Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

A Delaware limited partnership, acting as the Members’ Representative for former members of a company, engaged in a merger agreement with a Delaware limited liability company. The merger agreement included specific notice requirements for indemnification claims, which required the acquiring company to provide written notice with reasonable detail and all available material written evidence of the claim. The agreement also stated that failure to comply with these requirements would result in forfeiture of the right to recover from the indemnity escrow fund.The Court of Chancery dismissed the Members’ Representative’s complaint, which sought a declaration that the acquiring company’s claim notice was invalid for failing to meet the contractual requirements. The court held that the notice was valid under the escrow agreement and dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the notice provided sufficient detail and was timely.On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the merger agreement and escrow agreement should be read together as an integrated contractual scheme. The court found that the final sentence of the notice provision in the merger agreement created a condition precedent, requiring compliance with the notice requirements to avoid forfeiture of the right to recover from the indemnity escrow fund. The court determined that it was reasonably conceivable that the acquiring company failed to comply with the notice requirements, particularly the requirement to include all available material written evidence.The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Chancery for further proceedings to determine whether the acquiring company’s noncompliance with the notice requirements could be excused. The court instructed the lower court to consider whether the notice requirements were a material part of the agreed exchange and whether excusing the noncompliance would result in a disproportionate forfeiture. View "Thompson Street Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Sonova United States Hearing Instruments, LLC" on Justia Law

Larry Lawson, former CEO of Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., retired and entered into a Retirement Agreement with Spirit, which allowed him to continue vesting in long-term incentive stock awards as if he were an active employee. This agreement was conditioned on his compliance with a non-competition covenant from his original Employment Agreement. Lawson later engaged with a hedge fund, Elliott Management, which was involved in a proxy contest with Arconic, a competitor of Spirit. Spirit deemed this a violation of the non-competition covenant and ceased payments and stock vesting under the Retirement Agreement.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas held a bench trial and found that Lawson had not violated the non-competition covenant, ruling in his favor. Spirit appealed, and the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that Lawson had breached the covenant and remanded the case to determine the enforceability of the covenant under Kansas law.On remand, the district court found the non-competition covenant enforceable without applying the reasonableness test from Weber v. Tillman, concluding that the covenant was a condition precedent to the receipt of future benefits, not a traditional non-compete. The court severed the injunctive enforcement mechanism from the covenant, leaving only the condition precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, predicting that the Kansas Supreme Court would not apply the Weber reasonableness test to a non-competition condition precedent to the receipt of future benefits. The court also denied Lawson's motion to certify the question to the Kansas Supreme Court, finding it unnecessary to resolve the issue. View "Lawson v. Spirit Aerosystems" on Justia Law

Advocacy Holdings, a company that helps clients influence public policy through its online platform OneClickPolitics, sued its former CEO, Chazz Clevinger, for breaching a noncompete agreement. Clevinger, who resigned in 2023, allegedly stole Advocacy’s customer list, started competing businesses, solicited Advocacy’s customers, and created a near duplicate of Advocacy’s platform. Advocacy sought a preliminary injunction to stop Clevinger’s actions, claiming irreparable harm.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia partially denied Advocacy’s motion for a preliminary injunction, ruling that Advocacy had not demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm. The court did, however, enjoin Clevinger from using Advocacy’s platform design and interface but allowed him to continue operating his competing businesses and soliciting Advocacy’s customers. Advocacy appealed the partial denial of the preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Advocacy had not shown irreparable harm. The court noted that financial injuries, such as loss of customers, are typically remediable through monetary damages and do not constitute irreparable harm. Additionally, the court found that Advocacy’s claims of reputational harm were unsubstantiated and that the stipulation of irreparable harm in the noncompete agreement was forfeited because Advocacy did not raise it in its initial motion. The court also declined to consider Advocacy’s sliding-scale argument for evaluating preliminary injunction factors, as it was raised too late. The court concluded that without a showing of irreparable harm, a preliminary injunction was not warranted. View "Clevinger v. Advocacy Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Diamond Quality, Inc., an industrial inspection and sorting company, had been working with subsidiaries of Dana Incorporated, including Dana Light Axle Products, LLC (Dana Fort Wayne). In 2019, Dana Fort Wayne stopped using Diamond's services. In 2020, Dana Fort Wayne twice refused Diamond entry onto its premises to sort defective parts, despite requests from other Dana subsidiaries in Mexico.Diamond sued Dana Fort Wayne in Allen County state court, alleging tortious interference with its business relationships and contracts with the Dana subsidiaries in Mexico. Dana Fort Wayne removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, where it denied the allegations and moved for summary judgment, arguing that barring Diamond from its premises was not tortious.The district court sought guidance from the Indiana Supreme Court on whether a corporate subsidiary can tortiously interfere with the contracts and business relationships of another subsidiary of the same parent company. The Indiana Supreme Court reframed the question to whether a property owner acts without justification, for purposes of a claim for tortious interference, when barring a plaintiff from accessing the property.The Indiana Supreme Court held that a property owner is always justified in excluding another from its premises absent a contractual or statutory duty. This right to exclude is fundamental to property law and cannot support a claim for tortious interference under Indiana law. The court did not need to choose between the second and third restatements of torts for this decision. The answer to the reframed certified question was "no." View "Diamond Quality, Inc. v. Dana Light Axle Products, LLC" on Justia Law

