. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "McColl Farms v. Pflaum" on Justia Law

Northern Grain Equipment, LLC entered into contracts with Thimjon Farms Partnership and Hagemeister Farms to construct grain-handling systems on their respective properties. Neither Thimjon nor Hagemeister were customers of First International Bank & Trust. Both Thimjon and Hagemeister made down payments to Northern Grain, which were deposited in Northern Grain's account at First International. Northern Grain never constructed the grain-handling systems and discontinued business. Thimjon and Hagemeister brought separate actions against First International, alleging First International's decision to cease loaning money to Northern Grain resulted in Northern Grain breaching its contracts with Thimjon and Hagemeister and that First International intentionally misled Northern Grain to the detriment of Thimjon and Hagemeister. First International moved for summary judgment. While the motion was pending, Thimjon and Hagemeister moved to amend their complaints to add a claim for deceit and to seek exemplary damages. The district court denied the motion to amend, granted First International's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment dismissing Thimjon's and Hagemeister's claims with prejudice. Thimjon and Hagemeister appealed, arguing the district court erred by granting First International's motion and by denying their motion to amend. Finding no error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Thimjon Farms Partnership v. First International Bank & Trust" on Justia Law

Janet L. Brash, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Larry R. Brash, appealed judgment entered after a bench trial that dismissed her action against William M. Gulleson. We affirm. In the mid-1980s, Dr. Brash began running cows on Gulleson's ranch under an oral agreement to operate on a "60/40 share basis." Gulleson provided care and feed and received 60 percent of the calf crop from Dr. Brash's cows, and Dr. Brash provided veterinarian services. In the fall of 1997, Dr. Brash supervised an inventory and evaluation of cows on the Gulleson ranch, which included cows owned by Gulleson, Dr. Brash, and two or three others who had agreements with Gulleson. At that time, Dr. Brash had 108 cows on the Gulleson ranch. In 2000, Dr. Brash and Gulleson executed a written Cow/Calf Production Lease Agreement. Under the terms of the Agreement, the Brashes agreed to furnish 130 cows presently situated on the Gulleson farm to be cared for by Gulleson, and Gulleson would in return give the Brashes 40 percent of the calf crop each year. After Dr. Brash's death in 2004, Janet Brash testified she became the sole owner of all 130 cows and their offspring; however, when she demanded the return of the estate's and her portion of the herd, Gulleson returned only seven cows. In 2005, Janet Brash brought this action against Gulleson, alleging Gulleson failed to comply with the Agreement executed in 2000. After trial, the court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment, holding in part that Dr. Brash had failed to provide 130 cows as required under the contract, which constituted a failure of consideration, and that Janet Brash had failed to prove a breach of the agreement by Gulleson. The court dismissed Brash's claims with prejudice. Judgment was entered in June 2012. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in concluding there was a failure of consideration in the performance of the Cow/Calf Production Lease Agreement between the Brashes and Gulleson. View "Brash v. Gulleson" on Justia Law

Barbara McDermott appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding Kevin Pifer $80,957.07 in damages for unlawful interference with business, and several other orders issued by the district court in connection with these proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in ruling as a matter of law that a purchase option given to Pifer by her mother, Dorothy Bevan, was a valid and enforceable gift. Furthermore, the Court concluded the interference with business claim was properly presented to the jury, the evidence supports the jury verdict and the court did not abuse its discretion in its related rulings and orders. View "Pifer v. McDermott" on Justia Law

Solid Comfort, Inc., appealed a judgment that awarded damages against Hatchett Hospitality, Inc., and that dismissed William Glen Hatchett ("Glen Hatchett"), Nu Horizon Renovation, LLC, and Hospitality Depot, LLC, for lack of personal jurisdiction. Under the law applied in the district court, the Supreme Court concluded Solid Comfort established a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over Glen Hatchett, Nu Horizon, and Hospitality Depot sufficient to defeat their motion to dismiss. View "Solid Comfort, Inc. v. Hatchett Hospitality, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant John Schmitt appealed the dismissal of his claims against MeritCare Health System for defamation, tortious interference with a prospective business advantage, and violation of state antitrust law. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiff's allegations lacked merit, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims. View "Schmitt v. MeritCare Health System" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Wotzka was a guest at the Radisson Hotel. While taking a shower, he slipped and fell out of the shower. Wotzka sued the Hotel, claiming the Hotel maintained a dangerous condition on its premises by failing to equip the shower with a non-skid strip, a bathmat, or a handrail at the shower level. The Hotel moved for summary judgment, arguing it was under no duty to provide a non-skid strip, a bathmat, or a handrail in its showers. The Hotel also argued it had no duty to warn of the open and obvious dangers of a slippery shower. Wotzka appealed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the Hotel. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court misapplied the law of this case, and erroneously granted summary judgment because Wotzka raised genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the Radisson Hotel should have anticipated harm despite the obvious or known nature of the danger and failed to maintain the property in a reasonably safe manner. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Wotzka v. Minndakota Limited Partnership" on Justia Law