Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Vermont Supreme Court
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The plaintiff, Shayne Lynn, was the founder and majority owner of High Fidelity, Inc., a Vermont cannabis business. In late 2020, defendants Peter Miller and Christopher Driessen, who controlled Slang Worldwide, Inc., proposed a merger between High Fidelity and Slang. They assured Lynn that Slang was financially sound and promised an $18 million investment into High Fidelity. Based on these representations, Lynn agreed to the merger in June 2021. However, Lynn later discovered that Slang was financially unstable and needed to borrow $18 million to survive. Lynn was subsequently terminated from his position.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed Lynn's complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that Lynn did not allege any actionable misrepresentations to support a fraud claim and failed to allege justifiable reliance or the existence of a duty to support a negligent misrepresentation claim. Lynn appealed the decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the statements made by Miller and Driessen about Slang's financial health were opinions and not actionable misrepresentations of fact. The promise of an $18 million investment was a future promise, not a misrepresentation of existing fact, and Lynn did not allege that Miller and Driessen intended to renege on the promise when it was made. The court also found that Lynn's claim of misleading financial data was not pled with particularity as required by Rule 9(b).Regarding the negligent misrepresentation claim, the court held that Lynn did not adequately allege justifiable reliance, as he did not claim that the truth about Slang's financial status was unavailable to him. The court affirmed the dismissal of Lynn's complaint. View "Lynn v. Slang Worldwide, Inc." on Justia Law

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Garret Hirchak, Manufacturing Solutions, Inc., and Sunrise Development LLC (plaintiffs) appealed a trial court's order dissociating Garret from Hirchak Brothers LLC and Hirchak Group LLC (defendants) and requiring the LLCs to pay over $900,000 in equity interest, unpaid compensation, and reimbursements. Plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in not recognizing oppression by the majority members of the LLCs, treating a $300,000 down payment made by Garret as gratuitous, declining to order reimbursements for certain services and cash advances, and refusing to assess prejudgment interest on any of the reimbursements. Defendants cross-appealed, arguing that the court erred in awarding compensation to Garret after he breached his fiduciary duties.The Superior Court, Lamoille Unit, Civil Division, found that Garret had breached his fiduciary duties by failing to make explicit agreements on service rates and withholding financial records. The court ordered Garret's dissociation from the LLCs and required the LLCs to pay Garret $375,000 for his equity interest, $215,430 for cash advances made before March 2020, and $213,591.84 for unpaid compensation from October 2019 to January 2021. The court also ordered reimbursement of $71,537.64 and $50,214.57 for unpaid invoices from MSI and Sunrise, respectively, before March 2020. The court denied prejudgment interest on any reimbursements and rejected Garret's claim for the $300,000 down payment.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that Garret was not entitled to reimbursement for the $300,000 down payment or for cash advances and invoices after March 2020 due to his breach of fiduciary duties. The court also upheld the denial of prejudgment interest, finding it was within the trial court's discretion. However, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's award of compensation to Garret after March 2020, concluding that his breach of fiduciary duties forfeited his right to compensation during that period. The case was remanded for a recalculation of the compensation due to Garret. View "Hirchak v. Hirchak" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff and her partner, owners of Health Hero Farm LLC, sought to buy out a local farming family from their partnership. During this period, they befriended the defendant, a local auto-repair shop owner with a small farm. They discussed forming a partnership with him, and plaintiff represented to the Vermont Land Trust that they were partnering with the defendant to secure approval for the buyout. Plaintiff and defendant agreed to purchase Galloway cattle, with plaintiff advancing the funds. Plaintiff insisted on a written agreement, but defendant preferred a handshake deal. Eventually, defendant signed a promissory note without reading it, which included an attorney’s-fees provision.The Superior Court, Grand Isle Unit, Civil Division, held a bench trial and concluded that the promissory note did not accurately reflect an agreement between the parties. The court found that the note was a contract of adhesion and awarded plaintiff damages and prejudgment interest under a theory of unjust enrichment, rather than enforcing the promissory note.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the promissory note was unambiguous and enforceable according to its terms. The court found that defendant’s failure to read the note before signing it did not constitute a defense to enforcement. The court also determined that the note was not a contract of adhesion and was not unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Falcao v. Richardson" on Justia Law

