Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire certified two questions of law for the New Hampshire Supreme Court's consideration. Plaintiffs, individuals who presently or formerly lived in the Merrimack area, brought tort claims, including negligence, nuisance, trespass, and negligent failure to warn, alleging that defendants’ manufacturing process at its facility in the Town of Merrimack used chemicals that included perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA). They alleged PFOA was a toxic chemical that was released into the air from the Merrimack facility and has contaminated the air, ground, and water in Merrimack and nearby towns. As a result, plaintiffs alleged the wells and other drinking water sources in those places were contaminated, exposing them to PFOA, placing them at risk of developing health problems, including testicular cancer, kidney cancer, immunotoxicity, thyroid disease, high cholesterol, ulcerative colitis, and pregnancy induced hypertension. The first question from the federal circuit court asked whether New Hampshire recognized “a claim for the costs of medical monitoring as a remedy or as a cause of action” in plaintiffs' context. Depending on the answer to the first question, the second question asked, “what are the requirements and elements of a remedy or cause of action for medical monitoring” under New Hampshire law. Because the Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative, it did not address the second question. View "Brown, et al. v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought insurance coverage under an all-risks commercial insurance policy for business income losses during the COVID-19 pandemic. Finding no “direct physical loss of or damage to property” caused by COVID-19, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the appeal court and reinstated the trial court judgment denying coverage. View "Cajun County, LLC et al. v. Certain Underwriter at Llloyd's, London, et al." on Justia Law

In July 2019, Plaintiffs Suzanne Farrell and her husband, Joseph Farrell, were traveling to Galveston, Texas, when they stopped to refuel at a Circle K Store in Pineville, Louisiana. While Mr. Farrell pumped gas, Mrs. Farrell decided to take their dog for a walk. She ultimately chose a grassy area located at the edge of the Circle K parking lot. In order to reach this area of grass, Mrs. Farrell had to traverse a pool of water. The water extended approximately the length of a tractor-trailer and was draining to the low spot of the parking lot. Mrs. Farrell walked to the narrowest part of the water—approximately one foot across— and attempted to step over the water. She was unsuccessful, and she fell and sustained personal injury. Mr. and Mrs. Farrell subsequently filed this personal injury lawsuit against Circle K and the City of Pineville. Defendants jointly moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were not liable on the ground that the alleged hazardous condition was open and obvious. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that the hazard was not the pool of water, but the slippery substance hidden in the water, and that made the hazard not open and obvious. The trial court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding “that there exist issues of material fact regarding whether a reasonable person should have seen the mold/mildew/algae/slime present in the water puddle at issue.” The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed with the district court's decision, reversed and rendered judgment in favor of defendants. View "Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc. et al." on Justia Law

The district court awarded damages to plaintiff Lashondra Jones who was allegedly injured when she stepped on a wooden pallet with an attached pallet guard, holding a bulk watermelon bin, to reach a watermelon in the bottom of the bin, and the pallet guard collapsed. Defendant Market Basket Stores, Inc. appealed, and the appellate court reversed the award, finding manifest error in the factual findings of the district court requiring de novo review and concluding that the watermelon display did not present an unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff. After review, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded there was no manifest error in the district court’s finding of negligence on the part of the defendant; therefore, the appellate court erred in its ruling. View "Jones v. Market Basket Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

In this tort and breach-of-contract lawsuit, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's take-nothing summary judgment entered on the claim brought by several affiliated retailers (the Retailers), holding that the trial court erred in part.The Retailers in this case sought to recoup millions of dollars in disallowed reimbursements for purchases their customers made under the federally-funded Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) after a lengthy outage in a third-party contractor's Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) system. The Retailers had permitted their SNAP customers to make purchases during the system outage, as authorized by a federal regulation, but held the EBT transactions in abeyance until they could be submitted and the Retailers reimbursed. The EBT contractor, however, later declined reimbursement for nearly 90,000 transactions. The trial court rendered a final take-nothing judgment against the Retailers, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on the Retailers' breach of contract claim but reversed the judgment as to losses from certain transactions and the Retailers' tort claims, holding that the court relied on an erroneous construction of 7 C.F.R. 274.8(e)(1). View "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Xerox State & Local Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Tracey Weinberg (“Weinberg”) was the former Chief Marketing Officer of defendant-appellee Waystar, Inc.(“Waystar”). During her employment, the company granted her options to purchase stock in its co-defendant Derby TopCo, Inc.,(“Derby Inc.”), pursuant to a Derby TopCo 2019 Stock Incentive Plan (the “Plan”). Weinberg was awarded three option grants under the Plan pursuant to three option agreements executed between October 2019 and August 2020. By the time Weinberg was terminated in 2021, 107,318.96 of her options had vested. She timely exercised all of them in November 2021, and the options immediately converted to economically equivalent partnership units in co-defendant Derby TopCo Partnership LP, a Delaware limited partnership (“Derby LP”) (the “Converted Units”). Each Option Agreement contained an identical call right provision providing Appellees the right to repurchase Weinberg’s Converted Units (the “Call Right”), “during the six (6) month period following (x) the (i) [t]ermination of [Weinberg’s] employment with the Service Recipient for any reason . . . and (y) a Restrictive Covenant Breach.” This appeal turned on the meaning of the word “and” in the three option agreements. Specifically, the question presented for the Delaware Supreme Court was whether two separate events (separated by the word “and”) had to both occur in order for the company to exercise a call right, or whether the call right could be exercised if only one event has occurred. Although Weinberg had been terminated within the time frame specified by the Call Right Provision, a Restrictive Covenant Breach had not occurred. The parties disputed whether the Call Right was available in the absence of a Restrictive Covenant Breach. The Court of Chancery decided that it was, and the Delaware Supreme Court concurred, affirming the Court of Chancery. View "Weinberg v. Waystar, Inc." on Justia Law

