Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over attorneys' fees following a $1 billion settlement in litigation challenging Dell Technologies' redemption of Class V stock. The plaintiff, Steamfitters Local 449 Pension Plan, alleged that Dell Technologies, controlled by Michael Dell and Silver Lake Group LLC, redeemed the Class V stock at an unfair price. The litigation was complex, involving extensive discovery and expert testimony, and was settled on the eve of trial.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware awarded 26.67% of the settlement, or $266.7 million, as attorneys' fees. Pentwater Capital Management LP and other class members objected, arguing that the fee was excessive and that a declining percentage method should be applied, similar to federal securities law cases. The Court of Chancery rejected this argument, holding that Delaware law, as established in Sugarland Industries, Inc. v. Thomas and Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, does not mandate a declining percentage approach. The court found that the $1 billion settlement was a significant achievement and that the fee award was justified based on the results achieved, the time and effort of counsel, and other relevant factors.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Chancery did not exceed its discretion in awarding 26.67% of the settlement as attorneys' fees. The court emphasized that the Sugarland factors, particularly the results achieved, are paramount in determining fee awards. The Supreme Court also noted that while a declining percentage approach is permissible, it is not mandatory, and the Court of Chancery adequately justified its decision not to apply it in this case. View "In re Dell Technologies Inc." on Justia Law

Mark Nordlicht, founder and chief investment officer of Platinum Partners, defrauded Black Elk Energy Offshore Operations' creditors of nearly $80 million, transferring the funds to his hedge fund’s investors, including Shlomo and Tamar Rechnitz, who received about $10.3 million. Nordlicht was later convicted of securities fraud. Black Elk declared bankruptcy, and the Trustee initiated an adversary proceeding against the Rechnitzes to recover the transferred funds.The bankruptcy court ruled that the Trustee could recover the money from the Rechnitzes under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 548(a)(1), and 550(a), rejecting their defense under 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1) that they were good faith transferees. The court imputed Nordlicht’s knowledge of the fraudulent scheme to the Rechnitzes, as he acted as their agent. The court also found that the funds transferred to the Rechnitzes were traceable to the fraudulent scheme. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' rulings. The court held that the knowledge of an agent (Nordlicht) is imputed to the principal (the Rechnitzes) under 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1), and thus, the Rechnitzes could not claim to be good faith transferees. The court also found that Nordlicht’s actions were within the scope of his authority as the Rechnitzes’ agent. Additionally, the court upheld the bankruptcy court’s tracing methodology, which assumed that tainted funds were used first, finding it appropriate under the circumstances. The court concluded that the Trustee could recover the $10.3 million from the Rechnitzes. View "Rechnitz v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

In this case, Randall C. Belyea was the sole shareholder and president of Belyea Enterprises, Inc. (BEI), which had a contract with FedEx. Due to a misdemeanor charge, FedEx refused to renew the contract with Belyea, leading him to transfer his interest in BEI to his fiancée, Heather A. Campbell, under the understanding that she would be the owner in name only while he continued to run the business. However, in 2018, Campbell terminated Belyea's employment and restricted his access to BEI's bank accounts.The Superior Court (Aroostook County) initially granted Campbell’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on Belyea’s conversion claim and later entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of Campbell on Belyea’s breach of contract claim, despite a jury verdict in Belyea’s favor. The court found that there was insufficient evidence of an enforceable contract between Belyea and Campbell, as the terms were too vague and indefinite.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the terms of the alleged contract between Belyea and Campbell were not sufficiently definite to form an enforceable contract. The terms did not clearly define the roles and obligations of each party, the duration of the contract, or the details regarding a possible reconveyance of BEI to Belyea. Consequently, the court also upheld the judgment in favor of Campbell on the conversion claim, as Belyea did not have a legal interest in BEI in 2018. View "Belyea v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Overwell Harvest, Ltd. invested millions in Neurensic, Inc., which soon faced severe financial difficulties. Neurensic's management, led by CEO David Widerhorn and COO Paul Giedraitis, sought to sell the company. Trading Technologies International, Inc. emerged as a potential buyer. Before the shareholders' vote on the sale, Overwell made a competing offer, prompting Trading Technologies to increase its offer, which Neurensic's board accepted. The shareholders approved the sale to Trading Technologies. Overwell then sued Trading Technologies, alleging it aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duties by Neurensic's management.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois rejected Overwell's jury demand, ruling that its aiding and abetting claim was equitable, despite seeking legal relief. After a bench trial, the court found in favor of Trading Technologies, concluding that Overwell failed to prove any fiduciary breaches by Widerhorn and Giedraitis that Trading Technologies could have aided and abetted. Overwell appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying a jury trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with Overwell that it had a right to a jury trial because it sought legal relief. However, the court found that the district court's error was harmless. The appellate court concluded that Trading Technologies would have been entitled to a directed verdict because Overwell failed to establish that Trading Technologies knowingly participated in any fiduciary breaches by Neurensic's management. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Overwell Harvest, Limited v. Trading Technologies International, Inc." on Justia Law

