Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Francis M. Reynolds, who was convicted of three counts of obstruction of a United States Securities and Exchange Commission proceeding and one count of securities fraud. The District Court sentenced him to seven years of imprisonment plus three years of supervised release, ordered him to pay restitution to the victims of his fraud in the amount of $7,551,757, a special assessment of $400, and to forfeit $280,000 to the United States. Reynolds appealed his conviction, but he died while the appeal was pending.Reynolds was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. He appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. While the appeal was pending, Reynolds died. The government suggested that the court should either dismiss the appeal as moot or follow the practice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and dismiss the appeal as moot while instructing the District Court to add a notation in the record.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had to decide whether to apply the doctrine of abatement ab initio, which holds that when a criminal defendant dies during the pendency of a direct appeal from his conviction, his death abates not only the appeal but also all proceedings had in the prosecution from its inception. The court decided to apply the doctrine, aligning itself with other federal courts of appeals and its own past decisions. The court dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the District Court to vacate the convictions and dismiss the indictment. The court also instructed the District Court to vacate the orders of restitution and criminal forfeiture that were imposed in this case, as well as the special assessment. View "United States v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

A group of business associations, including the Fort Worth Chamber of Commerce, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Texas against the Consumer Protection Financial Bureau (CFPB). The plaintiffs challenged a new Final Rule issued by the CFPB regarding credit card late fees and sought a preliminary injunction against the rule. The plaintiffs requested expedited briefing and review due to the imminent effect of the rule and the substantial compliance it required.The district court, instead of ruling on the motion for a preliminary injunction, considered whether venue was appropriate in the Northern District of Texas and invited the CFPB to file a motion to transfer the case. The CFPB complied, and the district court granted its motion, transferring the case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs then petitioned for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by transferring the case while their appeal was pending and, alternatively, lacked jurisdiction to transfer the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs, stating that the district court acted without jurisdiction. The court explained that once a party properly appeals something a district court has done, in this case, the effective denial of a preliminary injunction, the district court has no jurisdiction to do anything that alters the case’s status. The court clarified that its decision was not about the correctness of the district court’s transfer order but rather about whether the court had jurisdiction to enter it. The court concluded that the district court did not have jurisdiction to transfer the case.The court granted the petition for mandamus, vacated the district court’s transfer order, and ordered the district court to reopen the case. The court also instructed the district court to notify the District of Columbia that its transfer was without jurisdiction and should be disregarded. View "In re: Chamber of Commerce" on Justia Law

The case involves shareholders of Genius Brands International, Inc., a children's entertainment company, who alleged that the company violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by making fraudulent statements and omissions. The shareholders claimed that Genius concealed its relationship with a stock promoter, PennyStocks.com, misrepresented its relationship with Arnold Schwarzenegger, exaggerated the frequency of its show Rainbow Rangers on Nickelodeon Jr., falsely suggested that Disney or Netflix would acquire Genius, and overstated its rights to the works of comic book author Stan Lee.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the shareholders' complaint, finding that they failed to adequately allege that Genius's representations were misleading or that they caused the shareholders' losses.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the shareholders adequately alleged that Genius's representations regarding PennyStocks were misleading and that they caused the shareholders' losses with respect to the Rainbow Rangers, Disney/Netflix, and Stan Lee claims. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the claim regarding Genius's relationship with Schwarzenegger, finding that the shareholders did not adequately allege loss causation. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Alavi v. Genius Brands International, Inc." on Justia Law

