Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

Several national securities exchanges challenged a 2024 rule adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that lowered the cap on fees exchanges may charge investors for executing orders. The SEC had previously set a cap of 30 mils ($0.003) per share for stocks priced at or above $1, and 0.3% of the quotation price for stocks below $1. In 2024, after gathering new data and considering market developments, the SEC reduced these caps to 10 mils for stocks priced at or above $1, and 0.1% for stocks below $1. The SEC explained that the changes were necessary to address market distortions and to align fee caps with reduced minimum tick sizes, thereby promoting price transparency and market efficiency.After the SEC adopted the new rule, several exchanges petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, arguing that the SEC exceeded its statutory authority and acted arbitrarily or capriciously. The SEC agreed to stay the amendment pending judicial review. The exchanges contended that the SEC lacked authority to impose an industry-wide fee cap and that, if it had such authority, it was required to proceed on an exchange-by-exchange basis. They also argued that the SEC’s decision-making was arbitrary, particularly in its assessment of market effects and its choice of the 10-mil cap.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the SEC acted within its statutory authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, which grants the SEC broad discretion to regulate the national market system, including the power to set universal access-fee caps. The court further found that the SEC’s rulemaking was not arbitrary or capricious, as the agency reasonably considered relevant issues, explained its decision, and relied on both economic theory and empirical data. The petition for review was denied. View "Cboe Global Markets, Inc. v. SEC" on Justia Law

Rowena Joyce Scott served as both the president of the board and general manager of Park Southern Neighborhood Corporation (PSNC), a nonprofit that owned a large apartment building in Washington, D.C. During her tenure, Scott exercised near-total control over PSNC’s finances and operations. She used corporate funds for personal expenses, including luxury items and services, and made significant cash withdrawals from PSNC’s accounts. After PSNC defaulted on a loan, the District of Columbia’s Department of Housing and Community Development intervened, replacing Scott and the board with a new property manager, Vesta Management Corporation, which took possession of PSNC’s records and computers. Subsequent investigation by the IRS led to Scott’s indictment for wire fraud, credit card fraud, and tax offenses.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia presided over Scott’s criminal trial. Scott filed pre-trial motions to suppress statements made to law enforcement and evidence obtained from PSNC’s computers, arguing violations of her Fifth and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied both motions. After trial, a jury convicted Scott on all counts, and the district court sentenced her to eighteen months’ imprisonment, supervised release, restitution, and a special assessment. Scott appealed her convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of her suppression motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Scott forfeited her statute of limitations defense by not raising it in the district court. It found the evidence sufficient to support all convictions, including wire fraud and tax offenses, and determined that Scott was not in Miranda custody during her interview with IRS agents. The court also concluded that the search warrant for PSNC’s computers was supported by probable cause, and that Vesta’s consent validated the search. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

Keith Berman, the appellant, pleaded guilty to securities fraud, wire fraud, and obstruction of proceedings related to a scheme to fraudulently increase the share price of his company, Decision Diagnostics Corp. (DECN). Berman issued false press releases claiming DECN had developed a blood test for coronavirus, which led to a significant increase in the company's stock price. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigated and suspended trading of DECN's stock, revealing that Berman's claims were false. Despite this, Berman continued to issue misleading statements and used aliases to discredit the SEC's investigation.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia sentenced Berman to 84 months' imprisonment. The court calculated the loss caused by Berman's fraud using the modified rescissory method, determining a loss amount of $27.8 million. This calculation was based on the difference in DECN's stock price before and after the fraud was disclosed, multiplied by the number of outstanding shares. The court also applied enhancements for sophisticated means and substantial financial hardship to five or more individuals, resulting in a Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months, but ultimately imposed a downward variance.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. Berman challenged the district court's calculation of the loss amount, arguing that the fraud was disclosed earlier and that the loss was not solely attributable to his fraudulent statements. The appellate court found that the district court did not commit clear error in determining the disclosure date or in its loss causation analysis. The court also upheld the enhancements for sophisticated means and substantial financial hardship, finding sufficient evidence to support these determinations. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Berman" on Justia Law

Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (ISS), a proxy advisory firm, challenged the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) interpretation of the term “solicit” under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC had begun regulating proxy advisory firms by treating their voting recommendations as “solicitations” of proxy votes. ISS argued that its recommendations did not constitute “solicitation” under the Act.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia agreed with ISS and granted summary judgment in its favor. The court found that the SEC’s interpretation of “solicit” was overly broad and not supported by the statutory text. The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), an intervenor supporting the SEC’s position, appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the ordinary meaning of “solicit” does not include providing proxy voting recommendations upon request. The court concluded that “solicit” refers to actively seeking to obtain proxy authority or votes, not merely influencing them through advice. The SEC’s definition, which included proxy advisory firms’ recommendations as solicitations, was found to be contrary to the statutory text of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act. View "Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. v. SEC" on Justia Law