Ryan Cox filed a class action lawsuit alleging that the defendants manipulated the price of a cryptocurrency called HEX by artificially lowering its ranking on CoinMarketCap.com. The defendants include two domestic companies, a foreign company, and three individual officers of the foreign company. Cox claimed that the manipulation caused HEX to trade at lower prices, benefiting the defendants financially.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that Cox needed to show the defendants had sufficient contacts with Arizona before invoking the Commodity Exchange Act's nationwide service of process provision. The court found that none of the defendants had sufficient contacts with Arizona.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the Commodity Exchange Act authorizes nationwide service of process independent of its venue requirement. The court concluded that the district court had personal jurisdiction over the U.S. defendants, CoinMarketCap and Binance.US, because they had sufficient contacts with the United States. The court also found that Cox's claims against these defendants were colorable under the Commodity Exchange Act. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the claims against the U.S. defendants and remanded for further proceedings.However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims against the foreign defendants, Binance Capital and its officers, due to their lack of sufficient contacts with the United States. The court vacated the dismissal "with prejudice" and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint against the foreign defendants without prejudice. View "COX V. COINMARKETCAP OPCO, LLC" on Justia Law

Robert Allen Stanford operated a billion-dollar Ponzi scheme through various entities in Texas and Antigua. In 2009, a federal district court appointed an equity receiver (the "Receiver") to manage the assets of the Stanford entities, handle claims from defrauded investors, and pursue claims against third parties. This appeal concerns a settlement with Societe Generale Private Banking (Suisse) S.A. ("SGPB"), which included a bar order preventing future Stanford-related claims against the Swiss bank. Two individuals appointed by an Antiguan court to liquidate one of the Stanford entities argued that the bar order should not apply to their claims against SGPB.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas approved the settlement and issued the bar order. The Joint Liquidators objected, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. They filed their objection in a related Chapter 15 proceeding rather than the main SEC action, leading to a jurisdictional dispute. The district court held a hearing, during which it indicated that any participation by the Joint Liquidators' counsel would be considered a waiver of their jurisdictional objection. The court approved the settlement and entered the bar order, prompting the Joint Liquidators to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not have the necessary personal jurisdiction to bind the Joint Liquidators with its bar order. The court emphasized that injunctions require in personam jurisdiction, which the district court lacked over the Joint Liquidators. The court vacated the district court's scheduling order and the bar order as it applied to the Joint Liquidators, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Dickson v. Janvey" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin-based corporation, Uline, Inc., sells industrial and packaging products and employs sales representatives who visit customers in Minnesota. Uline did not pay Minnesota income or franchise taxes for 2014 and 2015, claiming exemption under 15 U.S.C. § 381, which protects certain out-of-state business activities from state taxation. The Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue audited Uline and assessed taxes for those years, arguing that Uline's activities in Minnesota went beyond mere solicitation of orders.The Minnesota Tax Court upheld the tax assessment, finding that Uline's sales representatives engaged in activities beyond solicitation, specifically the preparation of "Market News Notes," which included detailed market research and competitor information. Uline appealed, arguing that these activities were either protected solicitation or de minimis and thus not subject to state taxation.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether Uline's activities created a sufficient nexus with Minnesota to justify the imposition of state taxes. The court found that the preparation of Market News Notes by Uline's sales team went beyond the solicitation of orders because it involved detailed market research that served independent business functions. The court also determined that these activities were not de minimis, as they were regular and systematic, with over 1,600 Market News Notes prepared during the two years in question.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the tax court's decision, holding that Uline's activities in Minnesota were not protected from state income or franchise taxation under 15 U.S.C. § 381 and were not de minimis. Therefore, Uline was subject to Minnesota state taxes for the years 2014 and 2015. View "Uline, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

