Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

Sasafrasnet, an authorized distributor of BP products, provided Joseph with notice of its intent to terminate his franchise based on three occasions when Sasafrasnet attempted to debit Joseph’s bank account to pay for fuel deliveries but payment was denied for insufficient funds. The district court denied Joseph a preliminary injunction, finding that Joseph failed to meet his burden for a preliminary injunction under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act 15 U.S.C. 2805(b)(2)(A)(ii). After a remand, the district court found that two of Joseph’s NSFs should count as “failures” under the PMPA justifying termination, at least for purposes of showing that he was not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Joseph’s bank account was not adequately funded for the debit on two occasions because Joseph had decided to change banks, circumstances entirely within Joseph’s control. Given Joseph’s history of making late payments in substantial amounts because of insufficient funds (each was more than $22,000), the delinquent payments were not “technical” or “unimportant.” View "Joseph v. Sasafrasnet, LLC" on Justia Law

Med‐1 buys delinquent debts and purchased Suesz’s debt from Community Hospital. In 2012 it filed a collection suit in small claims court and received a judgment against Suesz for $1,280. Suesz lives one county over from Marion. Though he incurred the debt in Marion County, he did so in Lawrence Township, where Community is located, and not in Pike Township, the location of the small claims court. Suesz says that it is Med‐1’s practice to file claims in Pike Township regardless of the origins of the dispute and filed a purported class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act venue provision requiring debt collectors to bring suit in the “judicial district” where the contract was signed or where the consumer resides, 15 U.S.C. 1692i(a)(2). The district court dismissed after finding Marion County Small Claims Courts were not judicial districts for the purposes of the FDCPA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

Wells Fargo and Hindman were creditors of Clark, whose president and CEO was Hindman’s son. Wells Fargo agreed to extend credit to the companies if Hindman agreed to become a subordinated creditor. Hindman executed subordination agreements. In 2010 Hindman authorized a wire transfer of $750,000 from his personal investment account at Wells Fargo to Clark at the request of his son. By that time, however, his son purportedly had been stripped of authority to make business decisions by Clark. When authorized decision makers learned about the purported loan, they ordered Hindman’s son to reject the funds. Hindman’s son promptly instructed a Wells Fargo Bank vice‐president to stop the transaction, but $750,000 arrived in Clark’s accounts and was automatically used to pay down its Wells Fargo line of credit. Days later, the same Wells Fargo vice‐president transferred $750,000 from Clark’s account to Hindman’s account at a Florida bank at Hindman’s request. Wells Fargo claimed that Hindman’s receipt of the $750,000 violated subordination agreements because Clark repaid a debt to Hindman while it had outstanding obligations to Wells Fargo. Hindman maintained that a valid loan was never consummated because his son could not bind the company and authorized decision makers rejected the proposed loan. The Seventh Circuit vacated summary judgment, reasoning that the district court failed to explain its rejection of Hindman’s plausible arguments. View "Wells Fargo Bus. Credit v. Hindman" on Justia Law

Manpower, an international staffing firm, is the parent of Right Management in Paris, France. A building in which Right leased space collapsed, so that Right’s offices were inaccessible. Right relocated without having access and incurred replacement costs and lost income from the interruption of operations. A local insurance policy, issued by ISOP’s French affiliate, provided primary coverage, and a master policy, issued by ISOP and covering Manpower’s operations worldwide, provided excess coverage over the local policy’s limits. Right received $250,000 under the local policy pursuant to a provision covering losses caused by lack of access by order of a civil authority. Another $250,000 was paid under the master policy, exhausting the $500,000 sublimit under a similar lack‐of‐access provision. Manpower also claimed that, under the master policy, it was entitled to reimbursement for business interruption losses and the loss of business personal property: about $12 million. ISOP denied the claim. The district court held that Manpower was covered under the master policy for business interruption losses and loss of business personal property and improvements, but excluded Manpower’s accounting expert, without whom Manpower could not establish those damages and held that the master policy was not triggered because the losses were also covered under the local policy, which had to be fully exhausted before master policy coverage was available. The Seventh Circuit reversed exclusion of the expert and entry of judgment against Manpower on the business interruption claim, but affirmed judgment for ISOP on the property loss claim. The master policy did not provide coverage for Manpower’s property losses.View "Manpower, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the State of PA" on Justia Law

Swift, Schaltenbrand, and Siddle entered into an informal partnership arrangement to operate a mail-order pharmacy, divide the profits from that business, and eventually sell the book of customers to another pharmacy. After some initial success, the partners began taking profit distributions that far exceeded agreed‐upon percentages. Swift eventually filed lawsuits against Schaltenbrand and Siddle. The district court listened to 14 days of testimony before ruling against Swift on most of his claims. The court invalidated a copyright registration that Swift’s marketing company obtained for a logo used by the partnership, finding that Swift knowingly misrepresented a material fact in the application to register a copyright in the logo. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, agreeing that Swift failed to prove Schaltenbrand and Siddle breached their obligation to provide him with a share of profits. Swift waived fraud claims by declining to include them in the final pretrial order. The district court erred by invalidating the copyright registration without first consulting the Register of Copyrights as to the significance of the inaccurate information. The Copyright Act requires courts to perform this “curious procedure” before invalidating a registration based on a fraud on the Copyright Office.View "Swift v. Medicate Pharm., Inc." on Justia Law

