Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

A fraudulent investment scheme orchestrated by Martin Silver and a co-conspirator caused millions of dollars in losses to several entities, including two investment funds and a bank. Silver, who was a managing partner at an investment advisory firm, pled guilty to conspiracy and substantive counts of wire and securities fraud. As part of his sentence, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ordered him to pay over $300 million in restitution, specifying a $40,000 lump-sum payment before incarceration and subsequent monthly payments equal to 10% of his income after release. At sentencing, Silver reported significant assets, which later increased in value post-release, although his income remained small.After his release, Silver made only minimal payments as required by the restitution schedule. The government, supported by the victims, moved in the district court to compel immediate turnover of Silver’s appreciated assets for restitution and to modify his payment schedule. The district court ordered Silver to liquidate and pay the appreciated value of his assets but declined to order turnover of the full asset value or further modify the payment schedule, reasoning that the statutory requirements for such modifications were not met.The petitioners sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, arguing that the district court should have ordered turnover of all of Silver’s assets. The Second Circuit held that under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, where a restitution judgment does not make payment due immediately and includes a fixed payment schedule, and the defendant is in compliance, the government is not entitled to enforce a turnover order for assets beyond the payment schedule. As a result, the court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus, affirming the district court’s decision. View "In re: IIG Structured Trade Fin. Fund, Ltd." on Justia Law

Three principals of an investment firm received approximately $141.5 million in distributive shares from the firm for the 2016 and 2017 tax years. The firm, organized as a Delaware limited partnership, did not include these distributive shares as self-employment income, asserting that the principals were "limited partners" within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code, which exempts limited partners’ distributive shares from self-employment tax. The Internal Revenue Service audited the firm and determined that, because the principals worked full-time and exercised managerial control over the partnership, they were not limited partners. The IRS issued adjustments to increase the firm’s taxable income for both years, including the distributive shares as self-employment income.The firm challenged the IRS adjustments in the United States Tax Court, arguing both that the principals qualified for the limited partner exemption and that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the adjustments under the TEFRA partnership-level procedures. The Tax Court found that the principals, despite their formal status as limited partners, functionally exercised managerial control and therefore did not qualify for the exemption. The Tax Court also held it had jurisdiction to review the adjustments as partnership-level items under TEFRA and upheld the IRS’s adjustments.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decisions. The court held that the Tax Court properly exercised jurisdiction and that the principals were not “limited partners” within the meaning of § 1402(a)(13) because they actively managed the partnership’s business. The distributive shares received by the principals were therefore subject to self-employment tax. The Tax Court’s orders and decisions were affirmed. View "Soroban Capital Partners LP v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

This case concerns a dispute between two sophisticated energy companies over a merger agreement. In December 2017, Trireme entered into an agreement with Innogy Renewables US, LLC, a subsidiary of a German energy company, to transfer valuable development companies related to wind and solar projects in exchange for an upfront payment and the possibility of future milestone payments. The agreement included provisions restricting Innogy from transferring these assets without Trireme’s consent. After a complex asset swap and corporate restructuring involving Innogy’s parent company and other entities, Trireme alleged that the assets were transferred within the corporate family in violation of the agreement.Previously, Trireme filed a lawsuit—referred to as Trireme I—in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging breaches of other sections of the merger agreement but not the section concerning asset transfers. Later, Trireme sought to amend its complaint to add this new breach-of-contract claim. The district court denied the motion to amend, finding that Trireme had not acted diligently to discover the claim and was on notice of the potential breach before filing the initial action. Trireme did not pursue an appeal of this denial but instead filed a new lawsuit asserting the same claim. The district court dismissed the new case on grounds of res judicata.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that when a party seeks to assert a claim in a new action after unsuccessfully moving to amend its complaint in a prior action, courts should consider several factors, including whether the denial was on the merits, whether the plaintiff failed to appeal, the timing of the claim, the plaintiff’s diligence, and whether the plaintiff was represented by counsel. Applying these factors, the Second Circuit concluded that res judicata barred Trireme’s new claim and affirmed the judgment. View "Trireme Energy Development v. RWE Renewables" on Justia Law

