Justia Business Law Opinion Summaries

In 1988, Faith Lutheran Church of Great Falls, Inc., which held certain property in its own name, affiliated with the Evangelical Lutheran Church of America (ELCA) denomination. In 2010, seventy-one percent of members voted to terminate Faith Lutheran’s affiliation with ELCA. Thereafter, the majority continued as Faith Lutheran, and approximately half of the minority formed the group that would become New Hope Lutheran Ministry. New Hope subsequently filed an action seeking a declaration that the minority was the rightful owner of all church property, including property held by the Foundation for the Endowment of Faith Lutheran Church, Inc. The district court determined that New Hope was entitled to all Faith Lutheran property and all property held by the Foundation. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that New Hope was entitled to property held by Faith Lutheran because the ninety percent super-majority necessary for Faith Lutheran to retain the property under its constitution was not obtained; but (2) erred in holding that New Hope was entitled to the Foundation’s property because New Hope failed to prove that an express trust existed over the Foundation’s property in favor of the church members. View "New Hope Lutheran Ministry v. Faith Lutheran Church of Great Falls, Inc." on Justia Law

C.R. Weaver formed Mikart Transport, LLC in January 2011. At that time, the articles of organization named Weaver and Michael Smith as members or managers. In March 2011, Smith submitted a credit application with Tri-County Implement, Inc. After Smith failed to pay Tri-County for work it performed on two vehicles, including a Volvo semi-truck titled in Weaver's name, Tri-County refused to release the Volvo from its possession pursuant to its asserted agisters' lien on the vehicle. Weaver subsequently filed a complaint against Tri-County. In response, Tri-County filed a counterclaim against Weaver and a third-party complaint against Mikart. The district court entered judgment against Mikart, ordering it to pay for the work it performed, and awarded Tri-County attorney fees and costs. The court also held Mikart, Smith, and Weaver jointly and severally liable for these amounts. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the district court's imposition of personal liability on Weaver for the work performed on the two vehicles, as there was no basis to hold Weaver individually liable for the obligations of Mikart to Tri-County. Remanded. View "Tri-County Implement, Inc. v. Weaver" on Justia Law

Bank and Lumber Company had business and financial relationships with Sawmill. A few years into its operation, Sawmill began experiencing serious financial difficulties. Sawmill defaulted on approximately $1.4 million in loan obligations to Bank and owed Lumber Company approximately $900,000. Proceedings were initiated in bankruptcy court and district court. While the cases were pending, Sawmill was destroyed by fire. Bank recovered approximately $980,000 from Sawmill's insurance proceeds. In a subsequent case between Bank and Lumber Company, the jury determined that neither Bank nor Lumber Company was entitled to recover damages from the other. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit into evidence a particular letter written by the Bank president. View "H.E. Simpson Lumber Co. v. Three Rivers Bank of Mont." on Justia Law

Pam, Allan, and Charles and Mary Lou Dees (the Dees) started a business, Great Falls Portables, Inc. (GFP), with Allan acting as sole manager of the business. Pam subsequently took over management. The Dees later filed a complaint against Pam, GFP, and others. A month later, Pam and Allan, who were married but separated, entered into a settlement agreement that provided that Pam would be responsible to the Dees for any obligation owed them in connection with their interest in GFP. In litigation with the Dees, Pam filed a third-party complaint against Allan, alleging (1) the Dees' complaint arose out of Allan's fraudulent activity (Count I), (2) Allan had fraudulently induced Pam to enter the agreement assigning responsibility for the Dees' interest (Count II), and (3) Allan must indemnify her from liability to the Dees (Count III). The district court granted summary judgment to Allan on all three counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that (1) Pam failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity; (2) Pam failed to show reliance on Allan's representations; and (3) Count III of Pam's complaint was dependent on and related back to Counts I and II. View "Fossen v. Fossen" on Justia Law

This case arose out of several business transactions entered into by parties involved in the development of condominiums on Hauser Lake. Cherrad, Merritt & Marie, and Max & V (the Hale interests) were limited liability companies owned by Conrad and Cheryl Hale. Craig Kinnaman was sole proprietor of a business called CK Design. Merritt & Marie purchased the Hauser Lake property. Subsequently, the Hales and Kinnaman agreed to develop a portion of the property. Cherrad was the developer, and Mountain West Bank (MWB) made three loans to Cherrad to develop the project. CK Design suffered delays in the project and later left the project. In 2007, Kinnaman committed suicide, and the Estate recorded a $3.3 million construction lien on the condominiums. MWB brought this action 2008 against the Hale interests and the Estate seeking foreclosure on the three secured loans. The Hale interests and the Estate cross-claimed against each other. The district court (1) declared the Estate's construction lien invalid; and (2) determined Cherrad owed the Estate $76,278 for work that CK Design performed on the project. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mountain West Bank, N.A. v. Cherrad, LLC" on Justia Law

