Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

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Minority partners in various cellular telephone partnerships hired attorney Michael A. Pullara to pursue breach of fiduciary duty claims against the majority partner, AT&T. The client agreements allowed Pullara to hire joint venture counsel, and he retained Ajamie LLP. Both firms agreed to a 50% discount on their hourly rates in exchange for a contingency fee if they prevailed. After lengthy litigation, the minority partners reached a favorable settlement with AT&T. However, a dispute arose between Pullara and Ajamie over the fee division, leading Ajamie to file for a charging lien to secure its fee.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware granted a charging lien to preserve Ajamie’s claim against the settlement proceeds. Ajamie then sought to enforce the lien. The court held that the fee-sharing agreement between Pullara and Ajamie was unenforceable under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct because the clients had not consented to the specific terms of the fee-sharing arrangement. However, the court ruled that Ajamie was still entitled to reasonable compensation under the principle of quantum meruit.The court calculated Ajamie’s lodestar at $13,178,616.78, based on market rates adjusted annually. Considering the Mahani factors, the court found that an upward adjustment was warranted due to the complexity and duration of the litigation, the significant results obtained, and the partially contingent nature of the fee arrangement. The court awarded Ajamie a total fee of $15,814,340.14, including a 20% increase for the contingency risk. After deducting amounts already paid, Ajamie was awarded $13,014,721.87 plus pre- and post-judgment interest. The court ordered the escrow agent to release this amount to Ajamie. View "Cellular Telephone Company Litigation cases" on Justia Law

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Garret Hirchak, Manufacturing Solutions, Inc., and Sunrise Development LLC (plaintiffs) appealed a trial court's order dissociating Garret from Hirchak Brothers LLC and Hirchak Group LLC (defendants) and requiring the LLCs to pay over $900,000 in equity interest, unpaid compensation, and reimbursements. Plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in not recognizing oppression by the majority members of the LLCs, treating a $300,000 down payment made by Garret as gratuitous, declining to order reimbursements for certain services and cash advances, and refusing to assess prejudgment interest on any of the reimbursements. Defendants cross-appealed, arguing that the court erred in awarding compensation to Garret after he breached his fiduciary duties.The Superior Court, Lamoille Unit, Civil Division, found that Garret had breached his fiduciary duties by failing to make explicit agreements on service rates and withholding financial records. The court ordered Garret's dissociation from the LLCs and required the LLCs to pay Garret $375,000 for his equity interest, $215,430 for cash advances made before March 2020, and $213,591.84 for unpaid compensation from October 2019 to January 2021. The court also ordered reimbursement of $71,537.64 and $50,214.57 for unpaid invoices from MSI and Sunrise, respectively, before March 2020. The court denied prejudgment interest on any reimbursements and rejected Garret's claim for the $300,000 down payment.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that Garret was not entitled to reimbursement for the $300,000 down payment or for cash advances and invoices after March 2020 due to his breach of fiduciary duties. The court also upheld the denial of prejudgment interest, finding it was within the trial court's discretion. However, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's award of compensation to Garret after March 2020, concluding that his breach of fiduciary duties forfeited his right to compensation during that period. The case was remanded for a recalculation of the compensation due to Garret. View "Hirchak v. Hirchak" on Justia Law

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Windy Cove, Inc., HB Fuels, Inc., and Staffing and Management Group, Inc. (collectively “Windy Cove”) are gasoline dealers who own Mobil-branded stations in southern California. In 2012, they entered into a 15-year exclusive fuel supply agreement with Circle K Stores Inc. as required by the agreement under which they purchased their gas stations from ExxonMobil. Windy Cove alleged that Circle K did not set gasoline prices in good faith under this exclusive distributorship contract.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Circle K. The court found that the prices charged by Circle K were within the range of those charged by its competitors, including at least one refiner, and thus were set in good faith under California Commercial Code § 2305(2). Windy Cove failed to provide evidence that Circle K's prices were discriminatory or commercially unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment, holding that Circle K’s prices were presumptively set in good faith because the contract had a “price in effect” term. The court noted that the safe harbor provision under Uniform Commercial Code § 2-305, which is codified as California Commercial Code § 2305(2), presumes good faith if the prices are within the range of those charged by competitors. The court found that Circle K’s prices were lower than at least one refiner, thus falling within the range of prices charged by competitors. Windy Cove’s arguments regarding Circle K’s use of a non-industry-standard pricing formula and higher prices compared to other wholesalers did not rebut the presumption of good faith. The court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate and affirmed the district court’s decision. View "WINDY COVE, INC. V. CIRCLE K STORES INC." on Justia Law

