After disagreements over Ripley Associates, LLC’s operation arose, the Domenick Marrara, Jr. Trust, which owned a twenty-five percent interest in Ripley, decided to dissociate from Ripley. The Trust and its Trustees filed this proceeding to enforce Ripley’s purchase of the Trust’s distributional interest. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court determined the fair market value of the Trust’s distributional interest in Ripley. The court subsequently ordered that Ripley should pay interest on this amount from the date the court determined the value of the Trust’s distributional interest at the hearing. The Trustees appealed, arguing that they were entitled to receive interest on the Trust’s distributional interest from the date of its dissociation from Ripley. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the payment of interest upon a dissociated member’s distributional interest in an at-will limited liability company is calculated from the date of dissociation. View "Marrara v. Ripley Assocs., LLC" on Justia Law
After an altercation that took place at Bubba's Bar and Grill (Bubba's), Petitioner filed a complaint against Bubba's, asserting three negligence claims. Petitioner subsequently learned that Bubba's was a fictitious name used for business purposes by The Tavern, LLC and that James Paugh and Lawson Mangum were the only members of The Tavern. Petitioner sought leave to amend his complaint to utilize the proper company name, add Paugh and Mangum as defendants, and assert a veil piercing count against Paugh and Mangum. The Tavern argued in response that the sole purpose for adding Paugh and Mangum as defendants was to pierce the veil of their West Virginia limited liability company, which The Tavern claimed was against West Virginia law. Instead of ruling on Petitioner's motion, the circuit court certified a question to the Supreme Court regarding West Virginia's version of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (the Act). The Court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that the Act permits the equitable remedy of piercing the veil to be asserted against a West Virginia limited liability company. View "Kubican v. The Tavern, LLC" on Justia Law
The City of Fairmont owned and operated Fairmont General Hospital (FGH) until 1985. In 1984, the City Council adopted section 4.06 of the Fairmont City Charter, which provided that the board of directors of the hospital would be appointed by the Council. FGH then became a private, not-for-profit corporation. In 2010, FGH amended its bylaws to provide for appointment of its board members by the board itself, rather than the Council. FGH also amended its articles of incorporation to comport with the amended bylaws. After the Council challenged FGH's authority to make appointments to the hospital board, FGH filed an action seeking a declaration that section 4.06 of the city charter was no longer applicable to the hospital. The City and Council counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that FGH's amended bylaws were void. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the hospital. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither the City nor the Council had standing to challenge, either as ultra vires or as a violation of the city charter, the actions of the hospital's board in amending its bylaws, appointing new members to the board, and amending the articles of incorporation. View "The City of Fairmont v. Fairmont Gen. Hosp., Inc." on Justia Law
Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice action against a hospital, several doctors, and others. Two of the doctors were employed by a corporate entity and treated patients exclusively at the hospital in accordance with a contractual relationship between the hospital and the entity. The third doctor provided surgical services at the hospital in accordance with a contract he executed with a corporation that contracted with hospital to provide a "surgicalist" program, an arrangement that provided the hospital with surgeons. Plaintiffs sought to hold the hospital vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of the doctors on the theory that the doctors were employees or actual agents of the hospital, or that the doctors and corporate defendants were engaged in a joint venture with the hospital. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital, holding (1) the doctors were not actual agents or employees of the hospital at the time of the alleged negligence, and (2) there was no joint venture. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "Cunningham v. Herbert J. Thomas Mem'l Hosp." on Justia Law
This case was before the Supreme Court for a second time. Here the case was before the Court on a petition for writ of prohibition brought by Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (MassMutual) seeking to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing its order requiring Roger Crandall, the president, CEO and chairman of Mass Mutual, to submit to deposition. The underlying lawsuits were part of a series of 412i retirement plan cases against multiple defendants, including MassMutual. Respondents alleged fraud and tax fraud in their complaints regarding annuities and pension plans that allegedly subjected Respondents to tax and compliance penalties and other collateral liabilities. In MassMutual I, the Court issued a writ of prohibition prohibiting the circuit court from enforcing its orders that directed Crandall submit to deposition. In the instant appeal, MassMutual argued that the circuit court failed to comply with the Supreme Court's decision in MassMutual I in ordering its president to submit to deposition. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ, holding that the circuit court and Respondents failed to follow the directive of the Court in MassMutual I, and therefore, the court was prohibited from enforcing its order requiring Crandall to submit to deposition. View "State ex rel. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law