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Frank Driscoll was running along East Shore Road in Isle La Motte when he was struck by a trailer being pulled by a truck driven by Benjamin Wright, an employee of Wright Cut and Clean, LLC. Driscoll was running on the left side of the road, facing traffic, while Wright was driving in the same direction on the right side. As Wright's truck approached, Driscoll moved to the left edge of the road but was struck by the trailer when he moved back towards the center. Driscoll was unconscious when police arrived and had no memory of the accident.Driscoll sued Wright for negligence and Wright Cut and Clean for vicarious liability and direct negligence in hiring, training, and supervising Wright. The Superior Court, Grand Isle Unit, Civil Division, bifurcated the claims and held a jury trial on the negligence claim. Driscoll's expert, Dr. Jerry Ogden, testified about the dimensions of the trailer and the truck's speed but could not establish Driscoll's position before the impact or a clear causative link between Wright's actions and Driscoll's injuries. The court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants, concluding that Driscoll failed to establish causation.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Driscoll did not provide sufficient evidence of causation, as his expert could not definitively link Wright's actions to the injury. The court emphasized that without clear evidence showing that Wright's alleged negligence caused the injury, the claim could not proceed. Consequently, the judgment in favor of Wright and Wright Cut and Clean was affirmed, and the direct negligence claim against Wright Cut and Clean was also dismissed due to the lack of an underlying tort by Wright. View "Driscoll v. Wright Cut and Clean, LLC" on Justia Law

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The case involves RSD Leasing, Inc., a Vermont-based corporation that leases trucks to commercial operators. Between 2008 and 2014, RSD purchased forty trucks manufactured by Navistar International Corp. and Navistar, Inc. from a nonparty dealer. These trucks were equipped with an emission-control system known as an exhaust gas recirculation system. RSD alleged that the system caused the trucks to lose power, break down, and damage other engine components. RSD leased the trucks to other entities for four-to-six-year terms and intended to sell them at the end of the lease term. RSD filed a complaint against Navistar alleging violation of the Vermont Consumer Protection Act (VCPA), among other claims.In the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont, Navistar moved for summary judgment on the VCPA claim, arguing that RSD is not a “consumer” under the VCPA and is therefore barred from recovery. The district court granted summary judgment on the VCPA claim, reasoning that RSD did not qualify as a consumer under the VCPA because it purchased the trucks for resale in the ordinary course of its business. RSD appealed to the Second Circuit, which certified the question of whether RSD qualified as a consumer under the VCPA to the Vermont Supreme Court.The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that RSD is not a consumer under the VCPA. The court found that RSD's intent at the time it purchased the trucks was to lease them out and, after each lease term expired, sell them. The court held that the trucks were purchased for resale in the ordinary course of RSD’s business. Therefore, RSD did not qualify as a consumer under the VCPA. The court answered the certified question from the Second Circuit in the negative. View "RSD Leasing, Inc. v. Navistar International Corporation and Navistar, Inc." on Justia Law

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A Vermont-based non-profit organization and an LLC challenged a superior court's dismissal of their complaint over a grant they did not receive. The plaintiffs, Housing Our Seniors in Vermont Inc. and Lakemont Retirement Community LLC, argued that the grant provided by the Newport Development Fund Grant Committee to another organization was wrongly awarded. The plaintiffs also alleged a conflict of interest in the committee.However, the Vermont Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision, reasoning that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the grant award. The court clarified that the plaintiffs had no legal right to receive the grant or to have any specific procedure in the allocation of the grant. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' argument of specific rules governing the grant process asserting that the grant process was discretionary, and the eligibility criteria did not guarantee any particular process.Consequently, the court affirmed the superior court's dismissal for lack of standing, reinforcing that a legal entitlement or right is essential to establish an injury-in-fact for standing. View "Housing Our Seniors in Vermont Inc. v. Agency of Commerce & Community Development" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Gregg Beldock contracted to purchase four solar assets in development from VWSD, LLC. Following allegations of breach, VWSD sold three of the solar assets to a third party, Green Lantern. Beldock filed a complaint against VWSD alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment, and against Green Lantern and its president alleging tortious interference with contract and unjust enrichment. VWSD counterclaimed for breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all three defendants on Beldock’s claims and in part in favor of VWSD on its counterclaim. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s grant of summary judgment regarding all claims against Green Lantern and its president and the implied-covenant claim against VWSD. However, because portions of the contract were ambiguous and a genuine dispute of material facts remained, the Court concluded summary judgment was inappropriate for Beldock’s breach-of-contract and unjust-enrichment claims against VWSD and VWSD’s counterclaim for breach of contract. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Beldock v. VWSD, LLC et al." on Justia Law

