Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff requested payment for the one year remaining on his employment contract, but the FDIC advised that the payment was a prohibited “golden parachute,” under 12 U.S.C. 1828(k) and 12 C.F.R. 359.1, which the bank could not make without prior agency approval. Plaintiff, a former executive at Reliance Bank, filed suit against the bank and the FDIC, alleging a breach of contract under Missouri law and sought a declaration that federal law does not prohibit the payment. The district court upheld the FDIC determination and granted summary judgment to the bank. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the agency determination is not worthy of deference because it is inconsistent with FDIC positions taken elsewhere. Rather, the court concluded that Chevron and Auer deference is irrelevant because the agency treats the word "contingent" as unambiguous and relies on its dictionary meaning. The court concluded that one could reasonably characterize the payment obligation as contingent on either plaintiff’s termination or his continued employment. In this case, plaintiff alleged the bank came to owe the payment because of his termination, not because of services he rendered. Therefore, the agency determined the payment was contingent on termination, and the court found this finding was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court concluded that the bank’s obligation to pay plaintiff was rendered impossible when the FDIC determined the payment was a golden parachute. The court rejected plaintiff's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment. View "Rohr v. Reliance Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under Sarbanes-Oxley, 18 U.S.C. 1514A(a)(1)(C), and Dodd-Frank, 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii), after Oracle terminated his employment in retaliation for reporting that Oracle was falsely projecting sales revenues. The district court granted summary judgment to Oracle. The court joined the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits and adopted the "reasonable belief" standard in Sylvester v. Parexel Int’l LLC standard, rejecting Platone v. FLYI, Inc.'s "definite and specific" standard, in determining that the employee must simply prove that a reasonable person in the same factual circumstances with the same training and experience would believe that the employer violated securities laws. Under the Sylvester standard, the court concluded that plaintiff's belief that Oracle was defrauding its investors was objectively unreasonable where missed projections by no more than $10 million are minor discrepancies to a company that annually generates billions of dollars. The court also concluded that plaintiff's claim under Dodd-Frank fails because he did not make a disclosure protected under Sarbanes-Oxley. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Beacom v. Oracle America, Inc." on Justia Law

Cargill and American Home filed suit against Greater Omaha, alleging breach of contract and warranties based on allegations that Greater Omaha sold raw beef trim tainted with E.coli O157:H7. Greater Omaha counterclaimed for tortious interference with business relationships and expectancies. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Cargill on Greater Omaha’s counterclaim. A jury returned a verdict for Cargill, awarding $9 million in damages. Greater Omaha appealed. The court concluded that there was no error in the admission of expert testimony from Dr. Harrison and Dr. Singer where the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the expert evidence met the standard for admissibility and that the evidence of the Ohio cases was best used for impeachment and cross-examination; the district court did not err in admitting the original and revised December 2007 Notice of Intended Enforcement (NOIE) and Greater Omaha’s response thereto, and there was no clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion; the court rejected Greater Omaha's challenge to the district court's jury charge and instruction; there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to forego instructing the jury on exclusion or modification of implied warranties; the jury did not reach an impermissible compromise verdict; and the district court did not apply the wrong standard of proof or otherwise err in granting Cargill’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "American Home Assurance Co. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co." on Justia Law

TCF filed suit against Market, alleging claims concerning the statutes of limitations for fraud, contract, and negligence. TCF had entered into a contract with Market under which TCF purchased Field Asset Verifications for Minnesota properties in 2002. The district court granted summary judgment for Market. The court held that the district court properly held that TCF discovered sufficient facts so that the limitations period for TCF’s fraud claims expired before TCF filed suit in September 2011. The court also held that the non-fraud claims accrued more than six years before TCF filed suit and that the limitations period was not tolled to prevent expiration prior to September 2011. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "TCF Nat'l Bank v. Market Intelligence, Inc." on Justia Law