Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

4201 2nd Ave. W., LLC, d.b.a. Safari Fuels 105 (“4201”) appealed a district court’s judgment finding First State Bank & Trust, formerly First National Bank & Trust Company (“the bank”), held a valid and enforceable security interest in a liquor license and other collateral. In 2015, the bank loaned approximately $4.34 million to Racers Store 102, LLC (“Racers”) under a promissory note for its operation of a convenience store. As security for the loan, Racers signed the bank a leasehold mortgage, security agreement, and fixture filing against real and personal property including a liquor license, coffee kiosk, walk-in freezer, and Kohler generator, among other collateral. In 2016, Racers defaulted on its loan, and the bank commenced a foreclosure action. During foreclosure proceedings, the bank took control of the convenience store and contracted with 4201 to operate the store while the foreclosure action was pending. Racers transferred its rights, titles, and interests in the ground lease and assets of the store to 4201; 4201 entered into a forbearance agreement with the bank. The parties subsequently discovered the liquor license could not be transferred until delinquent property taxes were paid. The bank and 4201 executed an addendum to the forbearance agreement agreeing to pay equal shares of the property taxes whereby the liquor license would become an asset of 4201 subject to the existing lien held by the bank. The parties also entered into a personal property pledge in which 4201 pledged to give the bank a continuing first-priority interest in the liquor license, 4201 agreed not to sell, assign, or transfer the license, and 4201 agreed to reimburse the bank for costs associated with defending its interest in the license. In 2021, the bank decided to cease operations of the store and offered to sell the liquor license to 4201. 4201 commenced legal action seeking a declaratory judgment that the bank no longer held a valid and enforceable lien on the liquor license, coffee kiosk, walk-in freezer, and Kohler generator. Following a bench trial, the district court determined the bank held a valid and enforceable security interest in the liquor license and other collateral. The court dismissed the bank’s counterclaim. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "4201 2nd Ave W v. First State Bank & Trust, et al." on Justia Law

In November of 2020, the people of Georgia, through the results of a ballot question posed in the general election, amended the State Constitution to allow for a specific waiver of sovereign immunity. This new waiver allowed citizens to sue the State for declaratory relief ("Paragraph V"). To the extent that citizens obtain a favorable ruling on their claim for declaratory relief, they could then also seek injunctive relief to “enforce [the court’s] judgment.” To take advantage of this new waiver of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, however, the Constitution provided that such actions had to be brought “exclusively” against the State. When a plaintiff’s suit violated this exclusivity provision, the Constitution required the suit be dismissed. In the underlying appeal, the plaintiffs’ suit named a defendant for whom a waiver was not provided by Paragraph V. Accordingly, the Constitution required the suit to be dismissed. The Georgia Supreme Court therefore vacated the trial court’s grant of an interlocutory injunction, reversed the denial of the State’s motion to dismiss, and remanded this case with direction that it be dismissed. View "Georgia, et al. v. Sass Group, LLC et al." on Justia Law

A putative class of over 12 million merchants brought this antitrust action under the Sherman Act against Visa U.S.A. Inc., MasterCard International Inc., and numerous banks that serve as payment-card issuers for those networks. Plaintiffs alleged that Visa and MasterCard adopted and enforced rules and practices relating to payment cards that had the combined effect of injuring merchants by allowing Visa and MasterCard to charge supracompetitive fees (known as “interchange fees”) on each payment card transaction. After nearly fifteen years of litigation, the parties agreed to a settlement of roughly $ 5.6 billion, which was approved by the district court over numerous objections. In so doing, $900,000 in service awards was granted to lead plaintiffs, and roughly $523 million was granted in attorneys’ fees. Appellants are various objectors who argue that the district court erred when it certified the class, approved the settlement, granted service awards and computed attorneys’ fees.   The Second Circuit affirmed in all respects the district court’s orders to the extent they constituted a final judgment, with the exception that the court directed the district court to reduce the service award to class representatives to the extent that its size was increased by time spent in lobbying efforts that would not increase the recovery of damages. The court made no ruling as to how damages should be allocated between branded oil companies and their branded service station franchisees, the reasonableness of the special master’s ultimate findings, or the legality of releasing an as-of-yet hypothetical future claim. View "In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust" on Justia Law

Metropolitan Washington Chapter, Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. (“Metro Washington”), a corporate trade organization representing construction companies, brought this pre-enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of the District of Columbia First Source Employment Agreement Act of 1984. The statute requires contractors on D.C. government-assisted projects to grant hiring preferences to D.C. residents. Metro Washington appealed the district court’s Rule 12 dismissals of the claims under the dormant Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the grant of summary judgment to the District of Columbia on the substantive due process claim.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Metro Washington’s dormant Commerce Clause claim and Rule 12(c) dismissal of the Privileges and Immunities Clause claim. The court also affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the District of Columbia on the inapplicability of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to a corporation. Further, although Metro Washington has Article III standing as an association, it lacks third-party standing to raise its alternative Privileges and Immunities claim based on incorporation through the Fifth Amendment, and therefore the court dismissed this alternative contention. View "Metropolitan Washington Chapter, Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. DC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a franchisor of tax preparation services, appeals from the district court’s denying its motion for preliminary injunctive relief to enforce, among other things, covenants not to compete or solicit former clients against Defendants, its former franchisees. On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the district court erroneously applied a heightened standard for obtaining preliminary injunctive relief, failed to credit an undisputed fact that Plaintiff had grounds to terminate the franchise agreements because Defendants were violating federal tax laws, and was compelled as a matter of law to find that it would suffer irreparable harm to its goodwill and client relationships in the absence of an injunction.   The Second Circuit affirmed the order denying preliminary relief. The court concluded that the district court applied the appropriate standard, permissibly credited Defendants’ denials that they violated federal tax laws, and acted well within its discretion in concluding that Plaintiff would not suffer irreparable harm. The court reasoned that nothing in the court’s precedents compels a district court to find irreparable harm to goodwill and client relationships in covenant-not-to-compete or -solicit cases simply because irreparable harm is often found in such cases. Instead, a plaintiff must present the district court with actual evidence. On that record, the court wrote it cannot conclude that the district court’s finding that Plaintiff had failed to make a strong showing of irreparable injury represented a clear error or exceeded the court’s discretion. View "JTH Tax d/b/a Liberty Tax Service v. Agnant" on Justia Law

During an investigation into possible violations of California overtime laws by appellant Nor-Cal Venture Group, Inc. (Nor-Cal), respondent Labor Commissioner for the State of California (Commissioner) subpoenaed Nor-Cal's business records. The Commissioner ultimately issued a wage citation to Nor-Cal, seeking over $900,000 in penalties and unpaid wages for alleged misclassification of about 40 restaurant managers. Nor-Cal challenged the wage citation in an “informal” adjudicatory hearing, and while that adjudication was pending, Commissioner issued a subpoena directing Nor-Cal’s “Person(s) Most Knowledgeable” on certain topics to testify at a deposition. When Nor-Cal refused, Commissioner filed a petition to a trial court to compel Nor-Cal to comply. The trial court agreed with Commissioner and ordered Nor-Cal to comply with the deposition subpoena. On appeal, Nor-Cal challenged the trial court’s order, arguing: (1) the California Government Code did not contemplate parties to adjudicatory informal hearings taking depositions for the purpose of discovery; and (2) because, under the trial court’s reasoning, only Commissioner could issue deposition subpoenas during the pendency of an informal adjudication, the trial court’s order permitting non-reciprocal discovery violated due process. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order, finding that while Commissioner had broad power to issue investigative subpoenas to a company for suspected violations of the law, "that broad power ends upon initiation of adjudicative proceedings against the company." View "Garcia-Brower v. Nor-Cal Venture Group" on Justia Law

During the tax years at issue, 2010–2013, the Taxpayers owned a New Jersey horse farm. Their Company employed several employees, none of whom had a budget. The Company paid the Taxpayers' personal expenses and lost more than $3.5 million during the years at issue and more than $11.4 million between 1998-2013. The Taxpayers contributed capital and made loans to the Company. In 2016, the Company sold a horse for nearly $1.2 million, enabling it to report a modest overall profit.In 2016, the IRS sent notices of income tax deficiencies. The Tax Court sustained the deficiency determinations, holding that the Taxpayers could not deduct Company losses because their horse breeding activity was not engaged in for profit under Internal Revenue Code section 183 and that the Taxpayers failed to substantiate net operating loss carryforwards that allegedly arose from Company activity. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Tax Court did not clearly err when it found that adverse market conditions did not explain the Company’s sustained unprofitability and correctly considered the Taxpayers’ substantial income from other sources. The profit generated from the 2016 horse sale was tempered by the fact that it occurred after the tax years at issue and after the notices of deficiency. The expertise of the Taxpayers and their advisors was the only factor that favored the Taxpayers. View "Skolnick v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Relevent Sports, LLC, a U.S.-based soccer promoter, alleges that the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (popularly known as FIFA) and the United States Soccer Federation, Inc. adopted and enforced a geographic market division policy in 2018 that unlawfully prohibits soccer leagues and teams from playing official season games outside of their home territory. Relevent claims that the 2018 policy represents an agreement among direct competitors to restrict competition in violation of federal antitrust laws. The district court concluded that Relevent failed to allege that the challenged anticompetitive conduct stemmed from a prior agreement to enter into the 2018 policy.   The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that a plaintiff challenging an association policy or rule that governs the conduct of the members’ separate businesses need not allege an antecedent “agreement to agree.” Because Relevent challenges the allegedly monopolistic 2018 Policy directly, it has adequately alleged concerted action. The Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Antitrust Act require no further allegations of an agreement to engage in concerted action for Relevent’s complaint to survive a motion to dismiss. View "Relevent Sports v. U.S. Soccer Federation" on Justia Law

Kimball entered annexation agreements with Illinois municipalities and contracted separately with Fidelity as a surety to issue bonds securing performance on those obligations. Fidelity required Kimball to indemnify it. In 2008, Kimball filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief before it satisfied its development obligations. The municipalities and Fidelity filed proofs of claim.Fidelity voted in favor of Kimball's reorganization plan. The confirmation order released the claims of every party that voted for the plan; an injunction prohibited those entities from seeking payment on their claims. Kimball’s assets, “free and clear of any and all liens, claims, encumbrances, and interests,” went into a trust that sold its development interests to TRG. The bankruptcy court later allowed the municipalities to sue Kimball to establish liability in order to recover the proceeds of the performance bonds.The municipalities sued Fidelity in state court to collect on the bonds. Fidelity interpleaded TRG. TRG asked the bankruptcy court to enforce the Kimball plan confirmation order and injunction against Fidelity and alleged “knowing and intentional violation of the confirmation order.” The bankruptcy court held Fidelity in contempt of that order, concluded that the order extinguished Kimball’s duty to indemnify Fidelity, and awarded TRG $9.5 million in sanctions, The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The bankruptcy court undertook a careful and detailed analysis in finding Fidelity in contempt and assessing sanctions based on TRG's costs. There was no legal or factual error. View "Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland v. TRG Venture Two, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs William Kainz and GeoChemicals, LLC appealed a district court’s order granting Jacam Chemical Co. 2013, LLC’s motion to abate and an order and judgment awarding attorney’s fees to Jacam. Plaintiffs argued the district court erred by abating the action and by awarding attorney’s fees. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court misapplied the law in granting the motion to abate and abused its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Kainz, et al. v. Jacam Chemical Co. 2013" on Justia Law