Children’s Health Defense (CHD), a nonprofit organization, alleged that Meta Platforms, Inc. (Meta) censored its Facebook posts about vaccine safety and efficacy. CHD claimed that Meta’s actions were directed by the federal government, violating the First and Fifth Amendments. CHD also asserted violations of the Lanham Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Meta, Mark Zuckerberg, the Poynter Institute, and Science Feedback were named as defendants.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed CHD’s complaint. The court found that CHD failed to establish that Meta’s actions constituted state action, a necessary element for First Amendment claims. The court also dismissed the Lanham Act claim, ruling that Meta’s fact-checking labels did not constitute commercial advertising. Additionally, the court rejected the RICO claim, stating that CHD did not adequately allege a fraudulent scheme to obtain money or property.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that CHD did not meet the requirements to treat Meta as a state actor. The court found that Meta’s content moderation policies were independently developed and not compelled by federal law. CHD’s allegations of government coercion and joint action were deemed insufficient. The court also upheld the dismissal of the Lanham Act claim, concluding that Meta’s fact-checking labels were not commercial speech. The RICO claim was dismissed due to a lack of proximate cause between the alleged fraud and CHD’s injury.Judge Collins partially dissented, arguing that CHD could plausibly allege a First Amendment claim for injunctive relief against Meta. However, he agreed with the dismissal of the other claims. The Ninth Circuit’s decision affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Meta. View "Children's Health Defense v. Meta Platforms, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-investors brought a securities fraud class action against Atieva, Inc., d/b/a Lucid Motors, and its CEO, Peter Rawlinson. They alleged that Rawlinson made misrepresentations about Lucid's production capabilities, which affected the stock price of Churchill Capital Corp. IV (CCIV), a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) in which the plaintiffs were shareholders. These misrepresentations were made before Lucid was acquired by CCIV. Plaintiffs purchased CCIV stock based on these statements but did not own any Lucid stock, as Lucid was privately held at the time.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California initially held that the plaintiffs had statutory standing but dismissed the action for failure to allege a material misrepresentation. The court allowed plaintiffs to amend their complaint, but ultimately denied the amendments as futile and dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged materiality.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal on an alternative ground. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, following the Birnbaum Rule, which limits standing to purchasers or sellers of the stock in question. The court agreed with the Second Circuit's precedent in Menora Mivtachim Ins. Ltd. v. Frutarom Indus. Ltd., holding that purchasers of a security of an acquiring company (CCIV) do not have standing to sue the target company (Lucid) for alleged misstatements made prior to the merger. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing. View "MAX ROYAL LLC V. ATIEVA, INC." on Justia Law

A nonprofit entity, Sports Medicine Research and Testing Laboratory (Sports Medicine), sought a property tax exemption for its South Jordan facility, claiming it was used exclusively for charitable purposes. Sports Medicine performs testing for both professional sports organizations at market rates and for government agencies and charitable organizations at discounted or no cost. It argued that the revenue from market-rate testing supports its charitable mission and that its vacant property space is intended for future charitable use.The Salt Lake County Board of Equalization denied the exemption, stating the property was not used exclusively for charitable purposes. Sports Medicine appealed to the Utah State Tax Commission, which affirmed the Board's decision. Sports Medicine then sought judicial review from the Utah Supreme Court.The Utah Supreme Court held that the property did not qualify for a tax exemption. The court reasoned that while Sports Medicine's discounted testing for charitable organizations could be considered a charitable use, its market-rate testing for professional sports organizations was not. The court emphasized that generating profit, even if used to support a charitable mission, does not constitute a charitable use of property. Additionally, the court found that the vacant portion of the property, intended for future charitable use, did not meet the requirement for current exclusive charitable use. Consequently, the court upheld the Tax Commission's denial of the property tax exemption. View "Sports Medicine Research v. Tax Commission" on Justia Law