Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

In 2022, NavSav Holdings, LLC, a Texas insurance company, acquired Universal Group, Ltd., a Nebraska insurance company. Following the acquisition, NavSav required Universal’s employees to sign noncompete and nonsolicitation covenants, which included Texas choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses. In June 2023, three employees—Austin Michael Beber, Cody Roach, and Jackie Damon—resigned from NavSav and joined a rival company, taking customers with them. NavSav claimed these customers were worth approximately $510,000 in annual premiums.Beber, Roach, and Damon filed lawsuits in Nebraska state court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that Nebraska law should apply and the covenants were unenforceable. NavSav filed a lawsuit in Texas state court against the three employees and their new employer, seeking to enforce the covenants under Texas law. The Nebraska cases were removed to the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, and the Texas case was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The Nebraska federal court issued antisuit and preliminary injunctions in favor of the employees, preventing NavSav from litigating in Texas and enforcing the covenants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. It vacated the antisuit injunctions for Roach and Damon, affirming only Beber’s antisuit injunction, as his Nebraska case was filed first. The court vacated all preliminary injunctions, finding that the district court erred in its analysis of irreparable harm, which should focus on the individual movants rather than state public policy. The court remanded Beber’s case for consideration of his request for declaratory relief and instructed the district court to evaluate the status of the Texas litigation for Roach and Damon’s cases to determine appropriate actions. The court dismissed NavSav’s appeal regarding the forum-selection clauses for lack of jurisdiction. View "Beber v. Navsav Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Thomas Petters orchestrated a Ponzi scheme through his company, Petters Company, Inc. (PCI), which collapsed in 2008. Following Petters' arrest and conviction, PCI was placed into receivership, and Douglas Kelley was appointed as the receiver. Kelley later filed for bankruptcy on behalf of PCI and was appointed as the bankruptcy trustee. As trustee, Kelley initiated an adversary proceeding against BMO Harris Bank, alleging that the bank aided and abetted the Ponzi scheme.The bankruptcy court and the district court both ruled that the equitable defense of in pari delicto, which prevents a plaintiff who has participated in wrongdoing from recovering damages, was unavailable due to PCI's receivership status. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury awarded Kelley over $500 million in damages, finding BMO liable for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty. BMO appealed, challenging the availability of the in pari delicto defense, among other issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the doctrine of in pari delicto barred Kelley’s action against BMO. The court reasoned that while a receiver might not be bound by the fraudulent acts of a corporation's officers under Minnesota law, a bankruptcy trustee stands in the shoes of the debtor and is subject to any defenses that could have been raised against the debtor. Since PCI was a wrongdoer, the defense of in pari delicto was available to BMO in the adversary proceeding. The court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case with directions to enter judgment in favor of BMO. The cross-appeal was dismissed as moot. View "Kelley v. BMO Harris Bank N.A." on Justia Law

TD Ameritrade offers brokerage services to retail investors, allowing them to trade stocks through its online platform. The company routes customer orders to trading venues for execution. Roderick Ford, representing a group of investors, alleged that TD Ameritrade's order-routing practices violated the company's duty of best execution by prioritizing venues that paid the company the most money rather than those providing the best outcomes for customers. Ford claimed this violated § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5, and that CEO Frederic J. Tomczyk was jointly liable under § 20(a) of the Act.A magistrate judge initially recommended denying Ford's motion for class certification due to the predominance of individual questions of economic loss. However, the district court certified a class, believing Ford's expert's algorithm could address these issues. The Eighth Circuit reversed this decision, stating individual inquiries were still necessary. Ford then proposed a new class definition and moved again for certification under Rule 23(b)(3), (b)(2), and (c)(4). The district court certified the class under Rule 23(b)(3) and alternatively under Rule 23(b)(2) and (c)(4).The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's certification order for abuse of discretion. The court found that Ford's new theory of economic loss, based on commissions paid, did not align with the previous definition of economic loss and still required individualized inquiries. Consequently, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(3). The court also found that the alternative certifications under Rule 23(b)(2) and (c)(4) were improper due to the predominance of individual issues and the lack of cohesiveness among class members. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ford v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves a pass-through billing scheme orchestrated by Beau Gertz, Mark Blake, SeroDynamics, and LabMed Services (collectively, the Sero Defendants). They made it appear that blood tests conducted at their Colorado lab were performed at a small hospital in Unionville, Missouri, resulting in a $26.3 million profit. The scheme involved billing Blue Cross using the hospital's provider numbers, despite the tests not being conducted there. Blue Cross paid the hospital $18,053,015 for these tests. The Sero Defendants were found liable for fraud, tortious interference with contract, civil conspiracy, and money had and received.