Employee was injured while working for Employer. Because Employer failed to retain current worker's compensation insurance, Employee filed a claim with the Uninsured Employer's Fund, which the Fund accepted. The Fund sought indemnity from Employer for Employee's damages, and the parties agreed to an interim payment plan. However, the Fund ultimately turned Employer over to collection. Employer responded by suing the Fund for breach of contract. The district court granted Employer's summary judgment motion on the issue of whether the Fund had breached the repayment agreement. The district court then awarded damages to Employer in the amount of $198,749. The damages awarded largely centered on the court's implicit conclusion that the Fund's actions had interfered with Employer's ability to obtain financing, which, in turn, hurt Employer's sales. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly (1) determined Employer was entitled to summary judgment on the question of whether the Fund had breached the payment plan agreement; (2) determined Employer could receive consequential damages for the Fund's breach of contract; (3) denied the Fund's motion for post-trial relief; (3) calculated damages; and (4) denied Employer's damage claim for ten years of lost profits. View "Elk Mountain Motor Sports, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus." on Justia Law

Johnson Farms, Inc. and Floyd Johnson filed a complaint against Ethel Halland alleging (1) in her capacity as secretary of Johnson Farms, Inc., Ethel breached her fiduciary duties by diverting corporate funds to herself and others; and (2) Ethel conferred gifts to herself and other family members in contravention of a written trust agreement. The district court granted Ethel's motion for summary judgment, finding that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations and that equitable estoppel did not toll the statute of limitations. The district court also awarded Ethel attorneys' fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Johnson's claims were barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) the district court did not err in awarding Ethel attorneys' fees and costs. View "Johnson Farms, Inc. v. Halland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking a judicial resolution of an LLC in which both Plaintiffs and Defendants held ownership interests. The district court ordered judicial dissolution and appointment of a receiver after finding that the managing member of the LLC, one of the defendants, had never operated the LLC in conformity with the operating agreement and had acted in a manner that was unduly prejudicial to Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there were substantial undisputed facts to support the district court's order for dissolution under Mont. Code Ann. 35-8-902(1), and the district court properly applied the statute; and (2) the district court properly denied Defendants' motion to amend their answer to add counterclaims because Defendants were required to arbitrate such claims under the operating agreement. View "Gordon v. Kuzara" on Justia Law

Pro se litigant Sharon McCrea appealed a district court's judgment that awarded over eight thousand dollars to CBM Collections, a Missoula collection agency. McCrea owned a business which had an outstanding credit card bill with the Missoula Federal Credit Union (MFCU). She was notified that the debts were being assigned to CBM for collection. CBM subsequently filed its complaint to seek the full amount owned plus interest. McCrea answered, arguing that MFCU was unfairly and deliberately targeting her for collection and that the matter should be "remanded" to the credit union so that she could continue making incremental payments. McCrea did not deny owing the debts. She sought discovery of credit card statements and cell phone billing statements to establish she had been in regular contact with MFCU in an attempt to resolve the matter. The district court granted CBM's motion for judgment on the pleadings without ruling on McCrea's discovery request and entered the award. Finding no error in the district court's ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "CBI Inc. v. McCrea" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant John Dilley appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee City of Missoula. The district court concluded the City acted within its legal authority when it purchased the Missoula Civic Stadium with tax increment financing (TIF) funds designated for urban renewal. The stadium was originally planned and developed by Play Ball Missoula, Inc. (Play Ball), a volunteer, non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of bringing a minor league baseball team to Missoula. In 2000, Play Ball and the City entered a development agreement that permitted Play Ball to finance and construct a stadium on blighted City property and later convey the facility to the City. Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed suit prior to the City's acquisition of the stadium, alleging the planned purchase using TIF funds was an "illegal payoff of private enterprise debt." On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erroneously failed to specify which provision under Title 7, Chapter 15, Part 42 of the Montana Code that permitted the "payoff." He also argued that the City could not make such an expenditure of TIF funds simply because the practice was not prohibited by statute. Finding that the City's use of TIF money to acquire the stadium was a proper exercise of its urban renewal posers, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the City's favor. View "Dilley v. City of Missoula" on Justia Law