Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

In a lawsuit between two competitors in the shipping logistics industry, Project44, Inc. and FourKites, Inc., Project44 alleged that FourKites agents sent defamatory emails to Project44's chief revenue officer and two members of its board of directors. FourKites argued that there was no publication to a third party because the emails were sent to members of the corporation who were, in effect, the corporation itself. The Cook County circuit court agreed with FourKites and dismissed Project44's complaint for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the decision of the appellate court, holding that there is publication to a third party when an allegedly defamatory statement is communicated to a member of a corporation’s executive leadership team. It was determined that a corporation has a distinct reputation from that of its management-level employees and an interest in protecting that reputation among its employees and the public at large. Therefore, defamatory statements made to corporate employees, even those with the power to act on behalf of the corporation, can harm the corporation’s business reputation among those employees. Communication of a defamatory statement regarding the corporation to these employees establishes the publication element for a defamation action brought by the corporation against the party that publishes the statement. View "Project44, Inc. v. FourKites, Inc." on Justia Law

In the case considered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, employee Michael Ashford sued his former employer, Aeroframe Services, and Aviation Technical Services (ATS), alleging unpaid wages and other damages. The case, which began in Louisiana state court and was later removed to federal court, was complicated by numerous claims and counterclaims among the parties, including third-party defendant Roger Allen Porter, who was Aeroframe's sole principal.Initially, Ashford and other employees pursued claims against Aeroframe and ATS, alleging that negotiations between the two companies led to Aeroframe's insolvency and employees' loss of wages. ATS, in turn, cross-claimed against Aeroframe and Porter, alleging financial losses from its failed attempt to acquire Aeroframe. Porter also cross-claimed against ATS, asserting tortious interference and unfair trade practices.The Court of Appeals previously remanded the case to the district court, finding that the parties were not aligned in their interests at the time of the lawsuit's filing, and the district court lacked jurisdiction due to lack of diversity among the parties. Upon reconsideration, however, the district court found new evidence indicating that the interests of Aeroframe, Porter, and the employees were aligned from the inception of the litigation and that an irrevocable settlement agreement between them existed, allowing removal under the relevant law.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling, finding that the non-ATS parties' interests were aligned from the litigation's inception. The Court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims against ATS and the individual judgments against Aeroframe in favor of the employees. View "Ashford v. Aviation Technical Svc" on Justia Law

The case in question involves a receiver, Burton Wiand, appointed after the collapse of a $78 million Ponzi scheme operated by Oasis, who sued ATC Brokers Ltd. (where Oasis held accounts), David Manoukian (owner of ATC Brokers), and Spotex LLC (which provided software to Oasis). Wiand alleged common-law tort claims against the defendants and fraudulent-transfer claims against ATC Brokers only. The district court dismissed Wiand’s complaint with prejudice, ruling that Wiand lacked standing to sue ATC Brokers and Manoukian and that Spotex was immune under the Communications Decency Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court erred in dismissing the fraudulent-transfer claims for lack of standing. The court explained that a receiver for a Ponzi estate has standing to maintain fraudulent-transfer claims on behalf of the estate. However, the court agreed with the district court that Wiand lacked standing to maintain the tort claims, as the Oasis corporate entities were not separate and distinct from the Ponzi scheme, and Wiand couldn't allege an injury to sustain his tort claims.As a result, the court reversed the dismissal of the fraudulent-transfer claims and remanded for further proceedings, and vacated the dismissal with prejudice of the tort claims and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice. View "Wiand v. ATC Brokers Ltd." on Justia Law

In 2015, Christopher Novinger and ICAN Investment Group, L.L.C. were sued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for fraudulently offering and selling life settlement interests in violation of the Securities and Exchange Acts. As part of the settlement, Novinger and ICAN were prohibited from casting doubt on the validity of the SEC’s investigation or enforcement against them or proclaiming their innocence unless they also indicated their lack of innocence.Later, Novinger sought judicial review of the decree, claiming it violated his First Amendment rights. His motion for relief was denied by the district court, and this decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Novinger then moved for a declaratory judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57, essentially raising the same claims as in his initial motion. The district court again denied his motion, ruling that it was procedurally improper and that there was no change in the law or facts that called for a modification of the decrees.Novinger appealed this decision, but the Fifth Circuit ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to review a procedurally improper motion that was denied as such. The court stated that the district court's order did not change the status quo or resolve any substantive issues, and thus, it was not a final decision that could be appealed. The court also rejected the assertion that the motion for declaratory judgment could be construed as an appropriate pleading under the DJA, maintaining the distinction between a pleading as an initial filing in a case and a motion as a subsequent filing. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "SEC v. Novinger" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the trial court's discretion to grant leave for amending a complaint under CPLR 3025 (b). The plaintiffs, a group of investors, filed an action against the defendants, the managers of their investment company, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the operating agreement. Their second amended complaint was dismissed by the Appellate Division due to lack of standing. The Supreme Court subsequently granted the plaintiffs' leave to file a third amended complaint to rectify the standing issue, attracting objections from the defendants who claimed that a new action was required.The Appellate Division sided with the defendants. It held that the Supreme Court possessed no discretion to allow amendment of a complaint that had been dismissed by the Appellate Division. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division. It held that if an appellate court has dismissed a complaint without prejudice and not on the merits, and the defect could be rectified by amendment, the trial court has the discretion to grant leave for amendment under CPLR 3025 (b). This ruling is in line with the trial court's general discretion to manage its docket for judicial economy. The Court also held that the motion to amend was timely, as it was filed well within the six months provided by CPLR 205 (a), even after accounting for the tolling period due to Executive Order 202.8. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for further proceedings following this judgement. View "Favourite Ltd. v Cico" on Justia Law