New England Country Foods, LLC (NECF) alleged that VanLaw Food Products, Inc. (VanLaw) intentionally undercut its business by promising to replicate NECF’s popular barbeque sauce and sell it directly to Trader Joe’s. NECF sued VanLaw in federal court, claiming tortious interference and other claims. The district court dismissed the case based on a clause in their manufacturing contract that limited damages. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit asked the California Supreme Court whether a contract clause that substantially limits damages for intentional wrongdoing is invalid under Civil Code section 1668.The district court dismissed NECF’s complaint, reasoning that the contract allowed only for direct damages and injunctive relief, while NECF sought lost profits, attorneys’ fees, and punitive damages. The court rejected NECF’s argument that section 1668 prevents limiting damages for future intentional conduct, stating it only prevents contracts that completely exempt parties from liability. NECF amended its complaint, but the district court dismissed it with prejudice, citing that parties may limit liability for breach of contract and that the contract did not bar all money damages but limited them to specific types NECF did not suffer. NECF appealed, and the Ninth Circuit sought guidance from the California Supreme Court.The California Supreme Court held that limitations on damages for willful injury to the person or property of another are invalid under section 1668. The court reasoned that the statute’s language and purpose, along with the policy against willful tortious conduct, support this interpretation. The court clarified that section 1668 does not preclude parties from limiting liability for pure breaches of contract absent a violation of an independent duty. The court’s decision ensures that parties cannot contractually limit their liability for intentional torts. View "New England Country Foods v. Vanlaw Food Products" on Justia Law

Defendants, alleged victims of a Ponzi scheme perpetrated by John Woods, sought to bring claims against Woods's employer, Oppenheimer & Co. Inc., in a FINRA arbitration forum. Defendants claimed they were customers of Oppenheimer because they transacted with Woods, an associated person of Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer filed a federal action seeking a declaration that Defendants were not its customers and a permanent injunction to prevent arbitration.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment in favor of Oppenheimer, concluding that Defendants were not customers of Oppenheimer or Woods. The court found that Defendants had no direct relationship with Oppenheimer and that their investments were facilitated by Michael Mooney, not Woods. The court also issued a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from arbitrating their claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that a "customer" under FINRA Rule 12200 includes any non-broker and non-dealer who purchases commodities or services from a FINRA member or its associated person. However, the court agreed with the district court that Defendants did not transact with Woods, as their investments were facilitated by Mooney. The court also rejected Defendants' "alter ego" theory, which suggested that their investments in an entity controlled by Woods made them Woods's customers.The Ninth Circuit concluded that Defendants were not entitled to arbitrate their claims against Oppenheimer under FINRA Rule 12200 and upheld the permanent injunction. The court found no errors in the district court's analysis or factual findings and affirmed the decision in full. View "OPPENHEIMER & CO. INC. V. MITCHELL" on Justia Law

