Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

Biolitec, Inc. (BI), a U.S.-based subsidiary of Biolitec AG (BAG), sold medical equipment to Plaintiff AngioDynamics, Inc. (ADI) and agreed to indemnify ADI or any patent infringement claims. Patent infringement claims were subsequently brought against ADI, and ADI settled the claims. In a separate lawsuit, ADI obtained a $23 million judgment against BI under the indemnification clause. Attempting to secure payment on that judgment, ADI sued BAG, BI, and other related entities (collectively, Defendants) on claims including corporate veil-piercing and violation of the Massachusetts Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act MUFTA), alleging that BAG looted more than $18 million from BI to move BI's assets beyond reach. The district court granted ADI a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from carrying out the proposed downstream merger of BAG with its Austrian subsidiary and from transferring any ownership interest the held in any other defendant. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) as a matter of law, preliminary injunctive relief was not barred in this case; and (2) the district court did not err in finding that ADI had demonstrated likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm. View "AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec AG" on Justia Law

Four corporations acknowledged they owed the federal government more than $24 million in taxes and penalties, but before the IRS could collect its dues, the corporations transferred all of their assets to other entities. At issue was whether the previous owner of the four corporations, a trust (Trust), was liable to the IRS for the corporations' unpaid taxes and penalties. The tax court looked to state substantive law to determine the Trust's liability and concluded that the Trust could not be held liable because the IRS (1) failed to prove the Trust had knowledge of the new shareholders' asset-stripping scheme, and (2) did not show that any of the corporation's assets were transferred directly to the Trust. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the tax court correctly looked to Massachusetts law to determine whether the Trust could be held liable for the corporations' taxes and penalties; but (2) the tax court misconstrued Massachusetts fraudulent transfer law in making its decision. Remanded for a determination of whether the conditions for liability were met in this case. View "Frank Sawyer Trust of May 1992 v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this putative class action under sections 11, 12, and 15 of the Securities Act, alleging that a prospectus and registration statement (the offering documents) issued by AMAG Pharmaceutical, Inc. in connection with a secondary stock offering held in 2010 contained two serious omissions: (1) a failure to disclose almost two dozen reports of serious adverse effects linked to a make-or-break drug for AMAG's future; and (2) failure to disclose information the FDA revealed in a warning letter issued after the offering. The district court dismissed the entire complaint on the ground that Plaintiffs failed sufficiently to plead section 11 claims pursuant to an SEC regulation. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) reversed the dismissal of the claims of actionable omissions because of the undisclosed reports because the reports gave rise to uncertainties AMAG knew would adversely affect future revenues and risk factors that made the offering risky and speculative; (2) affirmed as to the claims of omissions regarding the FDA information; and (3) reversed the dismissal of Plaintiffs' sections 12 and 15 causes of action. Remanded. View "Silverstrand Invs. v. Amag Pharms., Inc." on Justia Law

For approximately a decade, Global NAPs, Inc. (GNAPs) had been engaged in litigation with Verizon New England, Inc. The dispute arose over access fees the companies owed each other. Verizon prevailed in the dispute in 2009, but the district court as of the date of this appeal was still overseeing a receivership sale to satisfy the judgment against GNAPs. In 2011, the district court entered a sale order authorizing the sale of assets to Quality Speaks, LLC. In 2012, the district court entered an order imposing an injunction against GNAPs' former principal, Frank Gangi, prohibiting Gangi from taking any action to interfere with the ability of the receiver to transfer purchased assets in connection with the sale, or to reduce the value of the purchased assets. Gangi appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the injunction was plainly justified under longstanding equity principles. View "Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc." on Justia Law

Taxpayer owned fifteen acres of land in Ludlow, Massachusetts. Taxpayer obtained a commitment from Bank to make a loan to fund development on the land. The commitment stipulated that the loan would be made to Taxpayer or "nominee" and that, if Taxpayer assigned the commitment to a nominee, he would be required to guarantee the loan personally. Taxpayer subsequently transferred title of the property to an LLC he formed. Later, the loan became delinquent, and Bank foreclosed on unsold lots in the development. After selling the lots at auction, Bank filed this interpleader action to determine who had the right to the surplus proceeds. The United States claimed an interest in the fund, as did the town of Ludlow. At issue was who was the "nominee" of Taxpayer for purposes of the federal tax lien that attached to Taxpayer's property. The district court held in favor of the United States, concluding that the LLC was Taxpayer's nominee. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the nature of the relationship between Taxpayer pointed to the fact that the LLC was a "legal fiction," and therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that the LLC was Taxpayer's nominee. View "Berkshire Bank v. Town of Ludlow, Mass." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were Puerto Rico pension plans that owned shared in closed-end investment funds (the Funds) advised by UBS Trust Company of Puerto Rico (UBS Trust). In 2008, UBS Trust, acting as the Funds' investment adviser, purchased $757 million worth of bonds from a series of issuances underwritten by UBS Financial Services Inc. of Puerto Rico (UBS Financial), and then sold these bonds to the Funds. Consequently, the Funds were so heavily invested in these bonds that they suffered significant losses when the value of the bonds depreciated. Plaintiffs brought a shareholder derivative action against the Funds' directors, UBS Trust, and UBS Financial. The district court dismissed the claims on the ground that no presuit demand had been made on the Funds' boards of directors, and Plaintiffs had failed in their complaint to state with particularity the reasons such a demand would have been futile. The First Circuit vacated the dismissal of the derivative claims and remanded, holding that Plaintiffs' allegations established with sufficient particularity that a presuit demand would have been futile, and the district court erred in reaching a contrary conclusion. View "Union de Empleados de Muelles v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc." on Justia Law