Several individuals, including Richard and Jocelyn Markowitz, John and Elizabeth van Merkensteijn, and pension funds they controlled, were found by a jury to have defrauded the Danish tax authority (Skat) by submitting false claims for tax refunds. The defendants conceded before trial that they were never entitled to the refunds under the U.S.-Denmark tax treaty, admitting that they had not owned Danish shares or received dividends subject to Danish withholding tax. However, they argued that they had been misled by a London-based trading partner into believing otherwise and were unaware that the refund claims submitted on their behalf were fraudulent.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the case after it was consolidated as part of multidistrict litigation. The defendants unsuccessfully moved to dismiss Skat’s claims, contending that the common law revenue rule barred the suit. The district court held that because the defendants never owned the relevant Danish stocks or paid taxes, Skat’s claims were for commercial fraud rather than enforcement of Danish tax law. After trial, the jury found each defendant liable, and the district court entered judgments totaling over $476 million based on Skat’s gross payments and prejudgment interest.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Skat’s lawsuit was not barred by the revenue rule because it did not seek to enforce foreign tax laws, but rather sought recovery for fraud. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s exclusion of certain evidence and upheld the sufficiency of evidence supporting judgments against Jocelyn Markowitz and Elizabeth van Merkensteijn under an agency theory. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Skatteforvaltningen v. Markowitz" on Justia Law

A Swedish government agency managing a public pension fund initiated a consolidated class action for securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5. The claims were brought against a third-party auditor and several former executives of a New York-based, federally insured commercial bank, which collapsed in 2023 after significant losses tied to a shift into cryptocurrency banking. The plaintiff alleged that the auditor and executives made false statements regarding the bank’s liquidity and risk management, leading to artificial inflation of the bank’s stock price and subsequent investor losses when the bank failed.After the bank’s collapse, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed as receiver. The FDIC intervened in the case and moved to dismiss, arguing that, under the Succession Clause of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), it had succeeded to all rights of the bank’s stockholders regarding the institution and its assets, thus “owning” the securities fraud claims. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York agreed and dismissed the complaint for lack of prudential standing, concluding that the claims had transferred to the FDIC and that the plaintiff had not exhausted required administrative remedies.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation of the Succession Clause. The court held that the Clause does not transfer to the FDIC individual securities fraud claims brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, as these are not rights held by stockholders in their capacity as such, but rather as purchasers of securities. Additionally, the court found that administrative exhaustion was not required, as the claims were not against the failed bank or the FDIC as receiver. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Fonden v. FDIC" on Justia Law

Bradley Stinn, a former chief executive officer of a large jewelry retailer, was convicted in 2009 of securities fraud, mail fraud, and conspiracy. The charges stemmed from a scheme in which Stinn and others allegedly concealed the substantial risk of customer defaults in the company’s credit-extension program, thereby fraudulently inflating the company’s financial reports. As a result, Stinn received a significant bonus and salary increase that were tied to the company’s reported earnings. The company ultimately went bankrupt, and Stinn served a sentence of imprisonment and supervised release.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York presided over Stinn’s trial, where the jury was instructed it could convict under either a traditional fraud theory or the now-invalidated right-to-control theory. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty, and Stinn unsuccessfully challenged his conviction on direct appeal and in a habeas petition. After the Supreme Court in Ciminelli v. United States rejected the right-to-control theory, Stinn filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, seeking to vacate his conviction on the grounds that the jury may have relied on an invalid theory. The district court denied the petition, holding that any error was harmless because sufficient evidence supported the conviction under the traditional fraud theory.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that the standard for harmless error in coram nobis proceedings is that articulated in Kotteakos v. United States, which requires a petitioner to show that the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. The court found that Stinn failed to meet this burden, as the evidence overwhelmingly supported conviction under the traditional fraud theory. Thus, the denial of coram nobis relief was affirmed. View "Stinn v. United States of America" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a former project manager at a large corporation, raised internal compliance concerns in 2018. In April 2019, he was notified that he would be subject to a reduction in force and laid off, effective June 21, 2019. He subsequently filed several internal complaints alleging that his layoff and the company’s refusal to rehire him for numerous positions were retaliatory acts in response to his whistleblowing. After his layoff, he was placed on short-term disability and given a period during which he could apply for other positions within the company, but his applications were unsuccessful.Following these events, the petitioner filed a whistleblower-retaliation complaint under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in December 2020. OSHA dismissed the complaint as untimely. The petitioner then sought review before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who held a hearing and dismissed the claims as untimely, also finding that equitable tolling was not warranted. The petitioner appealed, and the Administrative Review Board (ARB) affirmed the ALJ’s dismissal.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that the ARB did not err in finding the claims untimely. The court held that the SOX 180-day filing window begins when the employee is notified of the adverse action or when the refusal to rehire becomes apparent, not the last date of employment or the date of final application rejection. The court also found no basis for equitable tolling, as the petitioner knew or should have known of the alleged retaliation well before the statutory deadline. Accordingly, the Second Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Mehrotra v. U.S. Dep't of Lab." on Justia Law