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Beijing Abace Biology Co., Ltd. (Abace) filed a lawsuit against Dr. Chunhong Zhang and MtoZ Biolabs, Inc. (MtoZ) after Dr. Zhang, a former employee, co-founded MtoZ, a company providing similar services to Abace. Abace claimed that Dr. Zhang breached her contract and fiduciary duty, and that MtoZ tortiously interfered with Abace's business. Dr. Zhang had signed several employment-related agreements, including non-compete clauses, while working for Abace. The dispute centered on whether these non-compete agreements were enforceable under Chinese law.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Zhang and MtoZ, concluding that Dr. Zhang did not fall within the categories of employees subject to non-compete agreements under Chinese law. The court found that Dr. Zhang was neither senior management nor senior technical personnel, and did not have access to trade secrets or confidential information that would justify a non-compete restriction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that under Chinese law, non-compete agreements are enforceable only against senior management, senior technical personnel, or employees with access to trade secrets. The court found no evidence that Dr. Zhang held a senior management or technical role, or that she had access to trade secrets. Consequently, the non-compete agreements were unenforceable, and the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Zhang and MtoZ was upheld. View "Beijing Abace Biology Co., Ltd. v. Zhang" on Justia Law

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A Delaware corporation issued a proxy statement that misstated the voting standard for approving a charter amendment to increase its authorized shares of common stock. The proxy statement indicated that the amendment would pass if more shares voted for it than against it, applying a votes-cast standard. The corporation’s charter, however, states that an amendment requires approval by a majority of the voting power of all outstanding shares. The plaintiff argued that the amendment needed approval by a majority of the voting power of all outstanding shares, while the defendants relied on Section 242(d) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which they claimed imposed the votes-cast standard.The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the corporation from proceeding with its stockholder meeting unless the proxy statement was corrected to reflect the need for approval from a majority of the outstanding shares. The defendants cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that the votes-cast standard applied.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware reviewed the case. The court found that both the plaintiff’s and defendants’ interpretations of Section 242(d) were reasonable, creating ambiguity. The court examined extrinsic evidence, including legislative history and public policy considerations, to resolve the ambiguity. The court concluded that the Single Vote Provision in the corporation’s charter, which closely tracked the Class Vote Opt-Out, did not trigger a Majority-of-the-Outstanding Requirement. Therefore, the correct voting standard for the proposed amendment was the Majority-of-the-Votes-Cast Standard.The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court’s decision emphasized the intent to make it easier for corporations to increase their authorized shares, aligning with the public policy goal behind the 2023 amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law. View "Salama v. Simon" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff and her partner, owners of Health Hero Farm LLC, sought to buy out a local farming family from their partnership. During this period, they befriended the defendant, a local auto-repair shop owner with a small farm. They discussed forming a partnership with him, and plaintiff represented to the Vermont Land Trust that they were partnering with the defendant to secure approval for the buyout. Plaintiff and defendant agreed to purchase Galloway cattle, with plaintiff advancing the funds. Plaintiff insisted on a written agreement, but defendant preferred a handshake deal. Eventually, defendant signed a promissory note without reading it, which included an attorney’s-fees provision.The Superior Court, Grand Isle Unit, Civil Division, held a bench trial and concluded that the promissory note did not accurately reflect an agreement between the parties. The court found that the note was a contract of adhesion and awarded plaintiff damages and prejudgment interest under a theory of unjust enrichment, rather than enforcing the promissory note.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the promissory note was unambiguous and enforceable according to its terms. The court found that defendant’s failure to read the note before signing it did not constitute a defense to enforcement. The court also determined that the note was not a contract of adhesion and was not unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Falcao v. Richardson" on Justia Law

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Alpine Securities Corporation, a securities broker-dealer and member of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), faced sanctions from FINRA in 2022 for violating its rules. FINRA imposed a cease-and-desist order and sought to expel Alpine from membership. Alpine challenged the constitutionality of FINRA in federal court, arguing that FINRA's expedited expulsion process violated the private nondelegation doctrine and the Appointments Clause.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Alpine's request for a preliminary injunction to halt FINRA's expedited proceeding. The court held that FINRA is a private entity, not subject to the Appointments Clause, and that the SEC's ability to review FINRA's decisions satisfied the private nondelegation doctrine.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Alpine demonstrated a likelihood of success on its private nondelegation claim, as FINRA's expulsion orders take effect immediately without prior SEC review, effectively barring Alpine from the securities industry. The court held that this lack of governmental oversight likely violates the private nondelegation doctrine. The court also found that Alpine faced irreparable harm if expelled before SEC review, as it would be forced out of business.The court reversed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction, instructing it to enjoin FINRA from expelling Alpine until the SEC reviews any expulsion order or the time for Alpine to seek SEC review lapses. However, the court did not grant a preliminary injunction on Alpine's Appointments Clause claims, as Alpine did not demonstrate irreparable harm from participating in FINRA's expedited proceeding itself. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's findings. View "Alpine Securities Corporation v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc." on Justia Law

