Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

Central Laborers instituted this action under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, section 220, to compel News Corp. to produce its books and records related to its acquisition of Shine. The court held that Section 220 permitted a stockholder to inspect books and records of a corporation if the stockholder complied with the procedural requirements of the statute and then showed a proper purpose for the inspection. Section 220 required a stockholder seeking to inspect books and records to establish that such stockholder had complied with the form and manner of making demand for inspection of such documents. Central Laborers had not made that showing. Because Central Laborers' Inspection Demand did not satisfy the procedural requirements of Section 220, it did not establish its standing to inspect the books and records of News Corp. On that basis alone, and without reaching the issue of proper purpose, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Central Laborers Pension Fund v. News Corp." on Justia Law

RAA appealed from a final judgment of the Superior Court that dismissed its complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). RAA's complaint alleged that Savage told RAA, one of several potential bidders for Savage, at the outset of their discussions that there was "no significant unrecorded liabilities or claims against Savage," but then during RAA's due diligence into Savage, Savage disclosed three such matters, which caused RAA to abandon negotiations for the transactions. The complaint contended that had RAA known of those matters at the outset, it never would have proceeded to consider purchasing Savage. Therefore, according to RAA, Savage should be liable for the entirety of RAA's alleged $1.2 million in due diligence and negotiation costs. The court held that, under Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the non-disclosure agreement (NDA), RAA acknowledged that in the event no final "Sale Agreement" on a transaction was reached, Savage would have no liability, and could not be sued, for any allegedly inaccurate or incomplete information provided by Savage to RAA during the due diligence process. The court also held that RAA could not rely on the peculiar-knowledge exception to support its claims. Finally, the court held that, when Savage and RAA entered into the NDA, both parties knew how the non-reliance clauses had been construed by Delaware courts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "RAA Management, LLC v. Savage Sports Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

The Vice Chancellor made an interim fee award of $2.5 million to plaintiff's attorneys, after the Court of Chancery's decision in Kurz v. Holbrook and the court's decision in Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v. Kurz. Delaware law rewarded plaintiffs' attorneys who provided a benefit to a Delaware corporation, even if the benefit did not produce immediate monetary rewards. The court held that the record supported the Vice Chancellor's factual finding that the voting rights preserved by the litigation were meaningful, and the court declined the invitation to fine tune the amount he awarded. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery.

Plaintiff filed this action against defendants claiming that defendants breached a limited partnership agreement under which another limited partnership was formed to seek out, acquire, and develop oil and gas producing properties through the use of three-dimensional seismic technology. At issue was whether the Court of Chancery abused its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's amended complaint for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff contended, that notwithstanding more than two years of inactivity, it established good cause for its failure to prosecute - change of counsel and settlement negotiations. The trial court found that plaintiff's showing was insufficient to overcome the long delay and the court found no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Series C-1 preferred shareholders, claiming that the forced conversion of their shares was unlawful, sued Omneon in the Superior Court for breach of contract. Those shareholders, as plaintiffs, claimed that, because the conversion of their preferred shares was integral to Harmonic's acquisition of Omneon, the conversion was part of a "Liquidation Event" under Omneon's certificate of incorporation, that entitled the shareholders to the liquidation "preference" payable for their shares. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Omneon, holding that under the plain language of Omneon's certificate of incorporation, only one series of preferred stock - the Series A-2.2 - was legally entitled to a liquidation preference payout. The shareholders were not entitled to a liquidation payout because the Series C-1 preferred shares had been validly converted into common stock before the Omneon-Orinda merger took place. The court agreed and concluded that the conversion was not part of a "Liquidation Event" as defined by Omneon's charter. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff filed this action seeking books and records from HP under 8 Del. C. 220. At issue was whether a letter concerning allegedly inappropriate conduct by a corporate executive should be kept under seal. The court held that the Court of Chancery acted well within its discretion in holding that the intervenor did not establish good cause to maintain the confidentiality of the letter and therefore, the letter should be unsealed.

Sagarra, a Spanish corporation, was a minority shareholder of Uniland, also a Spanish corporation. Sagarra brought a Court of Chancery action to rescind the sale, by CPV, of Giant, to Uniland. CPV was the controlling stockholder of both Giant and Uniland. Sagarra purported to sue derivatively on behalf of a wholly-owned Delaware subsidiary of Uniland, UAC, which was specifically created as the vehicle to acquire Giant. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Sagarra lacked standing to enforce a claim on behalf of UAC. The Court of Chancery held that Sagarra's standing to sue was governed by Spanish law, because Uniland - the only entity in which Sagarra owned stock - was incorporated in Spain. The court upheld the Court of Chancery's reasoning and judgment because Sagarra failed to satisfy the demand requirements of Spanish law.

Plaintiff brought this action under 8 Del. C. 220 to inspect certain books and records of defendant. More specifically, plaintiff sought to inspect one document that defendant refused voluntarily to disclose: an interim report (Covington Report) prepared by defendant's outside counsel in connection with an internal investigation into sexual harassment allegations made against defendant's former CEO. The Court of Chancery denied plaintiff relief and held that plaintiff had not demonstrated a need to inspect the Covington Report sufficient to overcome the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity protections. The court affirmed, but on the alternative ground that plaintiff had not shown that the Covington report was essential to his stated purpose, which was to investigate possible corporate wrongdoing.

Liberty commenced this action against the Trustee under the Indenture, seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that the proposed Capital Splitoff would not constitute a disposition of "substantially all" of Liberty's assets in violation of the Indenture. The Court of Chancery concluded, after a trial, that the four transactions at issue should not be aggregated, and entered judgment for Liberty. The Court of Chancery concluded that the proposed splitoff was not "sufficiently connected" to the prior transactions to warrant aggregation for purposes of the Successor Obligor Provision. The court agreed with the judgment of the Court of Chancery and affirmed.

CML, a junior secured creditor of JetDirect, sued JetDirect's present and former officers directly and derivatively for breaching their fiduciary duties. The Vice Chancellor dismissed all four of CML's claims. The court affirmed the judgment because CML, as a JetDirector creditor, lacked standing to sue derivatively on JetDirect's behalf.