Tracey Murray and the Estate of Robert Murray filed a lawsuit against Miracorp, Inc., NTTS, Inc., Lane Goebel, and Shane Goebel, alleging both legal and equitable claims based on conduct that took place before 2012. The Murrays claimed that they were shareholders in Miracorp and that the company and its officers had breached fiduciary duties, committed fraud, and unjustly enriched themselves at the Murrays' expense. The Murrays also alleged that Miracorp had converted their property and misappropriated trade secrets.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Miracorp, ruling that the Murrays' claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The court found that the Murrays' injuries were reasonably ascertainable in 2011, and thus, the period for filing a lawsuit had expired. The Murrays appealed this decision.The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the Murrays' claims were time-barred because their injuries were reasonably ascertainable in 2011. The court held that the Murrays had waited too long to investigate and seek redress for their injuries.The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that the Murrays had a duty to reasonably investigate their suspicions in 2011. The court found that the Murrays did nothing to investigate their suspicions until 2016, which was unreasonable. As a result, the court ruled that the Murrays' claims were barred by the statute of limitations. View "Murray v. Miracorp, Inc." on Justia Law

The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated an investigation into potentially anti-competitive practices in the real estate industry by the National Association of Realtors (NAR). In November 2020, the DOJ and NAR reached a settlement, and the DOJ sent a letter to NAR stating that it had closed its investigation and that NAR was not required to respond to two outstanding investigative subpoenas. However, in July 2021, the DOJ withdrew the proposed consent judgment, reopened its investigation, and issued a new investigative subpoena. NAR petitioned the district court to set aside the subpoena, arguing that its issuance violated a promise made by the DOJ in the 2020 closing letter. The district court granted NAR’s petition, concluding that the new subpoena was barred by a validly executed settlement agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with the district court's decision. The court held that the plain language of the disputed 2020 letter permits the DOJ to reopen its investigation. The court noted that the closing of an investigation does not guarantee that the investigation would stay closed forever. The court also pointed out that NAR gained several benefits from the closing of the DOJ’s pending investigation in 2020, including relief from its obligation to respond to the two outstanding subpoenas. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "National Association of Realtors v. United States" on Justia Law

A group of individuals, including D&T Partners LLC and ACET Global LLC, alleged that Baymark Partners Management LLC and others attempted to steal the assets and trade secrets of their e-commerce company through shell entities, corrupt lending practices, and a fraudulent bankruptcy. The plaintiffs claimed that Baymark had purchased D&T's assets and then defaulted on its payment obligations. According to the plaintiffs, Baymark replaced the company's management, caused the company to default on its loan payments, and transferred the company's assets to another entity, Windspeed Trading LLC. The plaintiffs alleged that this scheme violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The district court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice, finding that the plaintiffs were unable to plead a pattern of racketeering activity, a necessary element of a RICO claim.The case was then taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The appellate court agreed with the district court, holding that while the complaint alleges coordinated theft, it does not constitute a "pattern" of racketeering conduct sufficient to state a RICO claim. This is because the alleged victims were limited in number, and the scope and nature of the scheme was finite and focused on a singular objective. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "D&T Partners v. Baymark Partners" on Justia Law