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Two Massachusetts-based Volvo dealers filed a lawsuit against Volvo Car USA, Volvo Car Financial Services, and Fidelity Warranty Services, alleging violations of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93B. The dispute centers on Volvo-branded Prepaid Maintenance Program (PPM) contracts, which allow customers to prepay for future maintenance services at a discounted rate. Fidelity administers these contracts, which the dealers sell to their customers. The dealers claimed that the defendants were underpaying them for the parts and labor costs incurred in servicing these PPM contracts.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts heard cross-motions for summary judgment from both parties. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that entities like Fidelity are not regulated by the relevant provisions of Chapter 93B. The court denied the dealers' motion for summary judgment, leading the dealers to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision, but for a different reason. The appellate court held that the dealers' sale and service of the Volvo PPM are not franchise obligations under Chapter 93B. The court found that the Retailer Agreement between the dealers and Volvo USA did not obligate the dealers to sell or service the Volvo PPM. The court also noted that the dealers had the discretion to sell various financial products, including the Volvo PPM, and that servicing the PPM was not a material term of the Retailer Agreement. Therefore, Chapter 93B did not require Fidelity to reimburse the dealers at the statutory rates. View "Colony Place South, Inc. v. Volvo Car USA, LLC" on Justia Law

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Northstar Center, LLC filed a lawsuit against Lukenbill Family Partnership, LLLP, and Tundra Properties, LLC, alleging breach of contract and intentional interference with contract. Lukenbill had initially agreed to sell a 120-acre parcel to Templeton Enterprises, LLC, which later assigned its rights to Northstar. However, Lukenbill sold the property to Tundra instead. Northstar claimed Lukenbill breached their agreement, and Tundra intentionally interfered with the contract. Lukenbill sought indemnification from Tundra, and Tundra counterclaimed for breach of warranty deed against Lukenbill.The District Court of Williams County granted summary judgment in favor of Northstar on its breach of contract and intentional interference claims, and in favor of Lukenbill on its indemnification claim against Tundra. The court denied Tundra’s summary judgment motion on its breach of warranty claim against Lukenbill, concluding Tundra did not adequately brief the issue.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Northstar on its breach of contract and intentional interference claims, as genuine issues of material fact existed. The court also found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Lukenbill on its indemnification claim against Tundra. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Tundra’s breach of warranty claim against Lukenbill, as Tundra did not challenge the dismissal on the grounds that it could not maintain the claim without a certificate of authority to transact business in North Dakota.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Northstar Center v. Lukenbill Family Partnership" on Justia Law

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Mariusz Klin, the lead plaintiff, purchased Cloudera stock between its initial public offering (IPO) and a subsequent price drop following the company's announcement of negative quarterly earnings. Klin alleged that Cloudera, Inc. and its officers and directors made materially false and misleading statements and omissions about the technical capabilities of its products, particularly regarding their "cloud-native" nature.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Klin's first amended complaint for failure to state a claim, noting that Klin did not adequately explain what "cloud-native" meant at the time the statements were made. The court allowed Klin to file a second amended complaint, instructing him to provide a contemporaneous definition of "cloud-native" and explain why Cloudera's statements were false when made. Klin's second amended complaint was also dismissed for failing to meet the heightened pleading standards required for fraud claims, as it did not provide sufficient factual support for the definitions of the cloud-related terms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that Klin did not adequately plead the falsity of Cloudera's statements with the particularity required under Rule 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). The court noted that Klin's definitions of cloud-related terms lacked evidentiary support and that the cited blog post did not substantiate his claims. Additionally, the court found that Klin's reliance on later statements and product developments did not establish the falsity of the earlier statements.The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district court's decision to deny further leave to amend, concluding that additional amendments would be futile. Klin had not identified specific facts that could remedy the deficiencies in his complaint, and the court saw no reason to believe that another amendment would succeed. The court's decision to dismiss the case with prejudice was upheld. View "IN RE: MARIUSZ KLIN V. CLOUDERA, INC." on Justia Law