Upon an investigation by the Maine Bureau of Insurance (Bureau) and the Maine Attorney General's Office (AG's Office) into the questionable business practices of Bankers Life and Casualty Company (Company), Appellant, the Company's employee, accepted responsibility for his own unlawful conduct. In exchange, several state officials (Appellees) representing the Bureau and the AG's Office agreed to take no further action against Appellant. Appellees, however, subsequently agreed to Appellant's termination in a separate agreement with the Company. Appellant filed a complaint against Appellees, asserting violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985(2). The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding (1) Appellees were entitled to absolute immunity on the section 1983 claim, and (2) Appellant failed to plead a plausible section 1985(2) claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Appellees met their burden in establishing they were entitled to absolute immunity for entering into the consent agreements with Appellant and the Company, and the district court did not err by refusing to invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel on Appellees' immunity defense; and (2) because the complaint failed to allege any racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus underlying Appellees' actions, the district court properly dismissed Appellant's section 1985(2) claim. View "Knowlton v. Shaw" on Justia Law

This appeal involved litigation between Coverall North America, Inc. and its franchisees. Proceeding under federal diversity jurisdiction, the franchisees asserted a variety of state-law claims against Coverall. Which of the various plaintiffs were subject to the arbitration provisions of the Franchise Agreement was at issue in this appeal. Appellees were a subgroup of Plaintiffs who became Coverall franchisees by signing consent to transfer agreements, which by reference incorporated under franchise agreements that contained arbitration clauses. The district court determined that Appellees did not have to arbitrate their claims against Coverall because they did not have adequate notice of the arbitration clauses contained in the franchise agreements. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court erred because (1) Massachusetts law, which governed this dispute, did not impose any such special notice requirement upon these commercial contractual provisions; and (2) in any event, any special notice requirement would be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. View "Awuah v. Coverall N.A., Inc. " on Justia Law

House of Flavors purchased equipment from Tetra and executed an agreement with Tetra to fund its installation. Under the agreement, Tetra paid for the installation, House of Flavors then transferred ownership of the installed system to Tetra, and Tetra leased the system back to House of Flavors. After House of Flavors began monthly lease payments, it sought to exercise the buy back option a year early. Notwithstanding the twelve percent estimate it quoted earlier, Tetra quoted a purchase price around forty percent of the equipment and installation costs. House of Flavors filed suit in federal district court, where it prevailed on its claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed but remanded the case to reconsider the balance due between the parties. On remand, the judge recalculated the balance due and determined that, rather than owing House of Flavors, Tetra was in fact due $156,399. The First Circuit dismissed House of Flavors' appeal, holding (1) the attack on the recalculated figure was foreclosed by a jurisdictional objection, as the appeal was untimely; and (2) the appeal was jurisdictionally timely as to the district court's refusal to award attorneys' fees under a Utah statute, but the denial of attorneys' fees was affirmed. View "House of Flavors, Inc. v. TFG-Michigan, L.P." on Justia Law

Appellant Loan Modification Group, Inc. (LMG) appealed from a jury verdict awarding $414,000 in damages against LMG for breach of partnership duties and responsibilities owed to Appellee, Lisa Reed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the jury was entitled to find that although Reed and LMG's partnership was formed in anticipation of and carried out in accordance with the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), it could be fully performed within one year and need not last for the entire four-year duration of HAMP, and thus, the jury could have reasonably rejected application of the Statute of Frauds; (2) the evidence supported the jury's finding that a partnership existed, whether based on an express oral partnership agreement or on an implied partnership agreement; (3) having found that the partnership was never terminated and that LMG breached its fiduciary duties, the jury's damages award was proper; and (4) there was adequate evidentiary support to sustain the jury's damages award. View "Loan Modification Group, Inc. v. Reed" on Justia Law