Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Timothy Morales, who was injured when he was hit by a vehicle driven by Ruby Junewal within the Weatherford Distribution Facility in Williston. Morales filed a lawsuit alleging negligence against Weatherford U.S., L.P., Junewal, and Junewal's employer, Wilhoit Properties, Inc. He also claimed that Weatherford was negligent for failing to install proper lighting, road signs, or sidewalks near the road.The District Court of Williams County dismissed Morales's claims against Wilhoit with prejudice after the parties did not oppose Wilhoit’s motion for summary judgment. Later, Weatherford moved for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no duty to Morales because he was aware of the obvious danger posed by vehicles on the roadway. The district court granted Weatherford’s motion, and Morales appealed.Meanwhile, Junewal notified the court that she and Morales had reached a settlement. However, no concluding documents were filed. The district court then entered an order for judgment under its order granting Weatherford summary judgment. Morales appealed again, but the Supreme Court of North Dakota dismissed his appeal because claims against Junewal remained pending in the district court.In the Supreme Court of North Dakota, the court concluded that the district court misapplied the law when it treated Morales’s request as a Rule 60(b) motion and held it “no longer has jurisdiction.” The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order denying Morales's request and remanded the case with instructions for the district court to enter a single final judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities within twenty days from the filing of the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Morales v. Weatherford U.S., L.P." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between J.C. Penney Corporation, Inc. and Oxford Mall, LLC. Oxford Mall purchased a shopping center in a 2017 foreclosure sale and began a significant redevelopment plan. J.C. Penney, a tenant at the mall since 1968, had a lease that included the right to approve certain changes to the mall’s site plan. When J.C. Penney sought to exercise one of its remaining contractual options, Oxford denied the request, claiming that J.C. Penney was out of extension options. This led to a lawsuit filed by J.C. Penney in 2019, invoking the district court’s diversity jurisdiction.The case proceeded for two years under the assumption that diversity jurisdiction existed. However, in 2020, Oxford discovered that it was a citizen of Delaware, the same as J.C. Penney, which destroyed the court’s diversity jurisdiction. Despite this, Oxford continued to litigate in federal court and did not inform the court of the lack of jurisdiction until April 2021, after several unfavorable rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to impose sanctions on Oxford Mall, LLC for its bad faith conduct. The court found that Oxford had actual knowledge that it was a citizen of Delaware, which destroyed the court’s diversity jurisdiction, and that Oxford's delay in disclosing the lack of diversity jurisdiction was strategic. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of fees owed to J.C. Penney and in refusing to consider an irrelevant and untimely affidavit from Oxford's attorney. View "J.C. Penney Corporation, Inc. v. Oxford Mall, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Symons Emergency Specialties (Symons), a provider of ambulance services, and the City of Riverside. The City regulates ambulance services within its limits under the Riverside Municipal Code (RMC), which requires operators to obtain a valid franchise or permit. Symons filed a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City, arguing that the RMC section requiring a permit is invalid under the Emergency Medical Services System and Prehospital Emergency Medical Care Act (EMS Act). The dispute centered on whether the City had regulated nonemergency ambulance services as of June 1, 1980, which would allow it to continue doing so under the EMS Act's grandfathering provisions.The trial court found in favor of the City, concluding that Symons had failed to meet its burden of proof. Symons appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting certain testimonies, that the court's factual finding was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the RMC section violated federal anti-trust law.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found no error in the admission of testimonies, concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings, and rejected Symons's anti-trust argument. The court held that the City's regulation of ambulance services did not violate the EMS Act or federal anti-trust law. View "Symons Emergency Specialties v. City of Riverside" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of pension funds (plaintiffs) who filed a lawsuit against Inovalon Holdings, Inc., and its board of directors (defendants), challenging an acquisition of Inovalon by a private equity consortium led by Nordic Capital. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties and unjustly enriched themselves through the transaction. They also alleged that the company's charter was violated because the transaction treated Class A and Class B stockholders unequally.In the lower court, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, the defendants moved to dismiss the case. They argued that the transaction satisfied the elements of a legal framework known as MFW, which would subject the board's actions to business judgment review. The Court of Chancery granted the defendants' motions to dismiss in full.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed the decision of the Court of Chancery. The Supreme Court found that the lower court erred in holding that the vote of the minority stockholders was adequately informed. The Supreme Court determined that the proxy statement issued to stockholders failed to adequately disclose certain conflicts of interest of the Special Committee’s advisors. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the transaction did not comply with the MFW framework, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Sarasota Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Inovalon Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between BMC Software, Inc. (BMC) and International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) over a Master Licensing Agreement (MLA) and an Outsourcing Attachment. BMC, a software company, and IBM, an information technology company, directly compete in developing and selling mainframe software. However, IBM also provides necessary outsourcing services to BMC and its customers, including AT&T. In 2008, IBM and BMC entered into an MLA and an Outsourcing Attachment, which were amended in 2013 and 2015. The dispute centers around the 2015 amendment, particularly three provisions that govern IBM's use of BMC's software.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court awarded summary judgment to IBM on the claim for breach of Section 1.1 of the 2015 amendment, but denied IBM's motion for summary judgment on BMC’s Section 5.1 breach-of-contract claim. The court concluded that Section 5.4 of the 2015 amendment unambiguously prevented IBM from “displacing” BMC products with IBM software. The court granted partial summary judgment to BMC because IBM “displaced BMC Customer Licenses with IBM products when it implemented Project Swallowtail at AT&T.” After a bench trial, the district court awarded BMC approximately $1.6 billion in damages.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The appellate court disagreed with the district court's interpretation of Section 5.4 of the 2015 amendment. The court held that “other valid business reasons” under Section 5.4 supported IBM’s service in effecting AT&T’s switchover, which partially included IBM software. The court concluded that IBM did not breach Section 5.4 by agreeing to provide IT services to perform this task. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was reversed. View "BMC Software v. IBM" on Justia Law