Fair Friend Enterprise Co., Ltd., a Taiwan-based company and majority shareholder of CNC Systems, Inc., sought access to CNC's corporate books and records under Maine law. Fair Friend alleged that CNC had failed to pay for goods worth approximately $4 million and had unilaterally demoted its CEO without approval. Fair Friend made a written demand for access to CNC's records, which CNC ignored, leading Fair Friend to file a complaint in the Maine Superior Court.The Maine Superior Court ordered CNC to produce the requested records and denied CNC's motion to stay the proceedings due to related litigation in California. The court found that Fair Friend had a proper purpose for requesting the records and that CNC's actions warranted concern. CNC continued to delay compliance, prompting further court orders to enforce the production of records and awarding attorney fees to Fair Friend.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. CNC's appeal of the denial of the motion to stay was dismissed as moot because CNC eventually produced the requested records. The court affirmed the award of attorney fees, concluding that CNC had not acted in good faith and had no reasonable basis for doubting Fair Friend's right to inspect the records. The court found that CNC's resistance to producing the documents and filing of serial motions to delay justified the award of attorney fees. The case was remanded for dismissal of all pending motions and entry of final judgment. View "Fair Friend Enterprise Co., Ltd. v. CNC Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Michael Hooper, a former employee of Double Eagle Alloys, Inc., left the company to join competitor Ace Alloys, LLC, taking with him 2,660 digital files containing Double Eagle’s business information. Double Eagle discovered the download and sued Hooper and Ace Alloys, alleging trade-secret violations, misappropriation of confidential business information, and civil conspiracy.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment to Hooper and Ace Alloys on all claims. The court found that Double Eagle failed to identify its alleged trade secrets with sufficient particularity and clarity to proceed to trial. The court also held that Double Eagle did not present evidence that its business information was confidential, and thus, the misappropriation claim could not stand. Finally, the court dismissed the civil-conspiracy claim because it lacked an underlying tort.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that Double Eagle did not identify its trade secrets with sufficient particularity. The court noted that Double Eagle’s PSQ specifications, pricing, and customer drawings were either publicly available or not shown to be unique and confidential. The court also found that Double Eagle failed to present sufficient evidence that its business information was confidential, as required for the misappropriation claim. Consequently, the civil-conspiracy claim was also dismissed due to the absence of an underlying tort. View "Double Eagle Alloys v. Hooper" on Justia Law

Tina McPherson purchased a car from Suburban Ann Arbor, a Michigan car dealership, in July 2020. She was misled into believing she had been approved for financing, paid a $2,000 down payment, and drove the car home. Later, she was informed that the financing had fallen through and was given the option to sign a new contract with worse terms or return the car. McPherson refused the new terms, and Suburban repossessed the car and kept her down payment and fees. McPherson sued Suburban, alleging violations of state and federal consumer protection laws.A federal jury found Suburban liable for statutory conversion under Michigan law and violations of the Michigan Regulation of Collection Practices Act, among other claims. The jury awarded McPherson $15,000 in actual damages, $23,000 for the value of the converted property, and $350,000 in punitive damages. The district court denied McPherson's request for treble damages but awarded her $418,995 in attorney’s fees, $11,212.61 in costs, and $6,433.65 in prejudgment interest, totaling $824,641.26. McPherson appealed the denial of treble damages and the amount of attorney’s fees awarded, while Suburban cross-appealed the fee award as excessive.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying treble damages, as the $350,000 punitive damages already served to punish and deter Suburban's conduct. The court also found that the district court properly calculated the attorney’s fees, considering the market rates and the skill of McPherson’s attorneys. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "McPherson v. Suburban Ann Arbor, LLC" on Justia Law

Timothy Barton was involved in a scheme to develop underutilized land with loans from Chinese nationals. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice initiated parallel civil and criminal proceedings against Barton and his associates, alleging violations of antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. The SEC sought a receivership to preserve lenders' assets, leading to various district court orders imposing and administering a receivership and freezing Barton’s assets. Barton appealed these orders and requested reassignment of the case on remand.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially imposed a receivership, which Barton appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the receivership order, finding that the district court used the wrong standard and that the receivership's scope was too broad. On remand, the district court applied the correct standard from Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron and reimposed a receivership, including entities that received or benefited from assets traceable to Barton’s alleged fraudulent activities. Barton again appealed, challenging the district court’s jurisdiction, the decision to appoint the receiver, the scope of the receivership, the administration of the receivership, and the preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s imposition and scope of the receivership and the grant of a preliminary injunction. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s actions and dismissed Barton’s appeal of certain orders administering the receivership for lack of jurisdiction. The court also denied Barton’s request to reassign the case to another district-court judge, finding no basis for reassignment. View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Barton" on Justia Law