The case involves Century Aluminum Company and its subsidiaries (Century), and Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London (Lloyd's). Century uses river barges to transport alumina ore and other materials for its aluminum smelting operations. In 2017, the Army Corps of Engineers closed key locks on the Ohio River, causing Century to seek alternative transportation. Century filed a claim with Lloyd's, its maritime cargo insurance policy provider, for the unanticipated shipping expenses. While Lloyd's paid $1 million under the policy's Extra Expense Clause, it denied coverage for the rest of the claim.The case was first heard by the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. Century sought a declaration that its denied claims were covered by the insurance policy and requested damages for Lloyd's alleged breach of contract among other violations of Kentucky insurance law. Lloyd's sought summary judgment, arguing that the policy did not cover the claims. The district court sided with Lloyd's.The appeal was heard before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Century argued that the policy's All Risks Clause, Risks Covered Clause, Shipping Expenses Clause, and Sue and Labour Clause required Lloyd's to cover the additional shipping expenses. The court rejected these arguments, affirming the district court's ruling. The court held that under the All Risks Clause and Risks Covered Clause, Century's alumina did not suffer any physical loss or damage. As for the Shipping Expenses Clause, it covered the risk of a failed delivery, not an untimely one. Lastly, under the Sue and Labour Clause, Century was required to mitigate Lloyd's exposure under the policy, but it did not obligate Lloyd's to pay anything for reducing losses that fall outside the policy. View "Century Aluminum Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Keisha Kemmet and Lindell Kemmet, who were married in September 2016 and separated in June 2021. The main issues in the case revolve around the distribution of marital property following their divorce. Keisha Kemmet argues that the district court's distribution of marital property was not equitable, the court's valuation of land was clearly erroneous, and the court's computations contain errors. Lindell Kemmet cross-appeals, arguing that the court's valuations of his remainder interest in his family's homestead, personal property items, and his dental practice were clearly erroneous. He also argues that the distribution of marital property is not equitable, the provision regarding health insurance is ambiguous, and the court abused its discretion by failing to allow for cross-examination of Keisha Kemmet’s expert witness.The district court had valued the parties' property and debts and made an equitable distribution. Both parties presented testimony regarding the valuation of the land and the dental practice. The district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment and judgment. Both parties appealed.The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the district court's valuation of the Kidder County property and the dental practice was not clearly erroneous. The court's valuations of these items were within the range of the evidence presented. However, the court's execution of the distribution created confusion and required clarification. The Supreme Court remanded the issue for proper accounting of the distribution of the marital estate. The court also found that the district court's finding of an equitable distribution of 40% to Keisha Kemmet in a short-term marriage was not clearly erroneous. The court's findings and distributions were supported by the record. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in all other respects, except for the court's findings regarding the valuation and distribution of the Kidder County property, which must be clarified and its distributions reconsidered. View "Kemmet v. Kemmet" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of appellants who allegedly purchased luxury vehicles with funds provided by Dilmurod Akramov, the owner of CBC and D&O Group. The appellants would then transfer the vehicle titles back to Akramov's D&O Group without receiving cash or equivalent in exchange. They would then claim a "trade-in credit" against the sales tax due on the purchase of a vehicle. The Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration (DFA) argued that these were not valid sales as required by Arkansas law and denied the sales-tax-refund claims.The appellants challenged the DFA's decision through the administrative review process, which affirmed the DFA's decision. The appellants then appealed to the Pulaski County Circuit Court for further review. The circuit court found that the appellants' attorney, Jason Stuart, was a necessary witness and therefore disqualified him from further representing the appellants. The court also held the appellants in contempt for failing to provide discovery per the court's order.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Stuart. The court applied the three-prong test from Weigel v. Farmers Ins. Co., which requires that the attorney's testimony is material to the determination of the issues being litigated, the evidence is unobtainable elsewhere, and the testimony is or may be prejudicial to the testifying attorney’s client. The court found that all three prongs were satisfied in this case. The court also affirmed the circuit court's decision to strike the third amended and supplemental complaint filed by Stuart after his disqualification. View "STUART v. WALTHER" on Justia Law

The case involves a shareholder lawsuit challenging the fairness of IAC/InterActiveCorp’s separation from its controlled subsidiary, Match Group, Inc. The plaintiffs alleged that the transaction was unfair because IAC, a controlling shareholder of Match, received benefits in the transaction at the expense of the Match minority shareholders. The defendants claimed that business judgment review applied because they followed the MFW framework, which included approval by an independent and disinterested “separation committee” and a majority of uncoerced, fully informed, and unaffiliated Match shareholders. The Court of Chancery agreed and dismissed the complaint.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware concluded that in a suit claiming that a controlling shareholder stood on both sides of a transaction with the controlled corporation and received a non-ratable benefit, entire fairness is the presumptive standard of review. The controlling shareholder can shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff by properly employing a special committee or an unaffiliated shareholder vote. But the use of just one of these procedural devices does not change the standard of review. If the controlling shareholder wants to secure the benefits of business judgment review, it must follow all MFW’s requirements. The court reversed the lower court's finding that the separation committee functioned as an independent negotiating body. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Match Group, Inc. Derivative Litigation" on Justia Law