This consolidated opinion, delivered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, pertains to the appeals of defendants Richard Tipton and James Roane, Jr. Both were convicted in 1993 and sentenced to death and multiple years in prison for involvement in a drug-related enterprise that also included firearms, murders, and other racketeering activity. They have consistently sought post-conviction relief, and in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, they contested their sentences related to their firearm-related 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions in 1993.The court affirmed the district court's decisions, rejecting the defendants' challenges to their § 924(c) sentences. The court concluded that Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity (VICAR) murder constitutes a "crime of violence" under § 924(c). The defendants failed to demonstrate that there was more than a reasonable possibility that the jury did not rely on the valid VICAR murder predicate for any of their § 924(c) convictions. Therefore, the validity of any other alleged § 924(c) predicate did not need to be decided. The court held that the defendants' § 924(c) convictions and sentences were legally sound. View "United States v. Tipton" on Justia Law

The case was heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit between Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the plaintiff-appellant, against Novartis Pharma AG and associates, the defendants-appellees. Regeneron appealed the judgment from the district court which dismissed its claims of antitrust violations and tortious interference with contract under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).Regeneron and Novartis both manufacture medications to treat overproduction of a specific protein. The crux of the dispute was whether the medications, which come in vials and prefilled syringes (PFSs), compete in the same or in different product markets. Regeneron claimed that Novartis and its co-defendant Vetter Pharma International GmbH concealed their collaboration to produce a PFS version of Novartis’s drug, thereby delaying the launch of Regeneron's own PFS version and allowing Novartis to increase its market share.The district court had granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that Regeneron failed to plausibly allege that the relevant antitrust market was limited to PFSs. The court also dismissed Regeneron’s tortious interference claim as untimely.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Regeneron had provided a plausible explanation that the market for PFSs was distinct from that for vials. It also held that Regeneron adequately pleaded that Novartis was equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense to the tortious interference claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. View "Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Novartis Pharma AG" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia recently ruled on a case involving the nonprofit organization Tax Analysts and Matthew Irby, the West Virginia State Tax Commissioner. Tax Analysts requested copies of field audit and audit training manuals from the West Virginia State Tax Department under the West Virginia Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Department denied the request, citing a statutory exemption protecting certain tax-related documents. Tax Analysts then filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to prevent the Department from withholding the requested documents.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County ruled in favor of the Department and dismissed the case, accepting the Department's argument that the documents were statutorily protected by the asserted FOIA disclosure exemption. However, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed this decision, concluding that the circuit court erred by not requiring the Department to present detailed justifications, known as a Vaughn index and an affidavit, as to why each document or part of it was exempt from disclosure under the FOIA.The court remanded the case with instructions for the circuit court to require the Department to file a Vaughn index and an affidavit explaining why disclosure of the documents would be harmful and why they should be exempt. The court concluded that the Department had not met its burden of showing the express applicability of the claimed exemption to the material requested. View "Tax Analysts v. Irby" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the Trustee for the bankrupt company BWGS, LLC and BMO Harris Bank N.A. and Sun Capital Partners VI, L.P. The Trustee sought to avoid a payment made by BWGS to BMO Harris, which was used to finance the acquisition of BWGS by Sun Capital's subsidiary. The Trustee argued that the payment constituted a constructively fraudulent transfer under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and Indiana state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had to address two novel issues: whether Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which protects certain transactions made “in connection with a securities contract,” applies to transactions involving private securities; and, if so, whether it also preempts state law claims seeking similar relief.The Court held that Section 546(e) does apply to transactions involving private securities and does preempt state law claims seeking similar relief. Consequently, the Trustee's attempt to avoid the payment under the Bankruptcy Code and Indiana law was barred by Section 546(e). The Court also rejected the Trustee's argument that he could recover the value of the payment from Sun Capital under a different provision of the Bankruptcy Code, holding that this claim was also preempted by Section 546(e). The Court thus affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the Trustee's complaint with prejudice. View "Petr v. BMO Harris Bank N.A." on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute between LKQ Corporation and its former Plant Manager, Robert Rutledge, who resigned from the company and joined a competing firm. LKQ sought to recover proceeds Rutledge realized from multiple stock sales over many years, based on a forfeiture-for-competition provision in their Restricted Stock Unit Agreements.The key legal issue revolves around the applicability of Delaware law on forfeiture-for-competition provisions. These provisions require former employees to forfeit a monetary benefit upon joining a competitor. The Delaware Supreme Court held in a recent case that such provisions are not subject to a reasonableness review. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found it unclear whether this ruling applies outside the context of highly sophisticated parties.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's judgment in favor of Rutledge on the breach of the Restrictive Covenant Agreements and unjust enrichment claims. However, due to the complexity of the Delaware law issue, the Court decided to certify questions to the Delaware Supreme Court for clarification. Specifically, the certified questions ask whether the Delaware Supreme Court's ruling on forfeiture-for-competition provisions applies outside the limited partnership context and, if not, what factors inform its application. View "LKQ Corporation v. Rutledge" on Justia Law