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri oversaw the trial. After five days of evidence, the jury found the Sero Defendants liable and awarded Blue Cross $18,053,015 in compensatory damages and $1.9 million in punitive damages against each of the four Sero Defendants. The Sero Defendants appealed, raising multiple claims of error, including the exclusion of their lead counsel from delivering closing arguments and the admission of certain evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgments, finding no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of lead counsel from closing arguments due to repeated misconduct. The court also upheld the admission of a portion of an audit report, finding it relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings of fraud and tortious interference, noting that the Sero Defendants had actual knowledge of the contract between Putnam and Blue Cross and intentionally interfered with it. The court also upheld the jury's award of damages and punitive damages, finding no miscarriage of justice.In conclusion, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgments, rejecting all of the Sero Defendants' claims of error. View "RightCHOICE Managed Care v. Labmed Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Dr. Igor DeCastro, a neurosurgeon, worked at the Hot Springs Neurosurgery Clinic for seven years. He claimed that after his initial 18-month salary period, he was supposed to receive compensation based on the net proceeds of his production, less 33% of the clinic's overhead. However, he alleged that he never received more than his base salary because Dr. James Arthur, the clinic's owner, diverted the funds into a "secret account." DeCastro also sued Bank OZK, where the account was held, leading the bank to request the court to determine the rightful owner of the funds.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas dismissed DeCastro's amended complaint for failing to include essential facts, such as specific amounts received, production details, and overhead costs. The court also disbursed the funds to Arthur and denied DeCastro's motions for reconsideration, discovery, and leave to file a second amended complaint. DeCastro's subsequent attempts to revive the case, including a counterclaim in an unrelated contribution action, were dismissed based on res judicata.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that DeCastro's amended complaint lacked sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim for relief. The court noted that the complaint was filled with legal conclusions rather than specific facts about the alleged breach. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of DeCastro's post-dismissal motions, as the employment agreement he later produced did not support his original claims. The court also upheld the dismissal of DeCastro's counterclaim based on res judicata, as it was identical to the previously adjudicated claims. View "DeCastro v. Arthur" on Justia Law

During the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, American Screening, LLC, a Louisiana company, promised buyers that it would ship personal protective equipment (PPE) more quickly than it actually did. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sued American Screening, alleging that its shipping policies and practices violated the FTC Act and the Mail, Internet, or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule (MITOR). The company's website contained a shipping policy that stated orders would be processed and shipped within 24-48 hours. However, in practice, it took about six weeks for PPE to be shipped after the customer had purchased it.The district court granted the FTC summary judgment and ordered American Screening to return almost $14.7 million to consumers and permanently enjoined it from advertising or selling PPE. American Screening challenged the district court's ordered remedies on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court rejected American Screening's contention that the court should have considered whether each individual consumer had relied on American Screening's shipping representations and had sustained an injury as a result. The court also disagreed with American Screening's argument that the district court's equitable monetary relief went beyond what was necessary to redress consumers and so amounts to an award of exemplary or punitive damages. The court found that the relief was tailored to ensure that dissatisfied consumers are made whole while also ensuring that American Screening does not have to pay unharmed customers as punishment.Finally, the court rejected American Screening's challenge to the scope of the permanent injunction barring it from advertising or selling PPE. The court agreed with the district court that the egregiousness of American Screening's conduct weighed in favor of the injunction. The court also found that the injunction's effect on American Screening was more modest than its breadth might suggest. View "FTC v. American Screening, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around an insurance dispute between the Bradshaw Family Trust Inc., operating as Hunton Office Supply Inc. (Hunton), and Twin City Fire Insurance Company (Twin City). In June 2019, Hunton renewed a business owner’s policy on its office supply store building, which included a building replacement cost of $1,378,000. In April 2020, the building sustained wind damage from a storm. Hunton sought an insurance payout for the building’s repairs, but Twin City only paid a fraction of what was expected. A dispute arose surrounding the effective date of proposed policy changes, leading Hunton to sue Twin City.Twin City moved for summary judgment in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, arguing that it did not breach the insurance contract. The district court granted Twin City’s motion for summary