This case involves a dozen gas stations in the Green Bay, Wisconsin area, who alleged that Costco Wholesale Corporation violated a Wisconsin law prohibiting the sale of gasoline below a statutorily defined cost. The plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent Costco from selling gasoline below that level and damages of over half a million dollars each. Costco argued that it lowered its prices to match a competitor's price, which the statute allows, and that the plaintiffs failed to establish the causal element of the statutory claim.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which sided with Costco and awarded it summary judgment. The plaintiffs appealed this decision, challenging both the summary judgment and an evidentiary ruling made earlier in the proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that for 238 of the 256 days in question, Costco was immune from liability under the "meeting competition" exception in the Wisconsin law. For the remaining 18 days, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that they were injured or threatened with injury as a result of Costco's actions. The court also upheld the lower court's denial of the plaintiffs' request to supplement their expert report. View "Pit Row, Inc. v. Costco Wholesale Corporation" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a shareholder of Meta Platforms, Inc., sued the company's directors, officers, and controller, alleging that they breached their fiduciary duties by managing the company to generate firm-specific value at the expense of the economy as a whole. The plaintiff argued that under Delaware law, directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its stockholders as diversified equity investors, not just as investors in the specific corporation. The plaintiff proposed that Delaware law should change to adopt a diversified-investor model, particularly for systemically significant corporations.The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that they manage Meta under a firm-specific model, as required by Delaware law. The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware granted the defendants' motion, holding that directors owe firm-specific fiduciary duties. The court found that the plaintiff's argument was not supported by Delaware law, which contemplates a single-firm model where directors owe duties to the stockholders as investors in that specific corporation. The court also rejected the plaintiff's proposal to change Delaware law to adopt a diversified-investor model. The court concluded that the plaintiff had not made a persuasive case for such a change and dismissed the complaint. View "McRitchie v. Zuckerberg" on Justia Law

This case involves Commerzbank AG, a German bank, and U.S. Bank, N.A., an American bank. Commerzbank sued U.S. Bank, alleging that it had failed to fulfill its duties as a trustee for residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) that Commerzbank had purchased. The case revolved around three main issues: whether Commerzbank could bring claims related to trusts with "No Action Clauses"; whether Commerzbank's claims related to certificates held through German entities were timely; and whether Commerzbank could bring claims related to certificates it had sold to third parties.The district court had previously dismissed Commerzbank's claims related to trusts with No Action Clauses, granted judgment in favor of U.S. Bank on the timeliness of Commerzbank's claims related to the German certificates, and denied Commerzbank's claims related to the sold certificates. Commerzbank appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions on the timeliness of the German certificate claims and the denial of the sold certificate claims. However, it vacated the district court's dismissal of Commerzbank's claims related to trusts with No Action Clauses and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court found that Commerzbank's failure to make pre-suit demands on parties other than trustees could be excused in certain circumstances where these parties are sufficiently conflicted. View "Commerzbank AG v. U.S. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The case involves a technology company, Root Inc., which sought to disrupt the traditional car insurance market. The plaintiff, Plumber’s Local 290 Pension Trust Fund, invested in Root around the time of its initial public offering (IPO). The plaintiff alleged that Root made misleading statements about its customer acquisition cost (CAC), a key performance metric. Root's CAC was lower than traditional car insurance companies, giving it a competitive advantage. However, the plaintiff claimed that Root's CAC increased after its IPO, ending its competitive advantage. The plaintiff argued that Root had a duty to update investors about its CAC because it was higher than its historical average at the time of the IPO.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, which dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim for relief. The court found that the statements made by Root were not actionable because they were based on past performance or historical data, and were not false or misleading.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiff's claims sounded in fraud and thus were subject to the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b). The court also found that Root's statements about its CAC were not misleading. Two of the statements were protected as statements of past or historical performance, and the third was protected by the "Bespeaks Caution" doctrine, which shields companies from liability when they make forward-looking statements accompanied by meaningful cautionary language. The court concluded that Root had no duty to update its CAC because the statements were about past performance and did not predict the future. View "Kolominsky v. Root, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed a lower court's decision that the Copper River Native Association (CRNA), a non-profit corporation formed by federally recognized Alaska Native tribes, is an arm of its member tribes and thus entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. The case arose when a former employee sued CRNA over her termination. The superior court dismissed her complaint, concluding that CRNA was an arm of its member tribes and therefore entitled to sovereign immunity. The former employee appealed, arguing that CRNA was not entitled to tribal immunity. The Supreme Court of Alaska agreed with CRNA that the legal landscape defining the contours of tribal sovereign immunity has shifted significantly since its 2004 decision in Runyon ex rel. B.R. v. Association of Village Council Presidents. The court adopted a multi-factor inquiry to determine whether an entity is entitled to “arm-of-the-tribe” immunity. Applying this multi-factor inquiry, the court concluded that CRNA is an arm of its member tribes and affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Ito v. Copper River Native Association" on Justia Law