Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a group of plaintiffs who claimed that the defendant, Bank of America, fraudulently denied them mortgage modifications under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) and then foreclosed on their homes. The plaintiffs filed their complaint in May 2018 and their amended complaint in March 2019, alleging claims based on common law fraud, fraudulent concealment, intentional misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, conversion, unjust enrichment, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and, in the alternative, negligence.However, the Supreme Court of North Carolina found that the plaintiffs' claims were time-barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The court held that the statutes of limitations for all of plaintiffs’ claims, except for their unfair and deceptive trade practices claim, started to run at the latest by the date that each plaintiff lost his or her home. Each plaintiff lost his or her home sometime between April 2011 and January 2014. Thus, the latest point in time any plaintiff could have filed a complaint was January 2017, or in the case of an unfair and deceptive trade practices claim, January 2018. Plaintiffs did not file their original complaint until May 2018. Therefore, their claims are time-barred.The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations for their fraud claims beyond the dates of their foreclosures. The court found that the plaintiffs were on notice of the defendant's alleged fraud by the time they lost their homes, and they should have investigated further. The court therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint. View "Taylor v. Bank of America, N.A" on Justia Law

The case before the Supreme Court of North Carolina involved a dispute between The Society for the Historical Preservation of the Twentysixth North Carolina Troops, Inc. (plaintiff) and the City of Asheville (defendant). The controversy centered around a monument dedicated to Zebulon Vance, a former North Carolina Governor and Confederate Colonel. The plaintiff, a nonprofit historical preservation organization, raised funds to restore the monument and entered into a donation agreement with the City, whereby the monument was restored and then donated to the City. However, the City later decided to remove the monument, citing it as a public safety threat due to vandalism and threats of toppling.In response, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the City, alleging that the City breached the 2015 donation agreement and seeking a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and a declaratory judgment. The plaintiff argued that both parties had entered into a contract with the intent to preserve the monument in perpetuity. The City filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The trial court granted the City's motion, and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.When the case reached the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the court reversed the Court of Appeals’ determination that the plaintiff's breach of contract claim should be dismissed for lack of standing. However, the court noted that the plaintiff had abandoned the merits of its breach of contract claim in its appeal. As such, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and declaratory judgment for lack of standing. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to assert any ground for which it has standing to contest the removal of the monument. View "Soc'y for the Hist. Pres. of the Twenty-sixth N.C. Troops, Inc. v. City of Asheville" on Justia Law

