Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves 360 Virtual Drone Services LLC and its owner, Michael Jones, who sought to provide customers with aerial maps and 3D digital models containing measurable data. However, the North Carolina Board of Examiners for Engineers and Surveyors argued that doing so would constitute engaging in the practice of land surveying without a license, in violation of the North Carolina Engineering and Land Surveying Act. Jones and his company sued the Board, arguing that the restriction on their ability to offer these services without first obtaining a surveyor’s license violates their First Amendment rights.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The court concluded that Jones had standing to challenge the statute based on his desire to create “two-dimensional and three-dimensional maps with geospatial data.” It also concluded that the Engineering and Land Surveying Act implicated the First Amendment. However, it found that the Act constituted “a generally applicable licensing regime that restricts the practice of surveying to those licensed” and primarily regulated conduct rather than speech, such that intermediate scrutiny applied. Finally, the court concluded that the Act survived intermediate scrutiny.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the Act, as applied to the plaintiffs, was a regulation of professional conduct that only incidentally impacts speech. Therefore, it applied a more relaxed form of intermediate scrutiny that mandates only that the restriction be “sufficiently drawn” to protect a substantial state interest. The court found that the Act met this standard and therefore did not violate the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. View "360 Virtual Drone Services LLC v. Ritter" on Justia Law

The case involves Nano Dimension Ltd., an Israeli 3D printing and manufacturing company, and several defendants including Murchinson Ltd. and Anson Advisors Inc. Nano alleged that the defendants violated Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by failing to disclose that they acted as a group when acquiring more than five percent of Nano’s American Depository Shares (ADSs). As a remedy, Nano sought an order directing the defendants to disclose their alleged group status on amended Schedule 13Ds and an injunction prohibiting them from acquiring additional ADSs or voting their existing ADSs pending completion of the amended filings.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Nano's claims as moot. The court found that the defendants had cured the alleged Section 13(d) violations by amending their Schedule 13D filings to disclose Nano’s allegations and their position that the allegations were without merit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the defendants' amended filings satisfied Section 13(d)’s disclosure requirements. The court also rejected Nano's argument that it was entitled to retroactive injunctive relief, noting that such relief is not available under Section 13(d) when corrective disclosures have been made and the vote in question did not effect a change in control over the issuer. View "Nano Dimension Ltd. v. Murchinson Ltd." on Justia Law

A Lyft driver, Abdu Lkader Al Shikha, was attacked by a passenger who had a criminal record. Al Shikha sued Lyft for negligence, arguing that the company should conduct criminal background checks on all passengers, not just drivers. The trial court granted Lyft's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Lyft had no legal duty to conduct background checks on passengers.Al Shikha appealed, but the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Three affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found that Al Shikha failed to establish that Lyft's legal duty to its drivers extends to conducting criminal background checks on all riders. The court reasoned that such a duty would be highly burdensome and would not necessarily prevent violent attacks on drivers. The court also noted that the foreseeability of a passenger attacking a driver was not sufficiently high to warrant imposing this duty on Lyft.The court further noted that imposing a duty on Lyft to conduct criminal background checks on all passengers would raise significant concerns about consumer privacy and the potential for discrimination. The court concluded that Al Shikha's complaint failed to allege facts demonstrating that the type of harm he suffered was highly foreseeable, or that the failure to conduct criminal background checks on all passengers is sufficiently likely to result in a violent, unprovoked attack on a driver. View "Shikha v. Lyft, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Jacam Chemical Company 2013, LLC (Jacam) and its competitor GeoChemicals, LLC, along with Arthur Shepard Jr., a former Jacam employee who later worked for GeoChemicals. Jacam sued both Shepard and GeoChemicals, alleging breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, and tortious interference with contracts. Shepard and GeoChemicals countersued Jacam. The district court granted a declaratory judgment to Shepard, concluding that he owed no contractual obligations to Jacam, and dismissed the remaining claims of Jacam and GeoChemicals.The district court had previously reviewed the case and granted summary judgment to Shepard, holding that he had no enforceable agreements with Jacam. The court also dismissed all of Jacam’s and GeoChemicals’s other claims against each other. Both Jacam and GeoChemicals appealed aspects of the summary judgment order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that neither the HCS Agreement nor the 2015 version of CES’s Conduct Code created an enforceable contract between Jacam and Shepard. The court also held that Jacam did not make reasonable efforts to keep its pricing information secret, which means the pricing information documents were not trade secrets which Shepard could misappropriate. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that Jacam’s tortious-interference claim fails. The court also dismissed GeoChemicals’s cross-appeal, holding that Jacam did not commit an independently tortious act that interfered with GeoChemicals’s relationship with Continental. View "Jacam Chemical Co. 2013, LLC v. Shepard" on Justia Law