Todd alleges that in 2012 he received a recorded telephone message from Collecto asking him to call and help the company locate his mother, Terry. He called; a Collecto representative told him that Terry owed AT&T money for cell phone service. Todd stated that he is not Terry, but the representative continued to discuss the alleged debt without asking how to reach Terry or asking Todd to pay the bill. Todd claimed that this interaction harmed him emotionally and violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692b, which permits a debt collector to call a third party for help in locating a “consumer” but prohibits revealing the existence of the consumer’s debt to the third party. Section 1692f prohibits “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” The district court concluded that Todd lacked standing under the Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Todd lacked standing under 1692b and failed to state a claim under 1692f. View "Todd v. Collecto, Inc." on Justia Law

The Tax Court upheld the IRS’ disallowance of losses claimed by various LLCs that had been created by a tax attorney as tax shelters and a 40 percent penalty for a “gross valuation misstatement,” 26 U.S.C. 6662(a). An LLC is generally treated as a partnership for tax purposes, so that its income and losses are deemed to flow through to the owners and are taxed to them rather than to the business. How much income or loss should be recognized on the owners’ tax returns is now determined by an audit of the business. The LLCs at issue were formed to reduce taxes by transferring the losses of a bankrupt Brazilian electronics retailer to create what is called a distressed asset/debt (DAD) tax shelter, based on a tax loophole closed by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 26 U.S.C. 704(c) the year after creation of the tax shelters at issue. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the LLCs as entities without economic substance, not recognized for federal tax law purposes. View "Superior Trading, LLC v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

During the 1970s and 1980s, American Agri‐Corp organized several limited partnerships, for which the company served as general partner. American solicited high‐income individuals to serve as limited partners, investing in supposed agricultural ventures. According to the IRS, the actual purpose was to shelter the income of limited partners from taxation. Plaintiffs were each limited partners (or spouses) in at least one partnership that was audited by the IRS during the mid‐1980s. Several years later, the IRS concluded that the partnerships were, essentially, tax‐avoidance schemes .In 1990 and 1991, the IRS issued Final Partnership Administrative Adjusts for the partnerships and disallowed several listed farming expenses and other deductions for the 1984 or 1985 tax years. The Tax Court consolidated cases, held that the IRS action was not time‐barred, and determined that the partnerships had engaged in “transactions which lacked economic substance” that resulted in a substantial distortion of income and expense. The district court held that it lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction over the taxpayers’ claims that the assessments were untimely and improperly included penalty interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The determinations at issue are attributable to partnership items over which courts lack subject‐matter jurisdiction. View "Acute Care Specialists II v. United States" on Justia Law

Healix and HHI compete in the business of infusion therapy services: administration of substances such as pharmaceuticals intravenously or by any method other than ingestion. Some medical care providers offer these services to patients in their offices. Healix and HHI provide support. In 2007 Healix recruited the Clinic as a new customer. The Clinic had two members: Keller, a physician, and Porter, a nurse practitioner. Under their five-year contract, Healix would provide services after the Clinic built an in-office pharmacy and hired staff to work there. The Clinic was responsible for the cost of construction. Healix required Keller and Porter to execute personal guarantees and took a security interest in accounts receivable. Four months after signing the contract, the Clinic notified Healix that it would not fulfill its responsibilities. The Clinic was in breach, but Healix did not sue. One month later, the Clinic entered into a contract with HHI. Healix learned of the new contract and sued HHI for copyright and trademark infringement and for tortious interference with a contract. The intellectual property claims were dismissed. After a trial, the district judge rejected the tortious-interference claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding lack of causation because the evidence indicated that the Clinic would have “walked away” regardless of HHI’s actions. View "Healix Infusion Therapy, Inc. v. HHI Infusion Servs., Inc.." on Justia Law

In 2006, Kevin and his wife Marjorie moved to Indiana, to manage car dealerships owned by Savoree. In 2007 Savoree proposed selling the dealerships to the couple through a series of stock purchases to be financed by a $3.5 million loan from CSB. After negotiating the loan with CSB, Kevin took out a life insurance policy with Cincinnati Life that named Marjorie as the beneficiary. Two months later, Kevin assigned that policy to CSB. The couple eventually declared bankruptcy and litigation between all of the parties ensued. Kevin died of cancer in 2010. Cincinnati Life deposited the proceeds, $3 million, with the clerk of court and sought judicial determination of ownership. The district court dismissed Marjorie’s claims with prejudice for failing to meet pleading standards and entered summary judgment for CSB. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Marjorie did not present any evidence to create a genuine disputed issue of material fact. She identified lack of consideration for the assignment as a potential disputed fact, but the assertion was made and repeated without any support or citation to evidence. View "Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer" on Justia Law