This case was brought before the Supreme Court of North Carolina to determine whether a person who files a motion to claim exempt property after a judgment is entered makes a general appearance in the action and thereby waives objections to the sufficiency of service of process and personal jurisdiction.The plaintiff, John Slattery, alleged that he was induced to invest $500,000 in a sham technology company, Appy City, by defendants Timothy Fields and Melissa Crete. Later, he named additional defendants, including Daisy Mae Barber, alleging they conspired to hide the invested funds by converting them into cryptocurrency. The Business Court entered default judgment against all defendants, including Barber, when they failed to respond to the complaint. Barber first appeared in the case when she filed a motion to claim exempt property. Later, she moved to set aside the entries of default and summary judgment, arguing the Business Court’s judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction as she had not been served with process nor appeared in the action before the entry of summary judgment.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that when a defendant makes a general appearance in an action after the entry of a judgment, she waives any objections to the lack of personal jurisdiction or the sufficiency of service of process if she does not raise those objections at that time. Therefore, Barber, by filing a motion to claim exempt property, made a general appearance in the underlying action and did not raise her objections to personal jurisdiction or the sufficiency of service of process until over three months later. As a result, she waived these objections, and the Business Court’s judgment may be enforced. The decision of the Business Court was affirmed. View "Slattery v. Appy City, LLC" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was tasked with evaluating a previous decision by the Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) regarding cost allocation between the United States Postal Service's (USPS) market-dominant and competitive products. United Parcel Service (UPS), a competitor of the USPS, challenged the PRC's formula for allocating institutional costs.The USPS offers both market-dominant products, like standard mail (where it holds a near-monopoly), and competitive products, like package delivery (where it competes with private companies like UPS). The PRC's task is to ensure that the USPS's competitive products cover an "appropriate share" of institutional costs. In 2020, the court had remanded the PRC's Order that adopted a formula for this "appropriate share", and asked the PRC to better explain its reasoning.On remand, the PRC revised its analysis but maintained the same formula. The court of appeals concluded that the PRC had adequately addressed the previous issues identified and reasonably exercised its statutory discretion in adopting the formula. Consequently, UPS's petition for review was denied.The court found that the PRC's interpretation of the distinction between costs attributable to competitive products and costs uniquely or disproportionately associated with competitive products was reasonable. It also found the PRC's decision to not include attributable costs directly in the appropriate share to be reasonable, to avoid double-counting. The court rejected UPS's claim that the PRC was required to allocate all of the USPS's institutional costs between market-dominant and competitive products, and it also found that the PRC had adequately considered competitive products' market conditions. Lastly, the court upheld the PRC's proposed formula for setting the appropriate share. View "United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Postal Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The dispute involves a disagreement between two brothers, Brian and William "Bill" Bento, over the distribution of the assets and liabilities of their joint business, Bento Construction, LLC, following its dissolution. Brian filed a complaint seeking judicial dissociation of Bill as a member of the company, its dissolution, and a declaration of each party's rights and interests in the company. Bill countered, seeking damages and the dissolution of the company. An agreement led to an order that dissolved the company and dissociated Bill as a member.The order assigned contracts for performance of work by Bento Construction to Brian's new company, Brian Bento Construction, LLC. It also tasked the parties with winding down the company's operations. Despite the dissolution, the company continued to operate for the limited purpose of winding up its affairs. The company had several unsettled obligations, based on projects contracted before the dissolution date, and was also involved in several pending lawsuits regarding disputed invoices.The trial court issued an order distributing personal property and accounts in possession of each brother to the respective brother. It also made Brian responsible for all debts and obligations of Bento Construction. However, the order did not address the company's incomplete projects or the ongoing lawsuits. Both brothers appealed the trial court's order.The Supreme Court of Alabama found that the trial court's order was not a final judgment as it did not conclusively determine all the matters presented regarding the distribution of the company's assets. It did not discuss or attempt to allocate any portion of the revenues that may arise from the incomplete projects or the lawsuits. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeals. View "Bento v. Bento" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the District Court in favor of the City of Des Moines, in a case brought by Lime Lounge, LLC. Lime Lounge, a bar, challenged a city ordinance requiring it to obtain a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate. After receiving noise complaints, the City revoked Lime Lounge's CUP, which was upheld in a prior appeal. Lime Lounge then challenged the ordinance arguing it was preempted by Iowa Code, violated equal protection and spot zoning prohibitions. The trial court dismissed Lime Lounge's claims and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.The Supreme Court of Iowa found that the city's ordinance was not preempted by state law. Rather, it was a proper exercise of the city's zoning authority and did not create a separate local alcohol license. The Court also rejected Lime Lounge's equal protection claim, holding that the city had a legitimate purpose in imposing a CUP on specific businesses selling alcohol. Finally, the Court dismissed the claim of illegal spot zoning, as Lime Lounge failed to prove that the city had engaged in such activity. The Court thus affirmed the dismissal of Lime Lounge's challenge to the ordinance. View "Lime Lounge, Inc. v. City of Des Moines, Iowa" on Justia Law