Defendant and Plaintiffs were co-guarantors of a promissory note signed to obtain a bank loan to pay the debts of the parties' failed corporation. Plaintiffs paid the note from their personal funds. Plaintiffs then filed an action against Defendant seeking contribution for the amounts paid from their personal funds. The circuit court determined Defendant was liable to Plaintiffs for one half the amount they paid from their personal funds and entered a judgment order against Defendant in the amount of $24,081. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, to amend the judgment. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly determined that Defendant should pay Plaintiffs $24,081. View "Beverly v. Kent" on Justia Law
Petitioner Darrell McGraw, state attorney general, sought a writ of prohibition directed to Respondent Charles King, judge of the circuit court, to enjoin enforcement of an order dismissing Petitioner's action seeking enforcement of certain investigative subpoenas issued against Respondents, Fast Auto Loans, Inc. (FAL), Community Loans of America, Inc. (CLA), and the president and CEO of both corporations. Petitioner began the investigation of Respondents after receiving complaints by West Virginia residents regarding the collection of title loans provided by FAL and CLA. The circuit court ruled that the investigative subpoena was procedurally defective and therefore invalid, and denied Petitioner's request for enforcement of the subpoena. The Supreme Court denied the requested writ of prohibition because Petitioner had another adequate remedy, that being an appeal of the circuit court's order. View "State ex rel. McGraw v. Circuit Court (King)" on Justia Law
This case was before the Supreme Court on a writ of prohibition brought by Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (MassMutual) seeking to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing two orders requiring the president and CEO of MassMutual to submit to depositions. MassMutual argued (1) the orders requiring its president to submit to depositions were properly the subject of a writ of prohibition, and (2) the orders compelling the depositions of this high-ranking corporate executive, despite his lack of any personal or unique knowledge about the cases, were clearly erroneous and constituted an abuse of the circuit court's discretion. The Supreme Court issued the writ after adopting the apex deposition rule, a framework for assessing whether the deposition of a high-ranking corporate official is proper, holding that because the circuit court, in this case, did not make findings of fact or conclusions of law, there was an insufficient basis to sustain the circuit court's orders.
Employee of a railway company was accused by his Employer of stealing rail. After it was discovered that Employee was involved in the removal and sale of the rail, Employee's employment was terminated. An arbitration panel reinstated Employee's employment the next year. Employer then submitted the matter to an assistant prosecutor. Employee was never arrested or incarcerated. Employee subsequently sued Employer for malicious prosecution. During the trial, the circuit court granted Employee's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether Employer had procured his prosecution, which was one element of his required proof. The jury then returned a verdict in favor of Employee. The circuit court denied Employer's motions for judgment as a matter of law, new trial, or remittitur. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying Employer's post-trial motions, holding that the circuit court committed reversible error by determining as a matter of law that Employer procured the malicious prosecution of Employee where testimony of the assistant prosecutor directly contradicted the proposition that Employer had a level of control over the prosecution amounting to procurement. Remanded for a new trial.
Posted in: Business Law, Injury Law, Labor & Employment Law, Legal Ethics, West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
The Racing Commission suspended certain jockeys' occupational permits for thirty days and imposed fines for the jockeys' failure to declare an overweight amount. Afterwards, PNGI Charles Town Gaming (PNGI), a non-party in the underlying action, excluded the jockeys from its facility. The circuit court (1) entered an injunction and stayed the imposition of sanctions by the Racing Commission until the conclusion of a hearing before the Commission; and (2) extended the injunction and the stay to include PNGI, preventing PNGI from excluding the jockeys from PGNI's premises pending the outcome of the jockeys' administrative appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an ejection of a permit holder by a racing association or its stewards is subject to review by the Commission, and therefore, the jockeys, as permit holders, had the right to appeal the ejection, and PNGI was bound by the Commission's decision, subject to judicial review; and (2) PNGI waived its assigned errors regarding the injunction and stay.
Posted in: Business Law, Commercial Law, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law, West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals