Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

Rami Khalaf (“taxpayer”) was in the business of buying products for customers in the United Arab Emirates, primarily all-terrain vehicles (ATVs). He sought to claim certain business deductions on his 2013 income tax return. As relevant here, those included travel expenses that taxpayer had incurred on trips to the Emirates, and the cost of a dune buggy that taxpayer had purchased for use as a demonstration model. The Department of Revenue rejected those deductions. The Tax Court agreed with the department on those points, holding that the travel expenses were not deductible, because they were not sufficiently documented, and that the dune buggy was not deductible because it counted as inventory. Taxpayer appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Tax Court's judgment. View "Khalaf v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

This case involves the constitutionality of a business and occupation (B&O) tax. In 2019, the Washington state legislature imposed an additional 1.2 percent B&O tax on financial institutions with a consolidated net income of at least $1 billion. The tax applied to any financial institution meeting this threshold regardless of whether it was physically located in Washington, and it was apportioned to income from Washington business activity. The Washington Supreme Court found that because the tax applied equally to in- and out-of-state institutions and was limited to Washington-related income, it did not discriminate against interstate commerce. The Court therefore reversed the trial court and upheld the constitutionality of the tax. View "Washington Bankers Ass'n v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

RTS Shearing, LLC (“RTS”) appealed the dismissal of its action with prejudice after the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant BNI Coal, Ltd. (“BNI”). RTS provided rock crushing services for use on various construction projects. BNI operated a coal mine near Center, North Dakota. In February 2019, RTS filed suit against BNI, claiming breach of contract after BNI canceled purchase orders for RTS to provide rock-crushing services to BNI. BNI asserted it exercised its right to cancel the balance of the purchase orders under the Terms and Conditions that were incorporated by reference in the purchase orders. In January 2020, BNI moved for summary judgment, arguing RTS’s breach-of-contract claim failed and the action should have been dismissed because the two purchase orders at issue had also incorporated BNI’s standard “Terms and Conditions,” which allowed for the cancellation. In August 2020, the district court held a hearing on BNI’s motion. The court granted summary judgment in favor of BNI and dismissed RTS’s action with prejudice. Before the North Dakota Supreme Court, RTS argued the district court erred by entering summary judgment dismissing its complaint for breach of contract. The dispositive issue was whether BNI’s separate “Terms and Conditions” were incorporated by reference into the March 2015 and July 2015 purchase orders. On this record, the Supreme Court concluded as a matter of law the undisputed facts established that both RTS and BNI had knowledge of and assented to the incorporated terms referenced in the purchase orders and that RTS was not excused from the Terms and Conditions merely on the basis of its failure to request and review a copy from BNI before performing under the purchase orders. The district court, therefore, did not err in granting BNI’s summary judgment motion. View "RTS Shearing v. BNI Coal" on Justia Law

Alevy was an owner, officer, and board member of Amusement, a real estate company, engaged in the ongoing Stern Litigation. In 2010, Alevy offered Missakian employment as in-house counsel at Amusement, including working on the Stern Litigation. Under the Oral Contract, Missakian would receive a salary of $325,000, and, after the Stern Litigation ended, Missakian would receive a bonus of $6,250 for each month he had worked on that litigation plus 10 percent of the recovery, excluding ordinary litigation costs. The parties exchanged multiple written drafts but never signed a written contract. Missakian left Amusement in 2014. The Stern Litigation settled months later. Amusement received $26 million. Missakian never received the Monthly Bonus or the Stern Litigation Bonus.A jury issued a verdict in favor of Missakian on the claims for breach of oral contract and promissory fraud and made special verdict findings in favor of Alevy on promissory fraud. The trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on Missakian’s promissory fraud claim against Amusement.The court of appeal reversed. The Oral Contract is void under Business and Professions Code section 6147, 2 which requires contingency fee agreements to be in writing. The jury’s special verdict on promissory fraud was inconsistent because it found Alevy did not make a false promise, but that Amusement (acting only through Alevy) did. Because the court cannot choose between the jury’s inconsistent responses, the court should have ordered a new trial. View "Missakian v. Amusement Industry, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2016, the board of directors of Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) voted in favor of a stock reclassification that would allow Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook’s controller, chairman, and chief executive officer, to sell most of his Facebook stock while maintaining voting control of the company. Zuckerberg proposed the Reclassification to allow him and his wife to fulfill a pledge to donate most of their wealth to philanthropic causes. With Zuckerberg casting the deciding votes, Facebook’s stockholders approved the Reclassification. Not long after, numerous stockholders filed lawsuits in the Delaware Court of Chancery, alleging that Facebook’s board of directors violated their fiduciary duties by negotiating and approving a purportedly one-sided deal that put Zuckerberg’s interests ahead of the company’s interests. The trial court consolidated more than a dozen of these lawsuits into a single class action. At Zuckerberg’s request and shortly before trial, Facebook withdrew the Reclassification and mooted the fiduciary-duty class action. Facebook spent more than $20 million defending against the class action and paid plaintiffs’ counsel more than $68 million in attorneys’ fees under the corporate benefit doctrine. Following the settlement, another Facebook stockholder, the United Food and Commercial Workers Union and Participating Food Industry Employers Tri-State Pension Fund (“Tri-State”), filed a derivative complaint, rehashing many of the allegations made in the prior class action but sought compensation for the money Facebook spent in connection with the prior class action. Tri-State pleaded that making a demand on Facebook's board was futile because the board’s negotiation and approval of the Reclassification was not a valid exercise of its business judgment and because a majority of the directors were beholden to Zuckerberg. Facebook and the other defendants moved to dismiss Tri-State’s complaint arguing Tri-State did not make demand or prove that demand was futile. The Court of Chancery dismissed Tri-State's complaint under Rule 23.1. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed dismissal. View "United Food and Commercial Workers Union v. Zuckerberg, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the petition filed by NuVeda, LLC for a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus asking the Supreme Court to disqualify Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez from presiding over a contempt hearing and to order the Chief Judge of the Eighth Judicial District Court to randomly reassign that hearing to another judge, holding that NuVeda was not entitled to relief.In this business dispute, NuVeda moved for a change of judge thirty-seven days after the court set a date for a trial on NuVeda's alleged contempt. The district court denied the motion as untimely. NuVeda petitioned for extraordinary writ relief. The Supreme Court denied the relief, holding (1) motions for a change of judge under Nev. Rev. Stat. 22.030(3) must be made with reasonable promptness under the circumstances; and (2) the district court did not erroneously determine that the motion in this case was untimely. View "NuVeda, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Cheryl Thurston was blind and used screen reader software to access the Internet and read website content. Defendant-respondent Omni Hotels Management Corporation (Omni) operated hotels and resorts. In November 2016, Thurston initiated this action against Omni, alleging that its website was not fully accessible by the blind and the visually impaired, in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. By way of a special verdict, the jury rejected Thurston’s claim and found that she never intended to make a hotel reservation or ascertain Omni’s prices and accommodations for the purpose of making a hotel reservation. On appeal, Thurston contended the trial court erred as a matter of law: (1) by instructing the jury that her claim required a finding that she intended to make a hotel reservation; and (2) by including the word “purpose” in the special verdict form, which caused the jury to make a “factual finding as to [her] motivation for using or attempting to use [Omni’s] Website.” Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Thurston v. Omni Hotels Management Corporation" on Justia Law

Leonard sought the involuntary dissolution of the family business. After his brothers, Michael and Joseph, invoked their statutory right to buy Leonard’s interests in the business pursuant to a court-ordered appraisal, the parties stipulated to add five LLCs to the 14 entities that were already subject to the appraisal and buyout proceeding. The court confirmed a valuation of Leonard’s interests and issued an alternative decree ordering that Michael and Joseph had to pay the appraised amount by a certain date and that, if they did not, the entities would be wound up and dissolved. Michael and Joseph did not pay the buyout amount. The court proceeded to wind up and dissolve the business, including the five additional LLCs. Meanwhile, Leonard proceeded on a claim for breach of fiduciary duty; the court awarded Leonard compensatory and punitive damages.Michael and Joseph argued the alternative decree to wind up and dissolve the business and the “follow-up" orders were void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to dissolve the five LLCs. The court of appeal affirmed the order of dissolution but reversed the award of damages for breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court had fundamental jurisdiction; Michael and Joseph are estopped from collaterally attacking the alternative decree. Leonard lacked standing to assert breach of fiduciary duty; that cause of action was derivative, not individual. View "Schrage v. Schrage" on Justia Law

Bernice filed an action for the involuntary dissolution of an LLC. Her sisters, Arlene, Caroline, and Diana owned equal shares. Caroline and Diana elected to purchase Bernice’s and Arlene’s interests pursuant to Corporations Code section 17707.03. They stipulated to staying the dissolution action and appointing three appraisers. The LLC’s sole asset was a single-story industrial warehouse in San Gabriel, which had been appraised at $3 million in March 2018. Its tenant's five-year lease term was set to expire in 2021. The appraisers worked separately and reached different valuations. The court instructed the appraisers to review their respective reports and confer.The appraisers submitted a joint final report, establishing a net asset value of $831,973 for a 25 percent interest in the LLC, and stating “the value should be $623,979 after the application of a 27% discount applicable to a minority interest. The court ordered an additional deduction of $2,025 for reimbursement of appraisal fees and set a final buyout price of $621,954. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that instructing the appraisers to review each other’s reports and confer did not comply with the statutory procedures; that the court improperly discounted the fair market value; and that the court improperly failed to account for mismanagement allegations. View "Cheng v. Coastal L.B. Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

In March 2020, the Governor of Ohio declared a state of emergency in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic. A few days later, the Director of the Ohio Department of Health ordered restaurants across the state to close their doors to in-person diners, forcing Santosuossos restaurant in Medina to halt ordinary operations. Although the closure order permitted restaurants to offer takeout services, in-person dining generates the substantial majority of Santosuossos’s revenue.” The restaurant sustained significant losses and laid-off employees. The restaurant filed a claim with Acuity, seeking recovery under its commercial property insurance policy. After Acuity denied coverage, the owner filed suit.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The policy covers business interruption “caused by direct physical loss of or damage to property.” The cause of the suspension of operations—the prohibition on in-person dining—did not arise from a physical loss of property or physical damage to it. The court also noted policy exclusions for “loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by . . . [a]ny virus . . . capable of inducing physical distress, illness or disease” and for “loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by [ordinance or law] . . . [r]egulating the construction, use or repair of any property.” View "Santo's Italian Cafe LLC v. Acuity Insurance Co." on Justia Law