The case involves a petition by Inhance Technologies, L.L.C. against orders issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Inhance, a company that has been fluorinating plastic containers since 1983, was charged by the EPA for violating a Significant New Use Rule regarding long-chain perfluoroalkyls (PFAS) due to the presence of PFAS in an insecticide stored in a container fluorinated by Inhance. PFAS are long-lasting chemicals found in various products and have been linked to several health issues. The EPA issued two orders under Section 5 of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), prohibiting Inhance from manufacturing or processing PFAS during its fluorination process. Inhance claimed that if the orders were enforced, they would shutdown their fluorination process and bankrupt the company.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of Inhance, stating that the EPA exceeded its statutory authority by issuing the orders. The court held that Inhance's decades-old fluorination process could not be deemed a "significant new use" under Section 5 of TSCA. The court vacated the EPA's orders and noted that the EPA could regulate Inhance's fluorination process under Section 6 of TSCA, which requires a cost-benefit analysis for ongoing uses. The court's ruling was based on the interpretation of the term "new" in TSCA, the statutory framework, and the requirement for agencies to provide fair notice of their rules. View "Inhance Technologies v. EPA" on Justia Law

In a divorce case, the Supreme Court of Nevada was asked to consider whether a law firm, established by one spouse before the marriage and incorporated under a different name during the marriage, constitutes that spouse’s separate property. Robert Draskovich, a practicing criminal lawyer since 1997, married Laurinda Draskovich in 2012, at which point he had a 65% ownership stake in a firm. In 2018, that firm dissolved, and Robert incorporated the Draskovich Law Group (DLG) as his wholly owned corporation.During their divorce proceedings in 2022, DLG was the primary asset in dispute. The district court concluded that DLG was community property, based on the fact that DLG was incorporated during the marriage. The district court also rejected Laurinda’s request for alimony, in part because it determined that the share of community assets distributed to Laurinda would provide sufficient support through passive income.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the district court erred in determining that the law firm was entirely community property. The court found that the law firm was a continuation of the spouse’s original, separate property law practice, and thus, the presumption of community property does not properly apply. Therefore, the Court reversed the portion of the divorce decree pertaining to the DLG interests and remanded for further proceedings. The Court also vacated the district court’s alimony determination to be reconsidered in light of the changed circumstances surrounding DLG. View "Draskovich v. Draskovich" on Justia Law

The case involved a lawsuit against Meta Platforms, Inc. (formerly known as Facebook) by a class of advertisers who claimed that Meta misrepresented the "Potential Reach" of advertisements on its platforms. The plaintiffs alleged that Meta falsely claimed that Potential Reach was an estimate of people, when in fact, it was an estimate of accounts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order certifying one class of advertisers (the damages class) who sought compensation for fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment. The court stated that the misrepresentation was a common issue for the class and that the district court properly determined that the element of justifiable reliance was capable of classwide resolution.However, the court vacated the district court's order certifying another class of advertisers (the injunction class) who sought injunctive relief. The court asked the lower court to reconsider whether the named plaintiff, Cain Maxwell, had Article III standing to seek an injunction. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "DZ Reserve v. Meta Platforms, Inc." on Justia Law

The case pertains to a dispute between the Department of Finance of the City of New York and Brookdale Physicians' Dialysis Associates, Inc. over the revocation of a real property tax exemption. The property in question was owned by Samuel and Bertha Schulman Institute for Nursing and Rehabilitation Fund, Inc., a not-for-profit entity, and was leased to Brookdale Dialysis, a for-profit corporation. The Department of Finance retroactively revoked the property's tax-exempt status in 2013, citing the fact that the property had been leased to a for-profit entity.The Supreme Court initially annulled the Department's determination, arguing that it failed to consider whether Brookdale Dialysis' services were reasonably incidental to the exemption purpose. The Department of Finance reassessed the property for the 2014-2015 tax year and again revoked the exemption after finding that the income from the lease exceeded the expenses for the property. The decision to revoke the exemption was subsequently affirmed by the Appellate Division.However, the Court of Appeals reversed these decisions, holding that the property was not exempt under New York Real Property Tax Law § 420-a. The court noted that the law mandatorily exempts from taxation any real property owned by certain not-for-profit entities and used exclusively for beneficial purposes without financial gain. The law does not apply to property leased by a for-profit corporation. Therefore, the court concluded that the property in this case was not exempt under this law, and the Department of Finance's decision to revoke the exemption was justified. View "Matter of Brookdale Physicians' Dialysis Assoc., Inc. v Department of Fin. of the City of N.Y." on Justia Law