In this dispute between the residents of a senior-living facility in a receivership over the proceeds generated by the sale of the facility the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the conclusion of the circuit court that Bondholders' mortgage lien was superior to Residents' entrance fee claims, holding that Bondholders' mortgage lien was superior to Residents' contract claims.After Atrium, the subject senior-living facility, defaulted on debt service payments to Bondholders, it filed a petition for receivership. The receiver sold the assets for more than $4 million in proceeds. Atrium owed Bondholders more than $6 million secured by a valid mortgage lien on the facility's estate, but many of the facility's Residents claimed they were owed reimbursement of the entrance fees they paid to Atrium. The circuit court entered judgment for Bondholders, and the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bondholders were entitled to first payment from the proceeds of the sale of Atrium's assets. View "Casanova v. Polsky" on Justia Law

4201 2nd Ave. W., LLC, d.b.a. Safari Fuels 105 (“4201”) appealed a district court’s judgment finding First State Bank & Trust, formerly First National Bank & Trust Company (“the bank”), held a valid and enforceable security interest in a liquor license and other collateral. In 2015, the bank loaned approximately $4.34 million to Racers Store 102, LLC (“Racers”) under a promissory note for its operation of a convenience store. As security for the loan, Racers signed the bank a leasehold mortgage, security agreement, and fixture filing against real and personal property including a liquor license, coffee kiosk, walk-in freezer, and Kohler generator, among other collateral. In 2016, Racers defaulted on its loan, and the bank commenced a foreclosure action. During foreclosure proceedings, the bank took control of the convenience store and contracted with 4201 to operate the store while the foreclosure action was pending. Racers transferred its rights, titles, and interests in the ground lease and assets of the store to 4201; 4201 entered into a forbearance agreement with the bank. The parties subsequently discovered the liquor license could not be transferred until delinquent property taxes were paid. The bank and 4201 executed an addendum to the forbearance agreement agreeing to pay equal shares of the property taxes whereby the liquor license would become an asset of 4201 subject to the existing lien held by the bank. The parties also entered into a personal property pledge in which 4201 pledged to give the bank a continuing first-priority interest in the liquor license, 4201 agreed not to sell, assign, or transfer the license, and 4201 agreed to reimburse the bank for costs associated with defending its interest in the license. In 2021, the bank decided to cease operations of the store and offered to sell the liquor license to 4201. 4201 commenced legal action seeking a declaratory judgment that the bank no longer held a valid and enforceable lien on the liquor license, coffee kiosk, walk-in freezer, and Kohler generator. Following a bench trial, the district court determined the bank held a valid and enforceable security interest in the liquor license and other collateral. The court dismissed the bank’s counterclaim. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "4201 2nd Ave W v. First State Bank & Trust, et al." on Justia Law

In November of 2020, the people of Georgia, through the results of a ballot question posed in the general election, amended the State Constitution to allow for a specific waiver of sovereign immunity. This new waiver allowed citizens to sue the State for declaratory relief ("Paragraph V"). To the extent that citizens obtain a favorable ruling on their claim for declaratory relief, they could then also seek injunctive relief to “enforce [the court’s] judgment.” To take advantage of this new waiver of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, however, the Constitution provided that such actions had to be brought “exclusively” against the State. When a plaintiff’s suit violated this exclusivity provision, the Constitution required the suit be dismissed. In the underlying appeal, the plaintiffs’ suit named a defendant for whom a waiver was not provided by Paragraph V. Accordingly, the Constitution required the suit to be dismissed. The Georgia Supreme Court therefore vacated the trial court’s grant of an interlocutory injunction, reversed the denial of the State’s motion to dismiss, and remanded this case with direction that it be dismissed. View "Georgia, et al. v. Sass Group, LLC et al." on Justia Law

A putative class of over 12 million merchants brought this antitrust action under the Sherman Act against Visa U.S.A. Inc., MasterCard International Inc., and numerous banks that serve as payment-card issuers for those networks. Plaintiffs alleged that Visa and MasterCard adopted and enforced rules and practices relating to payment cards that had the combined effect of injuring merchants by allowing Visa and MasterCard to charge supracompetitive fees (known as “interchange fees”) on each payment card transaction. After nearly fifteen years of litigation, the parties agreed to a settlement of roughly $ 5.6 billion, which was approved by the district court over numerous objections. In so doing, $900,000 in service awards was granted to lead plaintiffs, and roughly $523 million was granted in attorneys’ fees. Appellants are various objectors who argue that the district court erred when it certified the class, approved the settlement, granted service awards and computed attorneys’ fees.   The Second Circuit affirmed in all respects the district court’s orders to the extent they constituted a final judgment, with the exception that the court directed the district court to reduce the service award to class representatives to the extent that its size was increased by time spent in lobbying efforts that would not increase the recovery of damages. The court made no ruling as to how damages should be allocated between branded oil companies and their branded service station franchisees, the reasonableness of the special master’s ultimate findings, or the legality of releasing an as-of-yet hypothetical future claim. View "In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust" on Justia Law