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The issue presented in this case before the Vermont Supreme Court stemmed from a dispute between former business partners and the turnover of records pursuant to a stipulated judgment entered following the dissolution of their business relationship. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking to enforce the judgment’s record turnover requirement, and pled various causes of action for injuries arising out of defendant’s refusal to turn the records over immediately after the judgment. The trial court dismissed the related claims as time-barred, and ultimately adjudicated the enforcement claim on the merits in favor of defendant. The Vermont affirmed the trial court in all but one aspect: because the Supreme Court came to a different conclusion on whether certain types of documents were subject to the stipulated judgment’s turnover requirement, the Supreme Court remanded for the trial court to amend its judgment. View "Sutton v. Purzycki" on Justia Law

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Insured Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. and insurer Huntington Ingalls Industries Risk Management LLC seek a declaratory judgment stating there is coverage under a property insurance policy for certain losses incurred by Huntington Ingalls Industries due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The trial court concluded that the complaint did not allege facts that would trigger coverage under the policy and granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of reinsurers. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court disagreed, reversed the trial court. and remanded for further proceedings. View "Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. et al. v. Ace American Insurance Company et al." on Justia Law

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New England Phoenix Company, Inc. appealed a trial court order denying its motion for a deficiency judgment following a foreclosure decree and an order confirming its purchase of a mortgaged property at a judicial sale. In 2010, Bank of America lent a veterinary hospital business in Grand Isle money. Paws and Laws, LLC owned the hospital’s real property, and Grand Isle Veterinary Hospital, Inc. owned the business assets. The bank lent Paws and Laws and Grand Isle Veterinary Hospital money separately: Paws and Laws' loan was secured by a mortgage on the real property, Grand Isle Veterinary was secured by the business' personal property and assets. In 2012, Paws and Laws violated the terms of the mortgage by conveying the real property by quit claim deed to Grand Isle Veterinary Hospital. In 2014, Grand Isle Veterinary Hospital gave Bank of America a second mortgage on the real property to secure its finance agreement. Soon thereafter the business defaulted on the loans and guarantor abandoned the property. Guarantor’s attempts to sell the property were unsuccessful. Bank of America did not initiate foreclosure proceedings on the loans, and instead, assigned the loans and mortgages to New England Phoenix. New England Phoenix filed this foreclosure action in April 2019. Guarantor did not participate in the proceedings. In late 2019, the trial court entered a default judgment and issued a foreclosure decree by judicial sale. Neither guarantor nor Grand Isle Veterinary redeemed the property, New England Phoenix submitted the winning bid and the judicial sale. In March 2021, the court issued an order confirming the sale and transferring title to the property to New England Phoenix. In a separate order, the court restated a request that New England Phoenix provide a 2010 appraisal before it would rule on the deficiency judgment. New England Phoenix argued, in effect, that the 2010 appraisal was immaterial to the court’s decision, and that in any case, by the time it took an assignment of the loans and mortgages, the property had long been abandoned and contained no business assets. In appealing the trial court's refusal to reconsider the deficiency issue, it argued to the Vermont Supreme Court that the trial court's reasoning for denying relief was made in error. The Supreme Court concurred with New England Phoenix that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider factors relevant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 80.1(j)(2), and by exercising its discretion to deny a deficiency judgment “for clearly untenable reasons.” View "New England Phoenix Company, Inc. v. Grand Isle Veterinary Hospital, Inc. et al." on Justia Law