judgment. Hunton appealed the decision, arguing that the policy endorsement was invalid because there was no meeting of the minds, the endorsement was never delivered to him, and the extent of the insurance agent's authority was a material fact question precluding summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the insurance agent had apparent authority to bind Hunton to the policy endorsement. It also concluded that based on the record, the only reasonable conclusion was that Hunton intended the policy changes to take effect immediately. Lastly, the court ruled that under Arkansas law, Hunton did not have to receive or sign the endorsement because it had requested the policy change. View "Bradshaw Family Trust Inc. v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Kevin Erikson, an employee of Wilbur-Ellis Company, LLC, left his job to work for a competitor, J.R. Simplot Company. Erikson had signed an employment agreement with Wilbur-Ellis in 2015, which included a non-competition and non-solicitation provision, preventing him from working with or soliciting from Wilbur-Ellis's customers or employees within a 100-mile radius of McCook County for two years after his employment was terminated. The agreement was set to terminate on March 31, 2019. Nearly four years after the termination of the agreement, Erikson resigned from Wilbur-Ellis and began working for Simplot, a competitor located in the restricted region.Wilbur-Ellis filed a lawsuit against Erikson, arguing that he had breached the agreement by violating the non-competition and non-solicitation provisions. The district court granted Wilbur-Ellis's motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that Wilbur-Ellis was likely to succeed on the merits of its breach of contract claim against Erikson. The court concluded that the non-competition and non-solicitation provisions survived the termination of the agreement and remained enforceable against Erikson at the time of his resignation in 2023.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Erikson argued that the non-competition and non-solicitation provisions were not enforceable against him because the agreement terminated on March 31, 2019, and the provisions did not survive the termination date. The appellate court agreed with Erikson, stating that the provisions did not contain express language sufficient to extend their application beyond the agreement's termination date. Therefore, the provisions expired at the same time as the agreement. The court reversed the district court's decision and vacated the preliminary injunction. View "Wilbur-Ellis Company v. Erikson" on Justia Law

Five employees of The Mayo Clinic, a Minnesota non-profit corporation, filed a lawsuit alleging that the organization failed to accommodate their religious beliefs under Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). The employees claimed that they were terminated for refusing to comply with Mayo's Covid-19 vaccination or testing policies. The plaintiffs sought religious accommodations for the vaccination requirement, citing their Christian religious beliefs. Mayo denied the accommodations for three plaintiffs who refused to get the vaccine. It granted vaccination exemptions to two plaintiffs, but required them to test for Covid-19 weekly, which they refused.The district court dismissed the claims, ruling that two plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies under Title VII, the other plaintiffs failed to plausibly plead religious beliefs that conflict with Mayo’s Covid-19 policies, and the MHRA fails to provide relief for not accommodating religious beliefs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case. The appellate court found that the district court erred in finding that two plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies under Title VII. The court also found that all plaintiffs adequately pled a conflict between their Christian religious beliefs and Mayo Clinic’s Covid-19 policy. Furthermore, the appellate court disagreed with the district court's finding that the MHRA does not provide a cause of action for failure to accommodate religious beliefs. The appellate court held that the MHRA, being a remedial act, should be construed liberally to secure freedom from discrimination for persons in Minnesota, and thus provides protection against failures to accommodate religious beliefs. View "Ringhofer v. Mayo Clinic Ambulance" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Jacam Chemical Company 2013, LLC (Jacam) and its competitor GeoChemicals, LLC, along with Arthur Shepard Jr., a former Jacam employee who later worked for GeoChemicals. Jacam sued both Shepard and GeoChemicals, alleging breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, and tortious interference with contracts. Shepard and GeoChemicals countersued Jacam. The district court granted a declaratory judgment to Shepard, concluding that he owed no contractual obligations to Jacam, and dismissed the remaining claims of Jacam and GeoChemicals.The district court had previously reviewed the case and granted summary judgment to Shepard, holding that he had no enforceable agreements with Jacam. The court also dismissed all of Jacam’s and GeoChemicals’s other claims against each other. Both Jacam and GeoChemicals appealed aspects of the summary judgment order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that neither the HCS Agreement nor the 2015 version of CES’s Conduct Code created an enforceable contract between Jacam and Shepard. The court also held that Jacam did not make reasonable efforts to keep its pricing information secret, which means the pricing information documents were not trade secrets which Shepard could misappropriate. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that Jacam’s tortious-interference claim fails. The court also dismissed GeoChemicals’s cross-appeal, holding that Jacam did not commit an independently tortious act that interfered with GeoChemicals’s relationship with Continental. View "Jacam Chemical Co. 2013, LLC v. Shepard" on Justia Law