The case involves civil actions brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Adam P. Rogas, arising from his fraudulent conduct between January 2018 and June 2020 while serving as CEO of NS8, Inc., a technology company. Rogas falsified NS8’s bank statements to inflate revenue and customer numbers, which were then used in financial statements provided to investors. This deception enabled NS8 to raise approximately $149 million in securities offerings, with Rogas personally profiting over $17.5 million. Despite internal whistleblower reports and federal subpoenas, Rogas continued his fraudulent activities until his resignation in September 2020.After the fraud was uncovered, the SEC initiated a civil action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, obtaining a temporary restraining order and subsequent asset freeze covering Rogas’s assets, including funds held for his benefit. Rogas was also criminally prosecuted and convicted of securities fraud. In the civil proceeding, an interim consent judgment was entered, holding Rogas liable for disgorgement and permanently enjoining him from violating securities laws. Rogas and his attorneys at Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP (Pillsbury) disputed the application of the asset freeze to a $4 million retainer Pillsbury received from Rogas.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed two appeals: Rogas’s challenge to a lifetime bar from serving as an officer or director of a public company, and Rogas and Pillsbury’s challenge to the asset freeze covering the retainer. The Court affirmed both district court orders, holding that the lifetime bar was warranted given Rogas’s egregious, systematic fraud and likelihood of recidivism, and that Pillsbury was required to turn over the retainer funds, as they were held for Rogas’s benefit and covered by the asset freeze. View "SEC v. Rogas" on Justia Law

Buyers of over-the-counter nasal decongestants containing oral phenylephrine brought numerous class actions against drug manufacturers and retailers, alleging that for years these companies sold and advertised decongestant products they knew to be ineffective. The plaintiffs claimed that scientific studies, particularly since 2016, had shown oral phenylephrine to be no better than a placebo at relieving congestion, yet the companies continued to market their products as effective decongestants and complied with Food and Drug Administration (FDA) labeling requirements. The FDA, despite mounting evidence, did not remove oral phenylephrine’s designation as an effective decongestant under its regulations.The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated nearly one hundred class actions and transferred them to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting New York statutory and common-law claims as well as a federal RICO claim. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) expressly preempted the state law claims because the drugs’ labels complied with FDA requirements, and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the RICO claim. The court also dismissed a Lanham Act claim brought by one pharmacy plaintiff.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the FDCA expressly preempts most of the state law claims because the federal regime requires manufacturers to follow the FDA-approved labeling, but it vacated the dismissal for claims regarding “Maximum Strength” labeling and brand-name drugs approved via the New Drug Application process, remanding those for further proceedings. The court affirmed dismissal of the RICO claim, adopting the indirect purchaser rule, and upheld denial of the pharmacy’s motion for reconsideration regarding its Lanham Act claim. View "Yousefzadeh v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc." on Justia Law

The defendant, convicted by a jury of conspiracies to commit wire and securities fraud in connection with a scheme to defraud investors, was ordered to pay over $10 million in restitution to the victim company. To enforce this restitution order, the government sought to garnish the defendant’s 401(k) retirement accounts. The defendant objected, arguing that various legal provisions, including plan terms and federal statutes, either prohibited or limited garnishment of his accounts. The victim, the financial institutions holding the accounts, and the government ultimately reached a settlement on how the garnishment and tax consequences would be handled.After the conviction and sentence were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York considered the government’s application for writs of garnishment. The district court rejected the parties’ proposed stipulated orders of garnishment, reasoning that the proposal exceeded the scope of the Second Circuit’s prior mandate by not resolving specific tax issues, and ordered its own procedure for liquidation and distribution of the funds. The district court also denied a stay of distribution, holding that the defendant lacked standing because the funds had been liquidated.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the controversy remained live despite the liquidation of the accounts, and that its previous mandate did not bar the district court from approving the parties’ stipulated orders of garnishment. The court found that the district court erred in its application of the mandate rule and in concluding that the defendant lacked standing. Accordingly, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to approve the parties’ proposed stipulated orders of garnishment. View "United States v. Greebel" on Justia Law