An elderly woman, Janice Geerdes, and her long-time friend, Albert Gomez Cruz, had a partnership raising hogs on a piece of land. Initially, Janice deeded half of her interest in the land to Albert. Over a decade later, she deeded the rest of her interest in the land to Albert, receiving nothing in return. About six months later, Janice’s adult daughters were appointed her conservator and guardian. The conservator challenged the validity of the quitclaim deed based on undue influence and lack of capacity.The district court set aside the deed, finding that there was undue influence through a confidential relationship and that Janice lacked the necessary capacity to deed her interest in the land. The court of appeals affirmed the decision on the basis of lack of capacity.The Supreme Court of Iowa, however, disagreed with the lower courts. The Supreme Court found that the conservator did not establish by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence that there was undue influence or that Janice lacked capacity at the time of the gift. The court found that the lower courts gave too much weight to the perceived improvidence of the transaction and too little weight to the testimony of the third-party accountant who witnessed the transaction. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the district court judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Conservatorship of Janice Geerdes v. Cruz" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, John Svensen wrote a check to Jeff Hester's company, Ginesis, for several thousand bottles of hand sanitizer. The check bounced, leading Ginesis to sue Svensen and his company, Marketpointe, for the owed money. After a series of legal proceedings, Hester pressed charges against Svensen for the bad check, resulting in Svensen's arrest. The Lauderdale Circuit Court later dismissed the criminal complaint due to the statute of limitations, and Svensen subsequently sued Hester for malicious prosecution.The Lauderdale Circuit Court initially entered a default judgment against Svensen and Marketpointe for failing to answer Ginesis's complaint. After Svensen successfully vacated the default judgment, the court set a bench trial. However, Svensen did not appear, leading to another default judgment against him. After Svensen provided an excuse, the court vacated the default judgment and reset the trial. Meanwhile, Hester, on the advice of his attorney, took the bounced check to the Lauderdale County Sheriff's Department, leading to Svensen's arrest.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of Hester. The court found that Hester had probable cause to believe that Svensen had committed the crime of negotiating a worthless negotiable instrument, as it is a crime in Alabama to knowingly write someone a bad check. The court rejected Svensen's argument that Hester lacked probable cause because the one-year statute of limitations for misdemeanor offenses had expired. The court reasoned that the expiration of the limitations period does not affect whether the defendant actually committed the offense charged. View "Svensen v. Hester" on Justia Law

The case involves Leah Lorch, who filed a peremptory challenge against Judge Timothy B. Taylor, who was newly assigned to preside over her trial. Lorch's challenge was denied by Judge Taylor, who ruled that the challenge was untimely under the master calendar rule. This rule requires a party to file a challenge to the judge supervising the master calendar not later than the time the cause is assigned for trial. After the denial of the challenge, Judge Taylor proceeded with a two-day jury trial, which resulted in a defense verdict and judgment in favor of the defendant, Kia Motors America, Inc. Lorch then filed a petition within the statutory 10-day period, arguing that her challenge was timely because it was filed before the trial started.The trial court denied Lorch's peremptory challenge, ruling that it was untimely under the master calendar rule. The court also refused to stay the trial, and Judge Taylor immediately began a two-day jury trial, which resulted in a defense verdict and judgment in favor of Kia Motors America, Inc. Lorch then filed a petition within the statutory 10-day period, arguing that her challenge was timely because it was filed before the trial started.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, held that Lorch's section 170.6 challenge was timely filed before the commencement of the trial and rejected Kia's laches argument. The court also concluded that the Superior Court of San Diego County's local rule, which purports to provide any superior court judge with the power to act as a master calendar department for purposes of assigning cases for trial, is inconsistent with section 170.6 and case law interpreting the statute. The court granted the petition with directions to vacate the void orders and judgment entered by Judge Taylor after denying the peremptory challenge. View "Lorch v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves Gerald Forsythe, who filed a class action lawsuit against Teva Pharmaceuticals Industries Ltd. and several of its officers. Forsythe claimed that he and others who purchased or acquired Teva securities between October 29, 2015, and August 18, 2020, suffered damages due to misstatements and omissions by Teva and its officers related to Copaxone, a drug used to treat multiple sclerosis. Teva's shares are dual listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.The District Court granted Forsythe's motion for class certification, rejecting Teva's assertion that the class definition should exclude purchasers of ordinary shares. The Court also rejected Teva's argument that Forsythe could not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.Teva sought permission to appeal the District Court’s Order granting class certification, arguing that interlocutory review is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). Teva contended that the Petition presents a novel legal issue and that the District Court erred in its predominance analysis with respect to Forsythe’s proposed class-wide damages methodology.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied Teva's petition for permission to appeal. The court found that the securities issue did not directly relate to the requirements for class certification, and agreed with the District Court’s predominance analysis. The court also clarified that permission to appeal should be granted where the certification decision itself under Rule 23(a) and (b) turns on a novel or unsettled question of law, not simply where the merits of a particular case may turn on such a question. View "Forsythe v. Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd" on Justia Law

A group of online travel companies (OTCs), including Hotels.com, Expedia, and Priceline, were found liable by the Jefferson County Circuit Court for unpaid taxes under several Arkansas tax statutes. The court ordered the OTCs to pay the unpaid taxes, along with penalties, interest, and attorney's fees. The OTCs appealed, arguing that the court erred in imposing the taxes and awarding penalties.The case began in 2009 when the Pine Bluff Advertising and Promotion Commission and Jefferson County, Arkansas, filed a declaratory-judgment action against the OTCs, seeking a declaration that the OTCs were liable for local gross receipts tax and local tourism tax. The City of North Little Rock intervened in the case in 2011, alleging a similar claim. The circuit court granted class certification in 2013. In 2018, the circuit court denied the OTCs' motion for summary judgment and granted the class appellees' motion, finding that the OTCs were liable for the taxes.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that the OTCs were not entities subject to the pre-2019 versions of the state and local gross receipts tax and the state tourism tax. The court also found that the OTCs did not rent, lease, or furnish rooms under the plain meaning of the local tourism tax statute. Therefore, the court held that the OTCs were not liable for the pre-2019 hotel taxes. The court did not address the OTCs' remaining arguments for reversal. View "HOTELS.COM, L.P. V. PINE BLUFF ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION COMMISSION" on Justia Law

The case involves Creative Games Studio LLC and Ricardo Bach Cater, who sued Daniel Alves for alleged breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, constructive fraud, and deceit. The plaintiffs, who are co-founders of Creative Games Studio, a company that develops board games for online sale, accused Alves of collaborating with a competitor and using the company's funds and intellectual property for the competitor's benefit. Alves, a Brazilian citizen, was also a co-founder of the company. The plaintiffs filed the lawsuit in Montana, where the company is based.The District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, dismissed the case due to lack of personal jurisdiction over Alves. The court determined that exercising jurisdiction over Alves would not comply with constitutional requirements. Alves had moved to dismiss the complaint under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction or under the doctrine of forum non-conveniens.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Alves did not consent to jurisdiction and that subjecting him to the jurisdiction of Montana courts would not comply with due process. The court noted that Alves' only connection to Montana was the fact that one of the plaintiffs resided there and established the company in the state. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to show that Alves either availed himself of the privileges of Montana law or that their claims arose out of Alves's actions in Montana. View "Creative Games v Alves" on Justia Law