Junius Joyner, III, an African-American male, was hired by a legal staffing agency, Mestel & Company (Hire Counsel), and assigned to work at Morrison & Foerster LLP in Washington, D.C. He worked on the merger of Sprint Corporation with T-Mobile U.S., Inc. from July to December 2019. Joyner alleged several incidents of racial discrimination and a hostile work environment, including delayed work assignments, derogatory comments, and harassment by coworkers. He also claimed wrongful discharge under D.C. law, asserting he was terminated after reporting potential antitrust violations.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Joyner’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that Joyner did not provide sufficient facts to support his claims of racial discrimination and a hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII. The court also dismissed his wrongful discharge claim under D.C. law, concluding that it lacked supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Joyner’s federal claims, agreeing that Joyner failed to plausibly allege that his treatment was racially motivated or that the work environment was sufficiently hostile. The court found that Joyner’s allegations did not meet the necessary standard to infer racial discrimination or a hostile work environment. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment on the wrongful discharge claim, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over this claim and remanded it with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Joyner v. Morrison and Foerster LLP" on Justia Law

In early 2020, Robert Goodrich liquidated his stock portfolio due to concerns about the financial market's reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in significant financial losses. Goodrich had an investment account with U.S. Trust Bank of America Private Wealth Management, managed by Matthew Lettinga. Despite advice from Lettinga to avoid liquidation, Goodrich insisted on selling his portfolio. Goodrich later sued Lettinga and Bank of America, claiming gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of the D.C. Securities Act, arguing that he was not adequately informed of the risks involved in liquidating his portfolio.The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Goodrich's claims of gross negligence and violations of the D.C. Securities Act, finding them implausibly pleaded. The court allowed the breach of fiduciary duty claim to proceed but later granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Goodrich had explicitly instructed the sale of his portfolio, which precluded liability under the terms of the investment agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decisions. The appellate court held that the investment agreement's exculpatory clauses were enforceable and that Goodrich's explicit instruction to liquidate his portfolio shielded the defendants from liability. The court also agreed that Goodrich failed to plausibly allege scienter, a necessary element for his claims under the D.C. Securities Act, and found no abuse of discretion in the District Court's limitation of discovery to the dispositive issue of whether Goodrich instructed the sale. View "Goodrich v. Bank of America N.A." on Justia Law

Advocacy Holdings, a company that helps clients influence public policy through its online platform OneClickPolitics, sued its former CEO, Chazz Clevinger, for breaching a noncompete agreement. Clevinger, who resigned in 2023, allegedly stole Advocacy’s customer list, started competing businesses, solicited Advocacy’s customers, and created a near duplicate of Advocacy’s platform. Advocacy sought a preliminary injunction to stop Clevinger’s actions, claiming irreparable harm.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia partially denied Advocacy’s motion for a preliminary injunction, ruling that Advocacy had not demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm. The court did, however, enjoin Clevinger from using Advocacy’s platform design and interface but allowed him to continue operating his competing businesses and soliciting Advocacy’s customers. Advocacy appealed the partial denial of the preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Advocacy had not shown irreparable harm. The court noted that financial injuries, such as loss of customers, are typically remediable through monetary damages and do not constitute irreparable harm. Additionally, the court found that Advocacy’s claims of reputational harm were unsubstantiated and that the stipulation of irreparable harm in the noncompete agreement was forfeited because Advocacy did not raise it in its initial motion. The court also declined to consider Advocacy’s sliding-scale argument for evaluating preliminary injunction factors, as it was raised too late. The court concluded that without a showing of irreparable harm, a preliminary injunction was not warranted. View "Clevinger v. Advocacy Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Rothe filed suit alleging that the statutory basis of the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) 8(a) business development program, Amendments to the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 637, violates its right to equal protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Rothe is a small business that bids on Defense Department contracts, including the types of subcontracts that the SBA awards to economically and socially disadvantaged businesses through the 8(a) program. The court rejected Rothe's claim that the statute contains an unconstitutional racial classification that prevents Rothe from competing for Department of Defense contracts on an equal footing with minority-owned businesses. The court concluded that the provisions of the Small Business Act that Rothe challenges do not on their face classify individuals by race. In contrast to the statute, the SBA’s regulation implementing the 8(a) program does contain a racial classification in the form of a presumption that an individual who is a member of one of five designated racial groups (and within them, 37 subgroups) is socially disadvantaged. Because the statute lacks a racial classification, and because Rothe has not alleged that the statute is otherwise subject to strict scrutiny, the court applied rational-basis review. Under rational-basis review, the court concluded that the statutory scheme is rationally related to the legitimate, and in some instances compelling, interest of counteracting discrimination. Finally, Rothe's evidentiary and nondelegation challenges failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment granting summary judgment to the SBA and DOD. View "Rothe Development v. DOD" on Justia Law

The Government sought to recover a $1.3 million judgment debt pursuant to the Federal Debt Collect Procedures Act (FDCPA), 28 U.S.C. 3001 et seq., by garnishing funds owed to WDG, a company T. Conrad Monts and his wife owned as tenants by the entireties. The court reversed the district court's holding that Monts had a sufficient property interest in WDG’s assets to permit garnishing them under the FDCPA in satisfaction of his debts. The court remanded for the district court to evaluate the Government’s alternative argument that it may garnish WDG’s assets by piercing the corporate veil between WDG and Monts. View "United States v. TDC Mgmt. Corp." on Justia Law